Judgment Intelligence
Petition DismissedSmt. Dayawati and Another v. Inderjit and Others
Civil Appeal No. 246 of 1964; reported as AIR 1966 SC 1423 and (1966) 3 SCR 275
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of Decision
- 14 January 1966
- Bench
- Justices M. Hidayatullah, K. Subba Rao and R.S. Bachawat
- Relevant Acts & Sections
- Usurious Loans Act, 1918 — Section 3; Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act — Sections 5, 6
Final Outcome
The appeal was dismissed with costs (para 11).
Key holdings
- Ordinarily an appeal court decides rights under the law in force on the date of suit, but a new law that expressly or by clear intendment takes in pending matters may be applied in appeal (para 9).
- Law affecting procedure is always retrospective; the distinction from vested rights does not matter when the law itself requires taking away what a successful plaintiff obtained (para 9).
- A suit pending at a statute's commencement means a live suit, whether in the trial court or in an appeal court; only suits ending in an executable decree that cannot be reopened are excluded (para 10).
- After the 1956 extension to Delhi, interest above 7 1/2 per cent on a secured loan had to be treated as excessive and reduced (paras 4, 8, 10).
Brief Facts
A preliminary mortgage decree of 12 August 1953 awarded the full interest claimed (para 2). While the mortgagor's first appeal was pending, the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act was extended to Delhi on 8 June 1956; its Section 5 amended Section 3 of the Usurious Loans Act to treat interest above 7 1/2 per cent on secured loans as excessive, and Section 6 applied it to all suits pending on or instituted after its commencement (paras 1, 4). The High Court, on the judgment-debtors' application, reduced the interest (paras 4, 5, 6). The decree-holders appealed by special leave (paras 6, 7).
Court's Findings
The amended Section 3 is mandatory: a court must reopen the transaction and must treat interest above 7 1/2 per cent as excessive (para 8). Ordinarily an appeal court cannot apply a new law made after the judgment under appeal, since rights are determined under the law in force on the date of suit; procedural law is always retrospective, but substantive rights are not absolutely inviolable (para 9). If the new law expressly or by clear intendment takes in pending matters, the appeal court may give effect to it even after the trial court's judgment, and may take away what a successful plaintiff obtained under it (para 9). Section 6 is clearly retrospective (para 10). An appeal is a part of the cause, and a preliminary decree does not end a mortgage suit; reading 'suit' otherwise would leave the anomaly that a remanded suit attracts the law while the appeal court cannot apply it (para 10).
Legal Principle
A statute applying to suits pending at its commencement covers a live suit at any stage before an executable decree that cannot be reopened, including a pending appeal. Where a new law expressly or by clear intendment takes in pending matters, an appeal court may apply it (paras 9, 10).
Precedents Relied Upon
- L. Ram Sukh Das v. Hafiz-ul-Rahman and others A.I.R. 1945 Lah. 177
Followed by the High Court: the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act applies where a decree has been passed and an appeal is pending when the amendment comes into force.
- Quilter v. Mapleson (1892) 9 Q.B.D. 672
Instance of a new law applied after judgment, taking away a landlord's vested right to recover possession.
- Stovin v. Fairbrass [1919] 88 L.J. K.B. 1004
Instance of a new law applied after judgment, taking away a statutory tenant's vested right to remain in possession.
View all precedents (5)
- Mukerjee (K. C.) v. Mst. Ramaraton 63 I.A. 47
No saving for pending suits was implied where the amended Bihar Tenancy Act provisions clearly applied to all cases without exception.
- Attorney General v. Sillem 11 E.R. 1200 at 1209
An appeal is the right of entering a superior court and invoking its aid to redress the error of the court below (Lord Westbury).
