Hero MotoCorp Ltd. v. Union of India (2026:RJ-JP:45966-DB): the Rajasthan High Court held that a vehicle manufacturer holding a valid trade certificate under Rule 33 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules need not obtain temporary registration under Rule 4.2(1)(a) of the Rajasthan rules for vehicles sent to its dealers. It quashed temporary registration fee demands for 2014 to 2026, ordered refunds and directed parity with Honda (paras 63, 71, 78).
In T.T. v. State of Goa, the Supreme Court refused to suspend the sentence of an applicant whose acquittal the High Court had reversed, while his criminal appeal is pending. On a prima facie view of the prosecution witnesses' evidence, read with the apology emails and text message(s) on record, it found no fit case for suspension. As the complainant worked under the applicant, her father and he were friends, and she and his daughter were friends, the Court could not say she had a motive to implicate him. The application was dismissed; the appeals will be heard in due course (paras 7-12).
In Sanjay Gupta v. Union of India & Ors., the Supreme Court disposed of an Article 32 writ petition by a man arrested by an officer of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) under Section 104 of the Customs Act, 1962. His bail plea had been rejected by the Chief Judicial Magistrate and a later Sessions Court bail application withdrawn. The Court said his first step should have been to get himself released on bail (para 12). It permitted him to seek bail in the Calcutta High Court, to be considered expeditiously, and left his other reliefs to an Article 226 writ petition (paras 13-15).
In A. John Kennedy v. State of Tamil Nadu, the Supreme Court, on applications after its forest eviction directions of 29 May 2026, held that Forest Rights Act claims in the Megamalai area must be decided strictly under Section 6, not on present occupation (para 55). Cultivators with only temporary residence in the forest, or living outside it, were excluded (paras 64, 70). Finding the State primarily responsible for the delay, the Court gave 30 days to form the remaining Gram Sabhas and five months to decide claims, under a Special Committee (para 70).
In J. Rajesh (Minor) v. M. Kumaran (Dead) thr. LRs., the Supreme Court held that a son had no right by birth to half of the land that fell to his father under a partition decree among his grandfather's Class I heirs. The grandfather's property devolved under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956; on partition, the father's share became his exclusive property in his individual capacity, not coparcenary (paras 35, 41). Neither unamended Section 6 nor Section 29-A of the Tamil Nadu amendment applied (para 39). The appeal was dismissed (paras 41-42).
In Chatur Singh Dhruw v. State of Chhattisgarh, the Supreme Court upheld the compulsory retirement of two Assistant Grade-III employees of the State's Legal Metrology Department. A Screening Committee had applied the parameters of the Circular of 25 April 2017 uniformly to all 14 eligible clerical employees, and the decision rested on relevant material (paras 36, 50). The Court held that such an order is neither punitive nor stigmatic, that promotion does not efface later adverse entries, and that uncommunicated adverse entries may be considered (paras 24, 39, 48). The appeals were dismissed (para 51).
In Union of India v. Rohith Nathan (2026 INSC 1201), the Supreme Court declined to defer its judgment of 11.03.2026 on the OBC creamy layer. As service allocation for the Civil Services Examination, 2025 is not finalised, the creamy layer principle as interpreted in that judgment will govern it (para 18(ix)). The Court clarified that the judgment determines the rights of the parties and does not, by itself, reopen concluded selections, and extended the time for compliance by two months (paras 18, 19).
In The Chairman, National Book Trust, India v. A.R. Abdul Gaffar (2026 INSC 1202), the Supreme Court held that the National Book Trust is an ‘other authority’ and so ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution, upholding a Full Bench of the Delhi High Court (para 26). The Trust is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by the Government, with control particular to it and pervasive; its registration as a society and its own income do not displace that (para 25).
In Yusuf v. Vigyapan Loke Delhi Advertising CGHS Ltd. (2026 INSC 1207), the Supreme Court held that a society's balance sheet entries carrying forward the amount claimed, read with cheques and bank reconciliation statements, amounted to an acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act. A fresh limitation period ran from each acknowledgment, so no condonation application was needed. It set aside the Delhi High Court's rejection of the plaint and revived the suit, leaving the merits open (paras 14, 16-17).
In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Union of India, the Supreme Court worked out its 2011 decree holding Himachal Pradesh entitled to 7.19% of the power generated by the Bhakra-Nangal and Beas projects (para 3). It took the energy arrears at 13,066 million units and assessed Himachal's capital-cost liability at ₹420.77 crore, adjusted against about 1,093 million units at ₹3.85 a unit. Punjab and Haryana must supply the balance of about 11,973 million units over 20 lean seasons, cashless (para 41). The Court was not persuaded by Punjab's objections (paras 32-33).
In Rita Tikku & Anr. v. State of Haryana & Ors., the Supreme Court, which has not yet decided the nature and composition of the Committee to complete the respondent builders' projects, modified its order of 13.07.2026 freezing their accounts to a limited extent. The Resolution Professional may pay electricity charges, part of the employees' dues and payments for basic amenities, funded by the lending financial institutions, and sale deeds are to be executed for previous allottees of completed projects with an occupancy certificate (paras 1-2).
In Sanjay Kumar Samantaray v. Shantilata Khuntia & Ors., the Supreme Court set aside an Orissa High Court judgment of 18.02.2026 that had quashed an Odisha embankment-protection tender from the stage of financial bid opening. The writ petitioner, a disqualified bidder, had not impleaded the appellant, the successful L-1 bidder, so the order was ‘passed behind the back of the successful bidder’ (para 19). Finding that a remand would serve no useful purpose, the Court directed that the work order be issued to the appellant (paras 20-21).











