The Supreme Court set aside an NDPS conviction for possessing 11 grams of opium because the officer was not shown to have sent the recorded information to his superior under Section 42(2) and did not tell the accused of his Section 50 right. Asking him whether he should be searched before senior officers or a Gazetted officer was not enough; the accused had to be told of his right and given the option (paras 5-7).
The Supreme Court upheld an opium conviction although the seizure memo and samples were prepared at the customs office, not at the spot. A seizure mahazar should normally be prepared on the spot, but a procedural illegality does not make the evidence inadmissible; the court asks whether serious prejudice was caused. The accused was present throughout and no tampering was alleged (paras 10, 16-17).
The Supreme Court cancelled the bail of a man caught with 7 kg of opium. The High Court had mentioned Section 37 of the NDPS Act but ignored its conditions, and granted bail on a second application without any change in circumstances. Under Section 37 negation of bail is the rule, and a repeat application without changed circumstances amounts to an impermissible review (paras 6, 8-10).
The Supreme Court upheld Section 82 of the Andhra Pradesh Endowments Act, 1987, which cancels agricultural leases of religious and charitable institutions except those of landless poor persons, reversing the High Court (para 17). "What Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits is class legislation and not classification for purpose of legislation" (para 8); tenants of such institutions form a separate class, and a law cannot be struck down on guesswork about how it will work (paras 12, 15).
The Supreme Court upheld an NDPS conviction for possessing 25 ampoules of Tidigesic, rejecting challenges under Sections 42, 50 and 57. Where information reached officers on patrol and immediate action was needed to catch the accused, not recording it first did not violate Section 42. Informing the accused orally of his Section 50 right is enough, and sending the FIR and records to the superior was substantial compliance with Section 57 (paras 7, 10, 12).
A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court upheld a broker's conviction for dishonour of four cheques, each for crores of rupees, issued to Standard Chartered Bank in 1991-92 (paras 16, 39). It held that the presumptions under Sections 138 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are mandatory, that they "do not conflict with the presumption of innocence", and that they are rebutted only by proof making the defence probable to a prudent man (paras 21-23).
"To have speedy justice is a fundamental right which flows from Article 21 of the Constitution", the Supreme Court held, suspending the life sentence of an elderly woman whose 1997 appeal had not been listed in the Madhya Pradesh High Court (paras 1, 4, 5). It said convicts whose appeals are not decided within five years, for no fault of theirs, may be released on bail, and asked Chief Justices to set up regular benches (para 4).
In Gurbax Singh v. State of Haryana (2001 INSC 74), the Supreme Court held that Section 50 of the NDPS Act applies only where the person of the accused is searched, not where, as the State pointed out, the poppy straw came from the gunny bag he was holding (paras 4-8). It still set aside his conviction under Section 15: the seal stayed with the panch witness for ten days, the parcels were not sealed under Section 55 and no Section 57 report was made (paras 9-10).
Allowing the State's appeal against acquittal in the rape and death of a four-year-old girl, the Supreme Court held that "there is no requirement either under Section 27 of the Evidence Act or under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to obtain signature of independent witnesses on the record in which statement of an accused is written" (para 21). It restored the rape convictions with life imprisonment and convicted both men of culpable homicide not amounting to murder (para 26).
A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held Section 32A of the NDPS Act unconstitutional to the extent that it bars appellate courts from suspending sentences: a right of appeal without that power "would be unjust, unfair and violative of Article 21" (paras 17, 25). The bar on executive suspension, remission and commutation was upheld and severed (paras 15, 26). Suspension remains subject to Section 37's conditions, and Section 32A does not bar parole (paras 10, 27, 29).
The Supreme Court set aside a ten-year NDPS sentence for possession of about 9 grams of charas because the police refused the accused's request to be searched before a Magistrate (paras 2, 6). Rejecting the State's plea that Section 50 does not apply when a gazetted officer searches, it held that the suspect's right "cannot be taken away, merely because the officer going to search happens to be a gazetted officer" (para 4).
A three-judge Supreme Court bench held that poppy husk falls within poppy straw under Section 2(xviii) of the NDPS Act, so possessing it is an offence under Section 15. Poppy straw covers all parts of the opium poppy except the seeds, and for Section 15 it does not matter whether the husk contains more than 0.2 per cent morphine. The appeals were dismissed (paras 14-16).










