The Supreme Court restored the acquittal of an auto-rickshaw driver found carrying charas worth Rs 5.29 lakh in gunny bags. The police inspector acted on a tip-off without writing it down or informing his superior, which was total non-compliance with Section 42 of the NDPS Act; such action becomes suspect and prejudices the accused. The driver also rebutted the Section 35 presumption of culpable mental state (paras 13, 17, 21-23).
In Kalema Tumba v. State of Maharashtra (1999 INSC 420), the Supreme Court held that the duty under Section 50 of the NDPS Act to tell an accused of his right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate arises only when his person is to be searched: a drug found in a bag he carries is not found from his ‘person’ (para 4). It upheld the conviction of a Zaire national whose bag held 2 kg of heroin (paras 1, 7).
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the man who shot Sant Longowal in 1985 under the TADA Act of 1985, which allowed only death for a terrorist act causing death, but commuted his death sentence to life imprisonment (paras 24, 37). Because Section 25 of TADA 1987 overrides inconsistent enactments, "the exclusivity of the extreme sentence contained in Section 3(2) of TADA 1985 must stand superseded by the corresponding benevolent provision in TADA 1987" (para 35).
A five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that an empowered officer about to search a person on prior information must inform him of his right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. Failure does not vitiate the trial, but renders the recovery suspect and vitiates a conviction resting only on contraband recovered from his person. Such contraband cannot by itself prove possession, and no Section 54 presumption can arise from an illegal search (paras 78, 93).
The Supreme Court upheld a heroin conviction, holding that the reliable oral evidence of the officer who conducted the search can establish compliance with Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act. T.P. Razak did not lay down a rule requiring independent or documentary support (paras 4-6). A confession recorded while the accused was in custody was not involuntary for that reason alone; his vague, belated retraction did not displace it, and a discrepancy in the sample's weight did not create a doubt (paras 7-8).
In a public interest case begun by a letter about deaths in police lock-ups, the Supreme Court held that torture in custody falls within the inhibition of Article 21 and laid down eleven requirements to be followed in all cases of arrest or detention (paras 23, 37). Non-compliance invites departmental action and contempt proceedings (para 38). Compensation in public law for such violations rests on strict liability, to which sovereign immunity is no defence (para 57).
Where TADA severely restricts bail, the trial must "proceed and conclude within a reasonable time", and release on bail "embedded in the right of a speedy trial" may be needed to meet Article 21, the Supreme Court held (para 6). Faced with 14,446 pending TADA cases and 248 Designated Courts, it sorted undertrials into four groups and directed bail, as a one-time measure, for those held five, three or two years according to their role (paras 2, 13-14, 16).
The Supreme Court held that Section 50 of the NDPS Act only requires the accused to be offered the option of being searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate; once he takes it, the searching officer, not the accused, chooses the nearest one conveniently available (para 2). Finding the construction plain, the Bench of Justices J.S. Verma and B.N. Kirpal declined to refer the question to a three-Judge Bench and dismissed the special leave petition (paras 3-4).
In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Shri Pirthi Chand (1995 INSC 815), the Supreme Court held that a Sessions Judge was not justified in discharging an accused under the NDPS Act, after the charge-sheet was filed, because Section 50 had not been complied with: whether the accused was told of his right, and whether the officer breached the requirement, is a question of fact to be proved at the trial (paras 3, 13). It added that the High Court’s power to quash a charge-sheet is an exceptional one (para 11).
A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that courts cannot presume, as an official act regularly performed, that the searching officer told the accused of his right under Section 50 of the NDPS Act to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate (paras 9-10). Without evidence of that, possession is not established and the accused must be acquitted (para 10). The appellants' convictions for possessing charas were set aside (paras 13-15).
A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that Section 4(1) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 does not apply to suits, claims or actions filed before it came into force on 19 May 1988, and that Section 4(2) does not bar a benami defence already allowed in a pending suit (para 21). It held that Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare does not lay down correct law on this point (para 21).
In Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee Representing Undertrial Prisoners v. Union of India (1994 INSC 456), the Supreme Court held that once an NDPS undertrial whose trial is delayed has suffered imprisonment of half the maximum punishment, further detention violates Article 21 read with Article 14. As the offences are grave, it refused to quash the prosecutions, but gave one-time directions for release on bail, with conditions and exceptions, despite Section 37 (paras 15-16). It also held that a Special Court is constituted only when its Judge is appointed (para 14).









