The Supreme Court upheld an NDPS conviction for possessing 1 kg of opium, rejecting the plea that the trial was vitiated because the complainant officer also investigated (paras 2, 9, 12). Distinguishing Megha Singh and Rajangam, it noted that the search was conducted in the presence of and under the instructions of a DSP, that the complainant was not alone in the investigation, and that the point had never been raised earlier (para 11).
The Supreme Court upheld a poppy husk conviction resting on one police witness, holding that where the non-examination of independent witnesses is satisfactorily explained, official witnesses whose evidence inspires confidence can found a conviction (paras 8, 10). Once physical possession was proved, Section 35 of the NDPS Act shifted to the driver the burden of proving he was not in conscious possession (para 12). The investigating officer's non-examination caused no prejudice; the sentence was cut from twelve to ten years (paras 16, 19-20).
A three-Judge Bench set aside a Prevention of Corruption Act conviction where the complainant had died before trial and the shadow witness did not reproduce any demand. Proof of demand is the gravamen of offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii), and mere acceptance or recovery of money without it cannot sustain a conviction (paras 21-22). Holding the appellant guilty on this evidence would be an inferential deduction impermissible in law (para 24).
The Supreme Court set aside an NDPS conviction because the officer who raided the accused's house on secret information never recorded that information or reported it to his superior under Section 42. The State argued that the FIR, sent to the Superintendent of Police the same day, was enough. The Court held that the Section 42 procedure is separate from the Code of Criminal Procedure, and compliance with one does not show compliance with the other (paras 11, 13).
In Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan (Criminal Appeal No. 1393 of 2010), the Supreme Court held that a man who had concealed stolen opium before the NDPS Act came into force, and remained in possession of it when the Act took effect, committed the offence under Section 18; Article 20(1) had no application (paras 16-17). Possession under Section 18 needs animus and may consist of dominion and control through concealment (para 16). The Court also rejected the objections based on Sections 42 and 57 and on Section 27 of the Evidence Act (paras 25, 29-30).
The Supreme Court held that Section 304B IPC must receive a fair, pragmatic and common-sense interpretation, declared that Appasaheb and Vipin Jaiswal do not state the law correctly, and ruled that money demanded at any time that is reasonably connected to a married woman's death is in connection with the marriage (para 20). ‘Soon before’ her death is a relative expression and not ‘immediately before’ (paras 23, 25). The husband's conviction was upheld (para 26).
The Supreme Court set aside an Allahabad High Court order granting bail on parity to a murder accused who was a history-sheeter, holding that "it was not a case of parity" and the order "clearly exposes the non-application of mind" (para 17). It explained that setting aside an unjustified grant of bail is different from cancelling bail for supervening circumstances (para 13).
In Union of India & Another v. Sanjeev V. Deshpande (Criminal Appeal No. 660 of 2007), the Supreme Court held that Section 8(c) of the NDPS Act, not the 1985 Rules, is the source of the prohibition on dealing in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, so a psychotropic substance in the Schedule to the Act is covered even if it is missing from Schedule I to the Rules (paras 26-27, 34). Hearing bail appeals placed before a larger Bench, the three Judges found the contrary High Court view untenable and held State of Uttaranchal v. Rajesh Kumar Gupta ‘wrongly decided’ (paras 27-29, 34). The NDPS Act operates in addition to the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (para 35).
In Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (Criminal Appeal No. 1277 of 2014), the Supreme Court held that the police may not arrest a person accused of an offence punishable with imprisonment up to seven years merely because the offence is cognizable and non-bailable. Under Section 41(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure the officer must also be satisfied that arrest is necessary for a listed purpose and record reasons, and a Magistrate must scrutinise them before authorising detention (paras 8-9). Its directions cover all such offences, not only Section 498-A cases (paras 13-14).
In the Akshardham temple attack case, the Supreme Court acquitted all six accused, three of whom had been sentenced to death. The sanction under Section 50 of POTA was void for non-application of mind, the confessions were recorded without the Section 32 safeguards, accomplice statements came a year late, and Urdu letters said to be found on the attackers' bloodied bodies were spotless (paras 77, 90, 97, 102-103). No independent evidence remained (paras 121, 135).
In B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P. (Criminal Appeal No. 696 of 2014), the Supreme Court held that demand of illegal gratification is a sine qua non of the offence under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and mere recovery of currency notes is not enough. Without proof of demand, Section 13(1)(d)(i)(ii) also fails, and the Section 20 presumption, which applies only to Section 7, cannot arise (paras 7-9).
The Supreme Court acquitted four in-laws convicted of burning a woman to death on her dying declaration. Two proved through employer, tenant and scooter-dealer witnesses that they were far away, and the courts below had wrongly picked holes in that defence evidence (paras 25-37). As the declaration blamed every in-law alike for every act, it could not be split, and an unchallenged neighbour's account of a door bolted from inside raised the possibility of suicide (paras 40-43).










