Judgment Intelligence
Conviction Set Aside- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of Decision
- 3 February 1964
- Bench
- Chief Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar (author) for a Constitution Bench; the JUDIS header lists Chief Justice B.P. Sinha and Justices K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta, J.C. Shah and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar
- Relevant Acts & Sections
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — Sections 3, 30, 114 illustration (b), 133; Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 396
The appeals were allowed; the convictions and sentences of the two appellants were set aside and they were acquitted (para 17).
Key holdings
- A confession under Section 30 is not evidence as defined in Section 3 of the Evidence Act, though the court may take it into consideration (paras 11-12).
- The court cannot begin with a co-accused's confession; it must first evaluate the other evidence and may then turn to the confession for assurance (paras 13-14).
- Accomplice evidence under Section 133 is substantive evidence that needs corroboration, but a co-accused's confession stands on a different footing (paras 13-14).
- Ram Prakash v. State of Punjab did not depart from these settled principles (para 14).
- Where the other evidence is wholly unsatisfactory, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt however grave the suspicion (paras 15-16).
Brief Facts
Court's Findings
Legal Principle
Precedents Relied Upon
- Ram Prakash v. State of Punjab [1959] S.C.R. 1219 (footnoted once as [1959] S.C.R. 1291)
The observation that a co-accused's retracted confession is extremely weak and needs the fullest corroboration was not meant to treat such a confession like accomplice evidence; there the other evidence was itself strong. The High Court misread it.
- Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbutty (1911) I.L.R. 38 Cal. 559
A confession can only be used to lend assurance to other evidence against a co-accused (name printed ‘Chuckerbuttv’).
- In re Peryaswami Moopan (1913) I.L.R. 54 Mad. 75
Where there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to support his conviction, a Section 30 confession may be thrown into the scale as an additional reason for believing it (name printed ‘Peryaswami Noopan’).
View all precedents (5)
- Bhuboni Sahu v. The King (1949) 76 I.A. 147
Privy Council: a co-accused's confession is evidence of a very weak type, not within Section 3, untested by cross-examination; it can be weighed with other evidence but cannot by itself amount to proof.
- Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1952] S.C.R. 526
Approved Bhuboni Sahu: the court begins with the other evidence and turns to the co-accused's confession only for assurance (citation printed ‘[19521 S.C.R. 526’).
