Thursday, 5 November 2026
Supreme Court of India
Criminal Law

Three Inconsistent Dying Declarations: Supreme Court Restores Mother-in-Law's Acquittal, Faults Conviction on a Charge Never Framed

Sau. Kamalbai Waman Patil v. The State of Maharashtra 2026 INSC 1196 Decided 5 November 2026

Published: · NyayVidhan · 4 min read

The Supreme Court restored the acquittal of Sau. Kamalbai Waman Patil, whom the Bombay High Court had convicted of murdering her daughter-in-law, who died of burns. The deceased's three dying declarations did not agree on who set her on fire. The Court held that the High Court could not reverse the acquittal on one uncorroborated declaration, Exhibit-56, had convicted her alone on a charge never framed against her, and could not use Section 106 of the Evidence Act to fill the gap (paras 18, 24, 27, 29-30).

Three Inconsistent Dying Declarations: Supreme Court Restores Mother-in-Law's Acquittal, Faults Conviction on a Charge Never Framed

Judgment Intelligence

Conviction Set Aside
Sau. Kamalbai Waman Patil v. The State of Maharashtra
2026 INSC 1196
Criminal Appeal No. 118 of 2018
Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of Decision
5 November 2026
Bench
Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar
Relevant Acts & Sections
Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 302, 34; Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 106; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 386(a)
Final Outcome

Appeal allowed. The High Court's judgment of 28.09.2017 in Criminal Appeal No. 63 of 2008 is quashed; the appellant is acquitted under Section 302 IPC and is to be set free forthwith if not required in any other case (para 30).

Source Supreme Court of India, www.sci.gov.in — judgment dated 5 November 2026 · Court's copy

Key holdings

  1. Convicting one accused alone under Section 302 IPC, after the co-accused's acquittal on a joint charge with Section 34, made out an accusation never framed (paras 15, 18).
  2. An inconsistent dying declaration needs corroboration; Exhibit-56 alone could not reverse the acquittal (paras 20, 24).
  3. The person who took the deceased to hospital was a material witness who was never examined (para 23).
  4. Section 106 of the Evidence Act applies only after the prosecution discharges its initial burden (para 27).
  5. An acquittal enhances the presumption of innocence (para 29).

Judgment digest by NyayVidhan: a summary of the court's judgment, not its text. The judgment itself is the authoritative version.

Brief Facts

The appellant's son was married to the deceased; the couple lived with his parents. The prosecution alleged that the four accused, the appellant, her husband and her two sons, ill-treated the deceased for not having a child and for dowry, and on 10.04.2005 set her on fire; she died on 15.04.2005 (para 2). All four were charged under Sections 498A, 342, 406 and 302 read with Section 34 IPC. Exhibit-56, a statement in the medico-legal papers recorded by the Medical Officer, said the appellant set her on fire; Exhibits-44 and 48, recorded by a police officer and the Special Executive Magistrate, said her father-in-law did (paras 7, 9, 22). The Sessions Court acquitted all four. On the State's appeal, the High Court convicted the appellant alone under Section 302 and sentenced her to life imprisonment (paras 9-10).

Questions before the Court (framed by NyayVidhan)

  1. Could the High Court convict the appellant alone under Section 302 IPC when the only charge was Section 302 read with Section 34 against four accused, three of whom stood acquitted?
  2. Could one of three inconsistent dying declarations, uncorroborated, justify reversing her acquittal?
  3. Could Section 106 of the Evidence Act supply what the prosecution had not proved?
  4. Was the Sessions Court's view perverse or illegal?

Submissions

For the appellant. The Sessions Court disbelieved all three dying declarations as inconsistent; the High Court upheld the rejection of Exhibits-44 and 48 but accepted Exhibit-56 without the corroboration that was necessary. Reversing an acquittal required material without any doubt. It relied on State of Punjab v. Parveen Kumar (para 11).

For the State. Exhibit-56, recorded by the Medical Officer, was voluntary and the High Court gave cogent reasons for accepting it; with the seizures and the Chemical Analyser's report it sustained the conviction, and by the accused's own statement the appellant was alone at home. It relied on Jagbir Singh and Rajendra s/o Ramdas Kolhe (para 12).

Court's Findings

A charge never framed

The only murder charge was under Section 302 read with Section 34 against all four accused (paras 14-15). Convicting her alone because, on the defence version, only she was at home with the deceased would make out a new accusation never charged, prejudicial on these facts (para 15). In Krishna Govind Patil, a four-Judge Bench called such a conviction, after the co-accused were acquitted, a legally impossible position (paras 16-18).

Inconsistent dying declarations

Exhibit-56 named the appellant as the one who set the deceased on fire; Exhibits-44 and 48 named her father-in-law (paras 9, 19). The High Court ought to have borne in mind the principles in Jagbir Singh and Abhishek Sharma (paras 19-20). Having rejected the other two declarations and her oral statements to relatives, it rested the conviction solely on Exhibit-56 and the doctor's evidence (para 21). The man who put out the fire, took her to hospital and was present when Exhibit-56 was noted was a material witness, never examined (paras 23-24). With burns of 94%, Exhibit-56 without corroboration could not be the sole basis to reverse the acquittal (para 24).

Section 106 of the Evidence Act

The High Court relied on the appellant's failure to explain the burns (para 26). Relying on the three-Judge Bench in Anees, the Court held that Section 106 applies only after the prosecution discharges its initial burden, which it had not (para 27).

The acquittal restored

The High Court had also not heard her on sentence under Section 386(a) CrPC, though nothing much turned on that (para 28). The Sessions Court rightly gave her the benefit of doubt for the inconsistency in the three dying declarations; her acquittal enhanced the presumption of innocence, and its view was neither perverse nor illegal (para 29).

Legal Principle

Where dying declarations are inconsistent, an appellate court cannot reverse an acquittal on one of them without corroboration. An accused tried with others only under Section 302 read with Section 34 should not, after their acquittal, be convicted alone on an accusation never framed; Section 106 operates only after the prosecution discharges its initial burden (paras 15, 24, 27).

NyayVidhan's view · Practice note

Why It Matters

In an appeal against a reversal of acquittal, the judgment offers three separate checks: does the conviction rest on a charge actually framed, is a dying declaration that conflicts with the others corroborated, and has the prosecution made out its initial case before Section 106 is invoked (paras 15, 24, 27)? Prosecutors should examine the person who first reached the scene and took the victim to hospital (paras 23-24). An appellate court reversing an acquittal must also hear the accused on sentence (para 28), as in Ramkrushna Prahllad Dongardive. Contrast Ramkishan Digambar Jadhav, where Section 106 required a husband in his wife's exclusive company to explain her death.

Editorial comment by the NyayVidhan Editorial Desk. It is not part of the Court's judgment and is not legal advice.

Precedents Relied Upon

  1. State of Punjab v. Parveen Kumar Criminal Appeal No.633/1999 decided on 18.11.2004
    Referred To Discussed at ¶ 11

    Relied on by the appellant for the submission that the reversal of her acquittal was contrary to law; the Court did not discuss it.

  2. Jagbir Singh v. State (N.C.T. of Delhi) 2019 INSC 1000
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 12, 19

    Where there are multiple dying declarations, including some inconsistent with each other, each case must be decided on its own facts after carefully examining the entire material and the circumstances in which each declaration was made. Also relied on by the State.

  3. Rajendra s/o Ramdas Kolhe v. State of Maharashtra 2024 INSC 422
    Referred To Discussed at ¶ 12, 20

    Relied on by the State; the Court noted that it also highlights the principles on multiple dying declarations set out in Abhishek Sharma.

View all precedents (7)
  1. Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra 1962 INSC 19
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 16, 17

    A four-Judge Bench held that where three of four accused charged under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC are acquitted, the fourth cannot be convicted for acting conjointly with them, and a court cannot make out a case for the prosecution not disclosed in the charge or the evidence (passage quoted). The Court found itself fortified by it.

  2. Abhishek Sharma v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2023 INSC 924
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 20

    Principles for multiple dying declarations (para 9 of that judgment quoted): each must be voluntary, reliable and made in a fit state of mind; inconsistencies must be material to shake credibility; other evidence may corroborate; each is scrutinised on its merits; medical fitness and possible tutoring matter. The High Court ought to have borne them in mind before accepting Exhibit-56.

  3. Anees v. The State Govt. of NCT 2024 INSC 368
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 27

    A three-Judge Bench held (paras 42-44 of that judgment quoted) that Section 106 of the Evidence Act is applied with care and caution, does not relieve the prosecution of its onus and cannot make up for its inability to prove guilt; until a prima facie case is established, the onus does not shift to the accused.

  4. Referred To Discussed at ¶ 28

    Considered in detail the hearing on sentence that Section 386(a) CrPC requires after an appellate court reverses an acquittal; the Court noted that the appellant was not heard on sentence, but said nothing much turned on it as the reversal of her acquittal was not justified.

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