The Supreme Court held that a law made applicable to "all suits pending on or instituted after the commencement of this Act" also reaches a suit whose appeal was pending, so the High Court rightly cut the interest in a mortgage decree to 7 1/2 per cent under the amended Usurious Loans Act (paras 4, 10). If a new law expressly or by clear intendment takes in pending matters, an appeal court may apply it even after the trial court's judgment (para 9).
By a majority, the Supreme Court held that an appellate or revisional court can act under Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 for an offender under 21 convicted before the Act reached his district, and sent the case back to the High Court (paras 8, 30). "But an ex post facto law which only mollifies the rigour of a criminal law does not fall within the said prohibition" of Article 20 (para 6). Justice Raghubar Dayal dissented (para 29).
A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court acquitted two men sentenced to death for dacoity with murder, holding that a co-accused's confession under Section 30 of the Evidence Act is not substantive evidence: "the court cannot start with the confession of a co-accused person; it must begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution" (para 13). The remaining blood-stain evidence was insufficient (para 15).
The Supreme Court restored a booking clerk's conviction under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. A Sub-Inspector had investigated before getting a magistrate's permission under Section 5A, but a fresh investigation followed and no prejudice was shown; "there must be a sufficient nexus, either established or probabilized, between the conviction and the irregularity in the investigation" (paras 10-12). Justice Mudholkar held the preliminary enquiry was not investigation at all (para 16).
In Raja Ram Jaiswal v. State of Bihar (1963 INSC 84), the Supreme Court held by majority that an Excise Inspector deemed by section 78(3) of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915 to be an officer in charge of a police station is a police officer under Section 25 of the Evidence Act, so a confession recorded by him in an investigation is inadmissible (paras 11, 15). The test is whether his police powers tend to facilitate obtaining a confession (para 12). As the confession was also barred by section 162 of the Code and the conviction could not stand without it, the appeal was allowed (paras 7, 28).
The Supreme Court held that under Section 24 of the Evidence Act a court need only form a prima facie opinion, not strict proof, that a confession was caused by a threat, inducement or promise (para 4). A retracted confession may found a conviction, but as a general rule of practice it should be true, voluntary and corroborated in material particulars (para 6). Taking a file from an office and returning it the next day is theft, because temporary dispossession causes wrongful loss (paras 7-8).
The Supreme Court set aside a postman's conviction for secreting registered letters under Section 52 of the Post Office Act, 1898, because the almirah where they were found was not shown to be in his exclusive possession; his father produced the key (paras 11, 13). It held that "even assuming that the search was illegal the seizure of the articles is not vitiated" (para 5), and that entrustment is not an ingredient of secreting (para 7).
By a 2:1 majority, the Supreme Court held in 1961 that Customs Officers are not "police officers" under Section 25 of the Evidence Act, so an engine driver's confessional statements to Land Customs officials about smuggled gold were admissible, and his conviction was restored (paras 25-26). Their powers serve the levy of customs duties, not the prevention and detection of crime (paras 8, 10-11). Subba Rao J. dissented, holding a Customs Officer a police officer for his police functions (para 39).
An eleven-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that compelling an accused to give specimen handwriting, signatures or finger, palm or foot impressions does not make him a witness against himself under Article 20(3) (paras 18, 36). Mere police custody or questioning is not compulsion (paras 16-17). Section 27 of the Evidence Act is valid unless the information was compelled (paras 10, 37). Article 20(3) needs the person to be an accused when he made the statement (para 20).
A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of assault complaints against income-tax investigation officials for want of sanction under Section 197 CrPC, holding that "There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty" (para 19). The need for sanction may be decided at any stage (para 20), and Section 197 does not violate Article 14 (para 14).
In M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi (1954 INSC 24), the Supreme Court held that a search and seizure of documents under a magistrate's warrant does not compel the accused to be a witness against himself under Article 20(3). A Bench of eight Judges, speaking through Jagannadhadas J., read the guarantee widely: to be a witness is to furnish evidence, by documents as well as by words, and the protection is available to a person against whom a formal accusation, there a First Information Report, has been made (paras 11-12). But a search warrant is addressed to an officer, and the search is not the occupier's testimonial act (para 24). The petitions were dismissed (paras 26, 28).
In Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1952 AIR 159), the Supreme Court held that the confession of an accused is not evidence against a co-accused in the ordinary sense and cannot be the foundation of a conviction: a court must first weigh the other evidence without it and may then use the confession only to lend assurance to that evidence (paras 8-11). Applying that test, it set aside the appellant’s conviction for the murder of a five-year-old boy and convicted him only under Section 201 IPC (paras 43, 45).











