The Supreme Court acquitted a hotel servant convicted of possessing 2.1 kg of opium found in a room next to the hotel kitchen, holding that possession under Section 18 of the NDPS Act "has to be conscious" and that a servant does not possess his master's contraband unless it was left in his custody under his absolute control (paras 2, 15-16). His confessions to Central Bureau of Narcotics officers were held admissible and voluntary, but showed only that he was the owners' servant (paras 10, 13, 15).
The Supreme Court acquitted a cinema-hall owner convicted of possessing 175 grams of smack, because the seized powder was never produced at trial and nobody explained where the samples and the bulk were kept before they reached the laboratory and the Malkhana (paras 10-12, 15). Following Jitendra, it held there was "no evidence to connect the forensic report with the substance that was seized" (para 12), and extended the acquittal to two co-accused who had not appealed (para 16).
In a State appeal against acquittal in an 8 kg opium case, the Supreme Court held that Section 50 of the NDPS Act did not apply because the opium was carried in a bag on the head (State of H.P. v. Pawan Kumar). It nonetheless upheld the acquittal: the prosecution could not show where the samples were between their removal from the Malkhana on 26 February and their receipt at the laboratory on 9 March, so their sanctity was compromised (para 2).
The Rajasthan High Court granted bail to a woman accused under Section 8/21 of the NDPS Act from whom 200 grams of brown sugar was recovered, after the trial court had added 500 grams recovered from a co-accused and applied the 180-day charge-sheet period (paras 2, 5-6). Since each accused is sentenced for the quantity recovered from his or her own possession, the total could not be read against her, and the 60-day limit under Section 167(2) CrPC applied (paras 5-7).
The Rajasthan High Court acquitted two men convicted of keeping ganja, doda powder and opium, holding that when secret information is received at the police station, Section 42 of the NDPS Act requires it to be written down and sent to superior officers in writing; a wireless message suffices only for a patrolling party. With no proof of written transmission or of the Section 42(2) report, the trial was vitiated (paras 20-25).
The Supreme Court upheld a ten-year NDPS sentence for 1 kg 750 grams of opium recovered from a bag the appellant was carrying (paras 1, 12, 15). Section 50 applies only where the drug is recovered in a body search, not from a container carried by the accused (para 12). The absence of independent witnesses did not by itself show false implication, and a twelve-day delay in sending the sample was not fatal given the link evidence (paras 9-10, 14).
The Supreme Court acquitted the co-owner of a truck caught carrying poppy husk, holding that Section 25 of the NDPS Act needs evidence that the owner knowingly permitted the vehicle's misuse, and that the presumption of a culpable mental state under Section 35 arises only after the prosecution proves that knowledge (paras 9-10). His giving a wrong address when registering the truck could not fasten him with knowledge of its misuse (para 10).
In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee (Criminal Appeal No. 2086 of 2010), the Supreme Court held that although it does not normally interfere with a High Court order on bail, the High Court must decide bail on settled factors, among them a prima facie case, the gravity of the accusation, the likely sentence and the risk of absconding or of witnesses being influenced. A bail order passed mechanically suffers from non-application of mind and is illegal (paras 11-12).
A five-Judge Constitution Bench held that Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act obliges the empowered officer to inform a suspect of his right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate, and that this obligation is mandatory and requires strict compliance. Merely asking whether the suspect wishes to be so searched is not enough, and the "substantial compliance" view in Joseph Fernandez and Prabha Shankar Dubey was rejected (paras 18, 21-22).
In Sajjan Kumar v. Central Bureau of Investigation (Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 6374 of 2010), the Supreme Court held that at the stage of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure a judge sifts the material only to see whether a prima facie case exists: grave suspicion that is not properly explained justifies a charge, while suspicion only, where two views are possible, permits discharge (para 17). It declined to discharge the appellant in a case arising out of the 1984 anti-Sikh riots, leaving the witnesses’ credibility and the delay to the trial (paras 18, 25, 27).
A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that no individual "should be forcibly subjected to any of the techniques in question", narcoanalysis, polygraph examination and the BEAP test, whether in criminal investigation or otherwise (para 223). Compulsory tests violate the right against self-incrimination and personal liberty (paras 221-222). Voluntary tests are allowed with safeguards, but their results are not evidence; facts discovered through them may be proved under Section 27 of the Evidence Act (para 223).
The Supreme Court dismissed a special leave petition against a conviction for six bags of poppy husk of 32 kg each. It held that a wireless message to the DSP on reaching the spot, followed by a ruqa sent from the spot on which the FIR was registered, was substantial compliance with Section 42 of the NDPS Act, as no prejudice was shown. Section 57 is not mandatory, and conscious possession was proved (paras 12-15).







