Judgment Intelligence
Conviction Set Aside- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of Decision
- 4 April 1963
- Bench
- Justices K. Subba Rao, J.R. Mudholkar and Raghubar Dayal
- Relevant Acts & Sections
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 25; Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915 — Sections 47(a), 77, 78; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 — Sections 156, 162
Appeal allowed. The conviction under section 47(a) of the Excise Act and the sentences of one year's rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2,000 are set aside (paras 1, 28); Raghubar Dayal J. agreed in the result for different reasons (concurring, paras 29, 90).
Source Supreme Court of India, judgment dated 4 April 1963 · Court's copy
Key holdings
- Police officer in Section 25 is read in a wide and popular sense, not confined to the police force (paras 10-11).
- The test is the kind of powers an officer has, not their totality or his dominant purpose (para 12).
- The power of investigation establishes the direct link with the bar in Section 25 (para 13).
- An Excise Inspector deemed an officer in charge of a police station under the Bihar Act is a police officer (para 11).
- A statement to him during the investigation is also barred by section 162 of the Code (para 28).
- Raghubar Dayal J. disagreed on both points but would not act on a confession he doubted was voluntary (concurring, paras 89-90).
Case explainer by NyayVidhan: an account of this judgment and the law it laid down, not the court's text. The judgment itself is the authoritative version.
Brief Facts
Questions before the Court (framed by NyayVidhan)
- Without the confession, could the conviction stand?
- When is an officer who is not a member of the police force a police officer under Section 25?
- Was the Excise Inspector such an officer, and did section 162 of the Code also bar the confession?
Submissions
For the appellant. The confessional statement, Exhibit 3, on which the High Court relied to support three prosecution witnesses, was inadmissible under Section 25 of the Evidence Act and under section 162 of the Code, because the Excise Inspector recorded it while investigating an excise offence under Chapter XIV; without it the evidence was insufficient in law (paras 3, 8).
For the State. Where a statute gives a public servant a wide range of duties and powers, conferring only some of a police officer's powers does not make him one: the sum total of his powers and the dominant purpose of his appointment must be considered (para 12).
Court's Findings
The confession was decisive
The seizure memo had been materially altered and could not be relied on, and the High Court had not believed even the direct evidence unaided by the confession (para 6). With six persons in the car and the boot openable with the driver's keys too, exclusive possession could not be found without the confession (para 7).
The test for a police officer
As in Barkat Ram, the words are read in a wide and popular sense, but not to cover persons with only some police powers; that case left the excise officer open (para 10). What matters is not the totality of an officer's powers but their kind: whether the police powers conferred on him, or exercisable because he is deemed an officer in charge of a police station, would tend to facilitate obtaining a confession (para 12). The power of investigation establishes that link (para 13), and Section 25 exists to exclude confessions an officer could extort by virtue of his position (para 15).
The Excise Inspector and section 162
Deemed by section 78(3) an officer in charge of a police station, the Inspector could exercise all the Chapter XIV powers, including filing a charge sheet; unlike a Customs Officer he had no judicial powers (para 11). The preponderance of High Court opinion agreed (para 27), and the confession was also barred by section 162 (para 28). Raghubar Dayal J. held him not a police officer, the deeming being only for section 156, but doubted that the confession was voluntary because the seizure memo had been tampered with (concurring, paras 60, 89-90).
Legal Principle
NyayVidhan's view · Practice note
Why It Matters
Raja Ram Jaiswal gave the test that frames the question: do the police powers an officer holds, directly or as a deemed officer in charge of a police station, tend to facilitate obtaining a confession? Investigation is the decisive power (paras 12-13). Raghubar Dayal J. disagreed, allowing the appeal only for doubt about voluntariness (concurring, paras 89-90). In Badku Joti Savant v. State of Mysore five Judges later distinguished it, the Central Excise law not deeming its officer an officer in charge of a police station. Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India (1990) noted that distinction, and the majority in Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu (2020) relied on its test for officers under the NDPS Act.
Editorial comment by the NyayVidhan Editorial Desk. It is not part of the Court's judgment and is not legal advice.
Precedents Relied Upon
- The State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram [1962] 3 S. C. R. 338
Read as holding that police officer in Section 25 is construed in a wide and popular sense, though not so wide as to include persons on whom only some police powers are conferred, and as leaving open whether officers given the powers of an officer in charge of a police station are police officers (para 10); a decision confining the words to the police force was put aside as not in accord with it (para 16). Raghubar Dayal J. applied its considerations to excise officers (concurring, para 31).
- Queen Empress v. Babulal (1884) I.L.R. 6 All. 509, 523
Mahmood J.'s account of the object of the rules excluding confessions to police officers, to stop the extortion of confessions, was quoted to explain why Section 25 was enacted (para 14).
- Ah Foong v. Emperor (1918) I.L.R. 46 Cal. 411
Held an excise officer not a police officer without discussing the question; the officer there, acting under the Opium Act, had no powers of an officer in charge of a police station under Chapter XIV (paras 16-17).
View all precedents (13)
- Harbhanjan Sao v. Emperor (1927) I.L.R. 54 Cal. 601
Held an excise officer not a police officer, merely following Ah Foong (paras 16, 18).
- Matilall Kalwar v. Emperor A.I.R. 1932 Cal 122
Held an excise officer not a police officer, merely following Ah Foong (paras 16, 18).
- Ibrahim Ahmed v. King Emperor (1931) I.L R. 58 Cal. 1260
Took the contrary view, after the amendment of the Opium Act, following Nanoo Sheikh Ahmed; affirmed by the Full Bench in Ameen Sharif (paras 16, 18).
- Ameen Sharif v. Emperor (1934) I.L.R. 61 Cal 607
The Calcutta Full Bench held an excise officer exercising the powers of an officer in charge of a police station a police officer under Section 25; the Court examined the leading judgment of Mukerji J. and agreed with its conclusion, though not with its reliance on the construction of ancient statutes (paras 16, 21). Raghubar Dayal J. did not accept that construction (concurring, para 85).
- Nanoo Sheikh Ahmed v. Emperor (1926) I.L.R. 51 Bom. 78
The Bombay Full Bench held that excise officers on whom substantially all the powers of a police officer are conferred are police officers under Section 25; reviewed with the decisions following it as the preponderant view (paras 16, 18). Raghubar Dayal J. preferred the view that disagreed with it (concurring, paras 85-86).
- Public Prosecutor v. C. Paramasivam A.I.R. 1953. Mad 917
Noted as taking the same view as Nanoo Sheikh Ahmed (para 16); Raghubar Dayal J. did not accept it (concurring, para 85).
- Ibrahim v. Emperor A.I.R. 1944 Lah 57
Noted as taking the same view as Nanoo Sheikh Ahmed (para 16).
- Radha Kishun Marwari v. King Emperor (1932) I. L. R. 12 Pat 46 F.B.
Held an excise officer under the Bihar Excise Act not a police officer; the majority did not consider it further, as it read police officer as an officer of the police force, which is not in accord with Barkat Ram (para 16). Raghubar Dayal J. set out and adopted its reasoning (concurring, para 86).
- The Queen v. Hurribole Chunder Ghose (1876) I.L.R. 1 Cal. 207
Its reading of police officer in its more comprehensive and popular meaning was quoted through Nanoo Sheikh Ahmed (para 18). Raghubar Dayal J. explained it as holding only that a regular police officer given magisterial powers did not cease to be a police officer (concurring, paras 68-69).
- Senior Electric Inspector v. Laxminarayan Chopra [1962] 3 S. C. R. 146
The maxim contemporanea expositio applies to ancient statutes, not to comparatively modern Acts, so it could not be used to construe Section 25 of the Evidence Act (para 21).
