Partitioned Share Not Coparcenary: SC Rejects Son's Claim

Judgment digest by NyayVidhan: a summary of the court's judgment, not its text. The judgment itself is the authoritative version.

Brief Facts

The appellant was born on 06.01.1994 (para 8). In 1993 his father's sister had sued for partition of his grandfather's property; the suit was decreed on a compromise dated 03.02.1994, under which his father got land of 1811 sq. ft. (paras 3, 37). In 1997 the father sold it to original defendants 2 and 3 (para 4). The appellant, a minor suing through his mother as natural guardian, then claimed partition and a half share as joint family property, without challenging the compromise decree or the sale deeds (paras 2, 4). The purchasers pleaded that the father was absolute owner under the decree; the father did not contest (paras 5, 8). The City Civil Court, Chennai passed a preliminary decree of partition. On the purchasers' first appeal, the High Court set it aside: under Section 8 the son took his share absolutely and the grandson had no right by birth (paras 6-7, 9-13).

Questions before the Court (framed by NyayVidhan)

Did the grandfather's property devolve on his Class I heirs under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956?
Did the father's share under the 1994 partition decree stay coparcenary property, giving the appellant, born before the decree, a right by birth?
Could unamended Section 6, or Section 29-A of the Tamil Nadu amendment, support his claim?

Submissions

For the appellant. Born before the compromise decree, he became a coparcener by birth; partition did not destroy the coparcenary character as against the father's own son, and he was not a party to the partition suit (para 17). Under Section 29-A the father's share was not self-acquired (paras 14-15). He relied on Rohit Chauhan and Arshnoor Singh (para 18).

For the respondents. Section 8 governs a grandson's claim to his grandfather's property, and a son's son is not a Class I heir; Sections 6 and 29-A did not apply (paras 22-23). The compromise decree was never challenged and the purchasers were innocent (para 25). They relied on Chander Sen, Vimalben Ajitbhai Patel and Radha Bai (para 24).

Court's Findings

Devolution under Section 8

Under Section 8 the property of a male Hindu dying intestate devolves on the Class I heirs, who take simultaneously to the exclusion of all others. A son's son is not a Class I heir, so he could get no right in his grandfather's property under that provision (para 34). Following Chander Sen, it would be difficult to hold that property devolving on a Hindu under Section 8 is HUF property in his hands vis-à-vis his own son; the express words of Section 8 must prevail (paras 29, 38). The Court also set out Bhanwar Singh and Radha Bai (paras 30-33).

The father's share after the 1994 decree

On the grandfather's death, his property devolved on his Class I heirs and did not become HUF property of the son's branch including the grandson (para 35). Under the compromise decree each heir became exclusive owner of his or her share; the heirs took as tenants in common, the property ceased to be joint family property and the joint coparcenary did not continue (para 35). The succession opened before the appellant was born, so no interest devolved on him (para 36). The father's share became his exclusive property in his individual capacity and cannot be said to be coparcenary (para 41).

Section 6 and Section 29-A

Unamended Section 6 provided for devolution of a coparcener's interest by survivorship on the death of a male Hindu after 1956. The grandfather's date of death was not indicated and the partition suit among the Class I heirs was filed in 1993, so neither Section 6 nor Section 29-A had any application on these facts; the appellant was not a surviving coparcener on his grandfather's death (para 39). There was no infirmity in the impugned judgment (para 41).

Legal Principle

Where a male Hindu's property devolves on his Class I heirs under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and is divided among them by a partition decree, the share falling to a son becomes his exclusive property in his individual capacity; his own son acquires no coparcenary right in it by birth (paras 35, 38, 41).

NyayVidhan's view · Practice note

Why It Matters

In a partition suit founded on a right by birth, the judgment turns on how the property reached the father. Where it devolved under Section 8 on Class I heirs and was divided by a decree, the father's share is his individual property, and a son born before the decree acquires no share in it by birth (paras 35, 41). Plead the date of the ancestor's death: the Court noted it was not indicated when it held Section 6 inapplicable (para 39). The Court also noted that neither the partition decree nor the sale deeds were challenged (para 40). For a different Section 6 question, the coparcenary share of children of a void marriage, see Revanasiddappa v. Mallikarjun.

Editorial comment by the NyayVidhan Editorial Desk. It is not part of the Court's judgment and is not legal advice.

Precedents Relied Upon

Shanmugha Udayar v. Sivanandam and others 1993 SCC OnLine Mad 99
Referred To Discussed at ¶ 16
A Madras High Court decision cited by the appellant for the submission that the Tamil Nadu amendment of 1989 made daughters equal coparceners from 1989; the Court did not discuss it.
Rohit Chauhan v. Surinder Singh and others (2013) 9 SCC 419
Referred To Discussed at ¶ 18
Cited by the appellant, with Arshnoor Singh, for the submission that ancestral coparcenary property allotted to a coparcener on partition remains coparcenary property qua the allottee's son; the Court did not discuss it.
Arshnoor Singh v. Harpal Kaur (2020) 14 SCC 436
Referred To Discussed at ¶ 18
Cited by the appellant, with Rohit Chauhan, for the submission that ancestral coparcenary property allotted to a coparcener on partition remains coparcenary property qua the allottee's son; the Court did not discuss it.

View all precedents (8)

Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur v. Chander Sen (1986) 3 SCC 567
Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 24, 26, 29, 31, 33, 38
Class I of the Schedule to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 includes the son and the son of a predeceased son but not the son's son; so a son inheriting under Section 8 takes the property in his individual capacity, not as karta of his own undivided family, and the express words of Section 8 must prevail (paras 21-24 of that judgment quoted). Applied by the Court to the present case.
Radha Bai v. Ram Narayan and others (2020) 19 SCC 513
Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 24, 32, 33
Ancestral property that came, on a partition between two sons, to the exclusive share of one of them was held by him in his individual capacity and could be alienated by him; his granddaughter could not be treated as a Class I heir or a coparcener so as to claim a share (paras 19-22 and 25-27 of that judgment quoted, noting Chander Sen). Also relied on by the respondents.
Bhanwar Singh v. Puran and others (2008) 3 SCC 87
Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 30, 31
Where admitted joint family property was partitioned between the original owner's son and three daughters, it ceased to be joint family property and the joint coparcenary did not continue; Section 6 was not attracted, and the heirs, as tenants in common under Section 19, could each alienate their shares. The question there was whether a grandson had acquired an interest by birth.
Yudhisthir v. Ashok Kumar (1987) 1 SCC 204
Referred To Discussed at ¶ 31, 33
Noted, in the account of Bhanwar Singh, as reiterating the principles in Chander Sen; its para 10 is quoted within the extract from Radha Bai.
C.I.T. v. M. Karthikeyan 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 112
Referred To Discussed at ¶ 31
Noted, in the account of Bhanwar Singh, as reiterating the principles in Chander Sen.

Father's Share Under 1994 Partition Decree Was His Exclusive Property: Supreme Court Rejects Son's Claim by Birth

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