Barkat Ram (1961): Customs Officers Not Police Officers

Customs Officers Are Not Police Officers Under Section 25 Evidence Act: Supreme Court (1961)

Published: 11 October 2026 · NyayVidhan

By a 2:1 majority, the Supreme Court held in 1961 that Customs Officers are not "police officers" under Section 25 of the Evidence Act, so an engine driver's confessional statements to Land Customs officials about smuggled gold were admissible, and his conviction was restored (paras 25-26). Their powers serve the levy of customs duties, not the prevention and detection of crime (paras 8, 10-11). Subba Rao J. dissented, holding a Customs Officer a police officer for his police functions (para 39).

Key holdings

Customs Officers are not police officers for the purpose of Section 25 of the Evidence Act (para 25).

Possessing some powers similar to those of the police, for detecting smuggling, does not make an officer a police officer (paras 11, 20).

A statement recorded in a Section 171-A enquiry, which is a judicial proceeding, is not a confession to a police officer (para 23).

The majority left open whether officers given the powers of an officer in charge of a police station are police officers (para 27).

Subba Rao J., dissenting, held that a Customs Officer is a police officer in his police functions, so a confession to him cannot be proved (paras 38-39).

Brief Facts

Barkat Ram drove the engine of a train that reached Amritsar from Pakistan on 8 June 1957 (para 2). Acting on information about gold smuggling by the engine crew, Land Customs staff searched the engine and recovered gold concealed under the coal in its tender (para 2). In statements to a Customs Inspector he admitted bringing 65 bars of gold from Pakistan (para 2). He was convicted under Section 23(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and Section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act, and the appellate court confirmed it (para 3). In revision the High Court set aside the conviction, holding Customs Officers to be police officers whose confessions were inadmissible, and the State appealed (para 3).

Court's Findings

For the majority, Raghubar Dayal J. said the police are the instrument for preventing and detecting crime, while Customs Officers' powers exist to check smuggling and realise customs duties (paras 7-8). A Customs Officer "is more concerned with the goods and customs duty, than with the offender" (para 10). Possessing some powers similar to those of the police, for detecting smuggling, does not make him a police officer (paras 11, 20). Section 25 was enacted to exclude confessions to the regular police, given their methods; the Legislature could not have meant it to cover officers later entrusted with preventing smuggling (para 17). The Sea Customs Act itself treats police officers and Customs Officers separately (para 21). An enquiry under Section 171-A is deemed a judicial proceeding, and a police officer never acts judicially (para 23). It would be incongruous for such statements to support penalties but be inadmissible at a criminal trial (para 24). Dissenting, Subba Rao J. held that an officer "on whom a statute substantially confers the powers and imposes the duties of the police is a police officer within the meaning of s. 25 of the Evidence Act" (para 38).

Legal Principle

Customs Officers under the Sea Customs Act, and Land Customs Officers to whom its provisions apply, are not police officers under Section 25 of the Evidence Act, because their powers serve the levy of customs duties rather than the prevention and detection of crime; confessions made to them are admissible (paras 10-11, 25).

Precedents Relied Upon

Maqbool Hussain's case [1953] SCR 730
Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 11
The powers of search, arrest and detention are given to the Customs Authorities for the levy of sea customs duties, with a reference to the Magistrate where search warrants or detention are needed.
Thomas Dana v. State of Punjab [1959] Supp. 1 SCR 274
Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 11, 20
The entries in the Schedule to Section 167 are not criminal offences; Customs Officers have only limited powers of search and summons, and the Collector's proceedings were revenue proceedings (the print reads ‘The estate of Punjab’).
R. v. Hurribole Chunder Ghose (1876) I.L.R. 1 Cal. 207
Referred To Discussed at ¶ 15, 34
A Deputy Commissioner of Police invested with magisterial powers is a police officer; Section 25 is read in a wide and popular sense (the majority calls it ‘R. v. Hurribole’, the dissent ‘The Queen v. Hurribole Chunder Ghose’).

View all precedents (15)

Ameen Sharif v. Emperor (1934) I.L.R. 61 Cal. 607
Referred To Discussed at ¶ 20, 34
Revenue officers may be regarded as police officers only when exercising the powers of police officers.
Ibrahim v. Emperor A.I.R. 1944 Lah. 57
Referred To Discussed at ¶ 20
Similar view to Ameen Sharif, relied upon on behalf of the respondent.
Public Prosecutor v. Paramasivam A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 917
Referred To Discussed at ¶ 20, 34
An excise officer invested with the powers of an officer in charge of a police station under Section 20A of the Opium Act is a police officer (the majority's footnote reads ‘A. I. R. 1953 Mad. 91’).
Leo Roy Frey v. The Superintendent, District Jail, Amritsar [1958] SCR 822
Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 23
Customs Officers act judicially when they impose confiscation and penalties under the Sea Customs Act.
Shewpujanrai Indrasanrai Ltd. v. The Collector of Customs [1959] SCR 821
Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 23
Customs Officers act judicially when they impose confiscation and penalties under the Sea Customs Act.
Queen-Empress v. Babulal (1884) I.L.R. 6 All. 509
Referred To Discussed at ¶ 32
Section 25 was enacted because of police malpractices in extorting confessions (cited in the dissent).
Nanoo v. Emperor (1927) I.L.R. Bom. 78
Referred To Discussed at ¶ 34
An Abkari Officer was held a police officer under Section 25 (cited in the dissent; the volume is printed as ‘S.’).
Radha Kishun Marwari v. King Emperor (1932) I.L.R. 12 Pat. 46
Referred To Discussed at ¶ 35
An Excise Officer merely invested with police powers is not a police officer; Subba Rao J., dissenting, did not accept it as correct.
In re Mayalavahanam I.L.R. [1947] Mad. 788
Referred To Discussed at ¶ 36
An Assistant Inspector of Customs is not a police officer under Section 25 (cited in the dissent).
Gopal Dass v. The State A.I.R. 1959 Punjab 113
Referred To Discussed at ¶ 37
A Customs Officer under the Sea Customs Act has powers analogous to police powers and is a police officer (cited in the dissent; the print reads ‘Punjab 1 13’).
Fernandez v. State A.I.R. 1953 Cal. 219
Referred To Discussed at ¶ 37
A Customs Officer is a police officer under Section 25 (cited in the dissent).
Issa Yacub v. State of Mysore A.I.R. 1961 Mysore 7
Referred To Discussed at ¶ 37
A Customs Officer is not a police officer under Section 25 (cited in the dissent).

Customs Officers Are Not Police Officers Under Section 25 Evidence Act: Supreme Court (1961)

Judgment Intelligence

Key holdings

Brief Facts

Court's Findings

Legal Principle

Precedents Relied Upon

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