Proof of Demand Is the Gravamen of Bribery: Supreme Court Rejects Inferential Deduction in Satyanarayana Murthy

The complainant, who ran a typing institute in Kurnool, alleged that on 3 October 1996 the appellant, an Assistant Director in the Commissionerate of Technical Education, demanded ₹1,000, later reduced to ₹500, to renew the institute's recognition (paras 3, 11). A trap was laid the next day at a Kurnool lodge, and phenolphthalein-treated notes were recovered from him (paras 3, 12). The complainant died before trial (para 3). The trial court convicted the appellant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) read with 13(2), with one year's rigorous imprisonment on each count (para 5). The High Court acquitted him under Section 7 but upheld the Section 13 conviction (opening paragraph, para 6).

The Court relied on A. Subair and C.P. Rao: demand and acceptance must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, and mere recovery does not prove the charge (paras 18-19). Following B. Jayaraj, mere possession and recovery of currency notes without proof of demand establishes neither offence, and the Section 20 presumption applies only to Section 7 and arises only once acceptance, and therefore demand, is proved (para 20). The "sheet anchor" was the shadow witness, PW-1, who said only that the appellant asked whether the complainant had brought the amount he had been told to bring the previous day (para 23). Even accepted at face value, this fell short of the quality and decisiveness of proof of demand that the law requires; with the complainant dead, primary evidence of demand was not forthcoming (para 23). Holding the appellant guilty would be an "inferential deduction which is impermissible in law" (para 24). Citing Sujit Biswas, suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of proof (para 25).