Judgment Intelligence
Petition Dismissed- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of Decision
- 2 December 1977
- Bench
- Chief Justice M.H. Beg and Justices V.R. Krishna Iyer, P.N. Bhagwati, P.K. Goswami and P.N. Shinghal (Constitution Bench)
- Relevant Acts & Sections
- Constitution of India — Articles 141, 145(3), 226, 324, 327, 328, 329(b); Representation of the People Act, 1951 — Sections 14, 30, 58, 64A, 66, 80, 80A, 98, 100(1)(d)(iv), 153
Appeal dismissed, each party bearing its own costs: the writ petition was barred by Article 329(b), and every relief claimed in the pending election petition was within the election court's reach (para 75; concurring, para 108).
Source Supreme Court of India, judgment dated 2 December 1977 · Court's copy
Key holdings
- Article 329(b) bans litigative challenges to steps taken to carry the election to the declaration of the result (para 74).
- Election runs from the Presidential notification to the declaration of the returned candidate (para 74; concurring, para 99).
- A writ petition against cancellation of the whole poll coupled with a re-poll is barred (para 25).
- Where law is silent, Article 324 is a reservoir of power, to be used bona fide and under the rule of law (para 74).
- Natural justice applies flexibly to an order for a total re-poll; candidates, not the whole electorate, must be heard (paras 56, 59, 74).
- A statutory order is judged by the reasons stated in it, not by fresh reasons given later in an affidavit (para 7).
- Mal-exercise of Article 324 power is non-compliance under section 100(1)(d)(iv); the election court can grant every relief (paras 71, 73, 75).
Case explainer by NyayVidhan: an account of this judgment and the law it laid down, not the court's text. The judgment itself is the authoritative version.
Brief Facts
Questions before the Court (framed by NyayVidhan)
- Does Article 329(b) bar a writ petition under Article 226 against an order cancelling a constituency's whole poll and directing a fresh poll?
- Can the Commission, under Article 324, order a re-poll of an entire constituency where the Act is silent?
- Must the Commission give the candidates notice and a hearing before cancelling a poll?
- Can the order be supported by reasons given later in an affidavit?
- Can the election court give full relief against such a cancellation?
Submissions
For the appellant. Article 329(b) did not bar a challenge to an order that dismantled the election instead of promoting it, and section 100 did not cover the cancellation of a completed poll, so the appellant would have no remedy (para 16). Article 324 was confined to what the Act conferred; sections 58 and 64A allowed a fresh poll only at particular polling stations, and only the President could alter the notification (para 31; concurring, paras 94, 97). The order was arbitrary and made without a hearing (paras 66, 71).
For the respondents. Article 329(b) ousted the High Court's jurisdiction, and the Commission had acted fairly within Article 324, a plenary power usable where specific legislation is absent (paras 5, 31). Natural justice did not apply: elections need speed, the order was provisional because the election court had the last word, no candidate had a right before the declaration, and a hearing would have to reach the whole constituency (para 49). A hearing had in fact been given (para 56).
Court's Findings
Article 329(b) bars the writ petition
Article 329(b) leaves an election petition as the sole remedy and excludes every other, Article 226 included, whenever a proceeding calls an election in question (para 17). Election, in its wide sense, covers every step from the Presidential notification to the declaration of the result (paras 20, 74). Following Ponnuswami, the Court separated proceedings that interfere with the progress of an election from those that further it; immunity attaches only to acts done to further a free and fair election (paras 21-22, 28). A writ petition against the cancellation coupled with a re-poll called a step in the election in question and was barred; a bare cancellation without a re-poll would have stood differently (para 25).
Article 324 fills gaps, within limits
Article 324 vests the whole responsibility for elections in the Commission, but where valid law exists the Commission must act in conformity with it; the Article operates in areas left unoccupied by legislation (paras 30-31, 74). It is a reservoir of power to push forward a free and fair election, used bona fide and under the rule of law (paras 31, 74). A re-poll of a whole constituency could be saved by Article 324 if it was bona fide necessary to vindicate the electorate's free verdict, while the particular order stayed open to scrutiny (para 31).
Natural justice applies, flexibly
After Kraipak, calling the cancellation administrative does not exclude natural justice (paras 36, 41). Urgency may shrink the hearing but not abolish it: a short hearing, an urgent meeting or a hearing immediately after the action may do (paras 46, 52-53). Civil consequences cover everything that affects a citizen in his civil life, so a candidate who has reached the end of the battle and sees the whole poll upset must get notice and a hearing (paras 55-56). Only the candidates, not the voters at large, need be heard, and the order was no mere prima facie step (paras 59-61). Whether a hearing was given was left to the election court (paras 56, 74).
Reasons cannot be supplied later
When a statutory functionary makes an order on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned; they cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in an affidavit or otherwise, or an order bad at the start could be validated by grounds brought out later. The Court relied on Bose J. in Gordhandas Bhanji that public orders must be construed objectively from their own language (para 7).
Full relief lies before the election court
A mal-exercise of power under Article 324 is a non-compliance with that provision and falls within section 100(1)(d)(iv), a residuary clause, as Durga Shankar Mehta had read its predecessor (paras 71-72). Under section 98 and the doctrine of implied powers, the election court can direct a re-poll of particular polling stations or of postal ballots, order a recount and, on valid grounds, declare the appellant elected (para 73). The bar of Article 329(b) is as wide as the door of section 100 read with section 98 (para 75).
Separate Opinions
What Changes
Legal Principle
NyayVidhan's view · Practice note
Why It Matters
On NyayVidhan, the judgments that cite this case most often rely on one rule: an order made by a statutory authority is judged by the reasons stated in it and cannot be shored up by fresh reasons in an affidavit (para 7). In election disputes the ruling still sets the route. A candidate aggrieved by a step taken to carry an election forward, even a countermanded poll, must wait for the result and file an election petition, where sections 98 and 100(1)(d)(iv) let the election court undo the step and give complete relief (paras 25, 73, 75). A step that prevents or halts the election, instead of furthering it, is not shielded (paras 27-28, 67). The Commission's residuary power under Article 324 is real but bounded by valid law, good faith and a fair hearing to the candidates (para 74). For later rulings on the Commission's powers and on natural justice in election matters, see Association for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India and State Election Commission, Rajasthan v. Indraj Singh.
Editorial comment by the NyayVidhan Editorial Desk. It is not part of the Court's judgment and is not legal advice.
Precedents Relied Upon
- Gordhandas Bhanji A.I.T. 1952 S.C. 16
Bose J. held that public orders made under a statutory authority must be construed objectively from the language of the order, not from later explanations of what the officer meant. Relied on for the rule that a statutory functionary's order is judged by the reasons stated in it and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in an affidavit or otherwise.
- Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain [1976] 2 S.C.R. 347
Mathew J.'s outline of the constitutional scheme of elections (laws, an executive for their conduct, a tribunal for disputes) and of the rule of law excluding arbitrary official action; cited also on natural justice where a power is conferred without mentioning it, and for the warning that the fear of perversion is no test of power.
- N. P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency and Others [1952] S.C.R. 218
Article 329(b) postpones election disputes to an election petition after the election, election covering the entire process; anything done towards completing the election does not call it in question. Followed in both opinions to hold the writ petition against the cancellation and re-poll barred.
View all precedents (22)
- Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghueraj Singh and Others [1955] 1 S.C.R. 267
Once the Election Tribunal has decided, the bar ends and Article 136 applies; and non-compliance with the Constitution in the election law's grounds clause is a residuary provision for any infraction. Relied on to read section 100(1)(d)(iv) as covering a mal-exercise of power under Article 324.
- Hari Vishnu Kamath [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1104
Upheld the rule in Ponnuswami excluding any proceeding, including one under Article 226, during the ongoing election, from notification to declaration.
- Virendra [1958] S.C.R. 308
Cited for the rule that discretion vested in a high functionary may be reasonably trusted to be used properly.
- Harishankar [1955] 1 S.C.R. 380
Cited with Virendra: discretion vested in a high functionary may be reasonably trusted to be used properly.
- Kraipak [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457
A five-Judge Bench applied natural justice to administrative proceedings; relied on to hold that calling the cancellation of a poll an administrative act does not exclude natural justice.
- Schmit [1969] 2 Ch. 149
Cited with Kraipak as making the administrative and quasi-judicial dichotomy obsolescent in England; relied on by the respondents among the decisions on exclusion of a hearing.
- All Party Hill Leaders Conference, Shillong v. Capt. W. A. Satigma [1978] 1 S.C.R. 393
Cited for the view that Article 324 vests functions which may be administrative and marginally judicative or legislative.
- Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] A.C. 40
A leading case that restored natural justice to administrative action; cited for the rule that classifying functions as judicial or administrative no longer decides whether a hearing is due.
- Russol v. Duke of Norfolk (1949) 1 All E.R. 109,118
Tucker L.J.: whatever standard of natural justice is adopted, the person concerned must have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case, and its requirements depend on the circumstances.
- Selvaraien [1976] 1 All E.R. 12,19
Lord Denning's statement that a person who may be adversely affected must be told the case against him and given a fair opportunity to answer it, though the body is master of its own procedure.
- Wiseman v. Borneman [1967] 3 All E.R. 1945
Cited for the balance between expedition and a fair opportunity and for the flexibility of natural justice; relied on by the respondents for a provisional decision needing no hearing, but held to concern only a prima facie decision, which the Commission's order is not.
- Pearlberg (1972) 1 W.L.R. 534
The House of Lords on natural justice at the stage of a prima facie decision before a tax assessment; held not to answer the case because the Commission's order is not a prima facie step subject to later modification.
- Rain Gopal [1970] 1 S.C.R. 472
Relied on by the respondents for the view that a hearing is needed only where civil consequences ensue; held inapplicable, since a temporary servant's tenure ends legally without injury.
- Col. Sinha [1971] 1 S.C.R. 791
Relied on by the respondents on civil consequences; read as holding only that lowering the retirement age takes away no right of a government servant, unlike the procedural rights of a candidate.
- Binapani [1967] 2 S.C.R. 625
Noted as conceding that the State may retire a servant on superannuation; not contrary to the view taken.
- Bihar School Examination Board v. Subhas Chandra Sinha & Ors. [1970] 3 S.C.R. 963
Cancellation of a whole examination for mass copying without hearing the examinees was upheld; relied on by the respondents, but held inapplicable because candidates in an election, unlike the electorate, are parties with a vital stake in the poll.
- Ghanshyam Das Gupta [1962] Supp 3 S.C.R. 236
Natural justice applied when the examination result of three candidates was cancelled; even an enquiry involving many persons should be regulated, not dispense with the opportunity.
- Metajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari [1955] 2 SCR 925
Cited by the Additional Solicitor General on the doctrine of implied powers.
- Commissioner of Commercial taxes,& Ors v. R. S. Jhaver & ors. etc. [1968] 1 SCR 148
Cited by the Additional Solicitor General on the doctrine of implied powers.
