Judgment Intelligence
Petition Dismissed- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of Decision
- 11 July 2001
- Bench
- Justices B.N. Kirpal, Ruma Pal and Brijesh Kumar
- Relevant Acts & Sections
- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — Sections 118, 138, 139; Special Court (Trial of Offences relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 — Sections 3(2), 4, 7, 9-A; Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 114
The conviction and sentence imposed by the Special Court were affirmed and the appeal was dismissed with costs assessed at Rs. 10,000 (para 39).
Key holdings
- The Special Court under the 1992 Act may try offences relating to securities transactions made between 1 April 1991 and 6 June 1992, whenever the offence was committed (paras 11, 16).
- Presumptions under Sections 138 and 139 are mandatory presumptions of law; they are rules of evidence and do not conflict with the presumption of innocence (para 21).
- Rebuttal need not be conclusive, but a merely plausible explanation is not enough; it must be supported by proof that makes the defence probable to a prudent man (paras 22-23).
- An averment in the written statement, without evidence on why the cheques were given, cannot rebut the presumptions (paras 35-36).
Brief Facts
Court's Findings
Legal Principle
Precedents Relied Upon
- Minoo Mehta v. Shavak D. Mehta (1998) 2 SCC 418
Its summing up that the offence must be committed within the statutory period was an obvious error; read with its paragraph 15, the period relates to the transactions in securities.
- Harshad Shantilal Mehta v. Custodian and Others
The Special Court's civil and criminal jurisdiction is in respect of transactions in securities during the statutory period 1.4.1991 to 6.6.1992.
- State of Madras v. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer AIR 1958 SC 61
"Shall presume" makes the presumption obligatory and shifts the onus to the accused, an exception to the general rule on the burden of proof.
View all precedents (10)
- Kundan Lal Rallaram v. Custodian, Evacuee Property, Bombay AIR 1961 SC 1316
The Section 118 presumption could be rebutted by a presumption of fact under Section 114 of the Evidence Act — limited to its facts.
- Dhanvantrai Balwantrai Desai v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1964 SC 575
A mandatory presumption is rebutted only by proof, not by an explanation that is merely reasonable or plausible.
- V.D. Jhingan v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1966 SC 1762
On the burden of rebutting a mandatory presumption.
- Sailendranath Bose v. The State of Bihar AIR 1968 SC 1292
On the burden of rebutting a mandatory presumption.
- Ram Krishna Bedu Rane v. State of Maharashtra 1973 (1) SCC 366
On the burden of rebutting a mandatory presumption.
- Trilok Chand Jain v. State of Delhi 1975 (4) SCC 761
To rebut a presumption the accused must show his explanation so probable that a prudent man would accept it, or that the material on record makes the presumed fact improbable.
- Standard Chartered Bank v. Custodian 2000 (6) SCC 427
In the Bank's recovery proceedings the appellant was found liable to pay Rs. 280 crores.
