In Bhatana Alloys Private Limited v. Kuljinder Singh (Criminal Appeal Nos. 5271-5273 of 2026), the Supreme Court held that a director's assertion that he resigned before the cheque was dishonoured was not, by itself, a sufficient basis to quash a Section 138 NI Act complaint when he had admittedly signed the cheque while still a director (para 19). It set aside the High Court's quashing of the summoning order against him (para 24) and dismissed the connected petition of Yadvinder Singh.
In Rameela v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., the Supreme Court restored a trial court's murder conviction under Section 302 of the IPC, setting aside a Rajasthan High Court judgment of 18.05.2026 that had altered it to Section 304 Part II because the deceased died 16 days after being stabbed. Applying Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, the Court held that, if the cause of death was septicemia, it was a result of nothing but the stab wounds (paras 12-16).
In Shailendra Mani Tripathi v. Union of India & Ors., the Supreme Court noted that the High Powered Enquiry Committee (HPEC) had received only a few complaints on its portal, hpec.nic.in, despite public notices, and had returned no findings yet. Stressing that no complainant or victim need be named or identified, it asked the parties to forward all their material, including petitions, affidavits and video clips, to the HPEC under the confidentiality safeguards of its order of 10.09.2026 (paras 5-7).
In Noor Ali v. Union of India (2026:GAU-AS:16236-DB), a Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court quashed a PIT-NDPS detention order against a man facing three NDPS cases (paras 2-3, 24). The order came 290 days after the police proposal with no explanation, snapping the live and proximate link, and the detaining authority never considered whether a detenu in judicial custody was likely to get bail, given Section 37 of the NDPS Act (paras 16, 21-22).
In Asha Ram @ Ashumal v. State of Rajasthan (2026:RJ-JD:55046-DB), the Rajasthan High Court disposed of a life convict's plea for transfer to an Open Air Camp. The Advisory Committee had refused him because of his conviction under Section 376(2)(f) IPC. Noting the Full Bench answer that such prisoners are not totally ineligible but have no automatic right, the Bench recorded the State's statement that a decision would be taken within three weeks, and directed it accordingly (paras 2.1, 7-11).
In Prem Dudi v. State of Rajasthan (2026:RJ-JP:45591), the Rajasthan High Court granted a third bail to a 23-year-old accused under Sections 8 and 22 of the NDPS Act after finding that the FSL report, collected by the police in February 2026, had been kept off the charge-sheet and that a police letter produced to explain the delay had been overwritten to mislead the Court (paras 12-16, 19). It ordered a police inquiry and a 15-day limit for FSL reports to reach police stations (paras 22-23).
In Rama Pandey v. Ram Lal (Dead) through LR., the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal against the Allahabad High Court's reversal of the Deputy Director of Consolidation's order of 31.12.1992 on Plot No. 159 in a village of District Basti. The Court noted that the appellants had no right in the plot, the respondents are the original tenure holders, the Settlement Officer's spot inspection showed that the plot abuts the highway, and the Deputy Director gave only mechanical reasons (paras 11-12).
In Mohammed Riyaz Attari v. National Investigation Agency (2026:RJ-JP:45369-DB), a Rajasthan High Court Division Bench headed by the Chief Justice dismissed appeals by eight accused against the orders framing charges in the murder of Kanhaiya Lal, including charges under Sections 16, 18 and 20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. Objections about the recovered videos and organisational membership go to evidence and are for the trial (paras 15-16). The Bench recorded no finding on guilt (para 17).
In Tejram v. State of Rajasthan (2026:RJ-JP:45486-DB), the Rajasthan High Court, in a Division Bench headed by Chief Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal, dismissed an intra-court appeal by police personnel who claimed promotion from Constable to Head Constable against 376 allegedly unfilled vacancies of 2013-14. It held that figures in an RTI reply are not clear promotional vacancies, accepted the High-Level Committee's fresh year-wise determination of 429 vacancies, and said courts cannot restructure the cadre or order promotions beyond vacancies legally determined (paras 8-16).
In Sri Sujit Das v. Union of India (2026 INSC 1195), the Supreme Court held that the 24 hours within which Article 22(2) requires an arrested person to be produced before a magistrate run from the moment he is detained and his liberty curtailed, not from a formal arrest recorded later. Only the journey time to the magistrate is excluded. The Bench held that rulings of the Orissa, Madras and Kerala High Courts excluding time spent on NDPS search and seizure do not lay down the correct law. As the three appellants were held from 02:00 pm on 29.09.2025 but produced at 04:45 pm the next day, it set aside the High Court's order and directed their release on bail (paras 66, 69).
In Mohd. Azam Khan v. Directorate of Enforcement, the Supreme Court said the appropriate recourse for the petitioner is first to approach the Allahabad High Court (para 2). It directed that the record of his writ petition be sent to that High Court within two days and that the case be listed before a Division Bench on 16.11.2026, which is requested to pass appropriate orders on his prayer for interim relief (paras 3-5). It expressed no opinion on the merits and disposed of the petition (paras 7-8).
The Supreme Court restored the acquittal of Sau. Kamalbai Waman Patil, whom the Bombay High Court had convicted of murdering her daughter-in-law, who died of burns. The deceased's three dying declarations did not agree on who set her on fire. The Court held that the High Court could not reverse the acquittal on one uncorroborated declaration, Exhibit-56, had convicted her alone on a charge never framed against her, and could not use Section 106 of the Evidence Act to fill the gap (paras 18, 24, 27, 29-30).











