Section 32A NDPS Cannot Bar Courts From Suspending Sentences, Parole Unaffected: Supreme Court

Two persons convicted under the NDPS Act challenged Section 32A, which says no sentence under the Act, other than under Section 27, shall be suspended, remitted or commuted (paras 1, 11). The first, sentenced to ten years under Section 21, had served more than seven but had not claimed parole, apparently believing Section 32A barred it (para 2). The second's bail application, filed with his appeal in the High Court, was dismissed as not pressed in view of Maktool Singh (para 3). They said the section was arbitrary, violated Articles 14 and 21 and took away the courts' judicial function (para 1). The Union defended it as a measure against drug trafficking (para 3).

Parole is not a suspension of sentence: the sentence continues to run, so Section 32A does not bar parole under the statute, Jail Manual or Government instructions (paras 5, 10). Section 32A displaces Sections 389, 432 and 433 of the Code (paras 12-13). Taking away the Executive's powers under Sections 432 and 433 is neither arbitrary nor a breach of Article 14 or 21 for a convict tried fairly (para 15). Suspending a sentence pending appeal, however, is a judicial function (para 16), and "totally disarming the court from granting interim relief in the form of suspension of sentence would be unjust, unfair and violative of Article 21", particularly with no mechanism for early disposal of appeals (para 17). The 1988 UN Convention never intended to oust the courts' jurisdiction (para 23). The Allahabad High Court in Ram Charan stated the law correctly; the Gujarat High Court's Ishwarsingh M. Rajput "cannot be held to be good law" (para 25). The invalid part is severable (para 26). Convicts cannot claim suspension as of right, and courts must apply Section 37's conditions, as explained in Ram Samujh (paras 27-28).