Judgment Intelligence
Petition Dismissed- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of Decision
- 21 January 1952
- Bench
- Chief Justice M. Patanjali Sastri and Justices Fazl Ali, Mehr Chand Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea, Sudhi Ranjan Das and N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar
- Relevant Acts & Sections
- Constitution of India — Articles 71(1), 132, 226, 227, 324, 327, 328 and 329(b); Representation of the People Act, 1951 — Sections 36, 80, 100, 105 and 170
Appeal dismissed: the Madras High Court's order declining jurisdiction under Article 226 upheld, and the view of that Court and seven other High Courts that they cannot entertain petitions against the rejection of nomination papers affirmed; no order as to costs (para 38).
Source Supreme Court of India, judgment dated 21 January 1952 · Court's copy
Key holdings
- Election in Part XV means the entire process culminating in a candidate being declared elected (para 10).
- Questioning the rejection of a nomination paper is calling the election in question (paras 12-13).
- Grounds that can vitiate an election may be raised only by an election petition, at no other stage or court (para 13).
- Article 329(b) excludes the High Court's jurisdiction over matters arising while elections are in progress (para 18).
- The 1951 Act gives a single remedy: an election petition after the election is over (paras 16-17).
- The right to vote or stand as a candidate is not a civil right but a creature of statute (para 25).
- Hardship to an individual candidate is a secondary question (para 6).
Case explainer by NyayVidhan: an account of this judgment and the law it laid down, not the court's text. The judgment itself is the authoritative version.
Brief Facts
Questions before the Court (framed by NyayVidhan)
- Does election in Article 329(b) mean only the final result, or the whole process from nomination to the declaration of the result?
- Is a challenge to the rejection of a nomination paper calling the election in question, open only by an election petition?
- Can a High Court entertain a writ petition under Article 226 against such a rejection while the election is in progress?
- Do the wider words of Article 71(1), or the Returning Officer's duty of scrutiny under section 36, support a narrower reading?
Submissions
For the appellant. Article 329(b) did not affect the High Court's jurisdiction, and he was entitled to certiorari (para 2). Election there meant the result of the poll or the final selection, since an election petition can be filed only after polling. Articles 324, 327 and 328 use wider words, such as arising out of or in connection with, so Article 329(b) left nominations outside it; and as section 36 was made under Article 327, which is subject to the Constitution, the Returning Officer's order stayed open under Article 226 (para 9). The wider words of Article 71(1) on presidential elections pointed the same way (paras 27-28). A remedy after the election was inadequate (paras 3-4), and if nomination were part of the election, section 36 would be ultra vires (para 36).
For the respondents. The judgment sets out no separate submissions for the respondents. It records points conceded at the bar: Article 329(b), unlike laws made under Articles 327 and 328, excludes the Article 226 jurisdiction over the matters it covers; it ousts the courts from matters between the start of polling and the final selection; and in England an improper rejection has always been raised by an election petition after the election (paras 8, 20-21).
Court's Findings
Election means the whole process
The word election has acquired both a narrow meaning, the final selection of a candidate, and a wide one, the entire process culminating in a candidate being declared elected. Agreeing with Srinivasalu v. Kuppuswami (Madras) and Sat Narain v. Hanuman Prasad (Lahore), Fazl Ali J. held that Part XV uses the word in the wide sense; the expression conduct of elections in Article 324 points the same way, and the treatises show an election as a process of several stages (paras 10-11).
Questioning a rejection is questioning the election
Improper rejection of a nomination paper is one of the grounds on which section 100 of the 1951 Act allows an election to be declared void (para 12). Under the election law, the rejection's only significance is that it can be used as a ground to call the election in question. Article 329(b) prescribes the manner in which, and the stage at which, such grounds may be raised, so by necessary implication they cannot be raised in any other manner, at any other stage or before any other court. Any other reading would make the special tribunal pointless and allow the High Court before polling and the tribunal afterwards to take conflicting views (para 13). Part XV is a code in itself, and Article 329 covers all electoral matters (paras 14, 21).
No writ while the election is in progress
The 1951 Act is self-contained and nowhere allows anything connected with elections to be questioned at an intermediate stage (para 15). Under the rule in Wolverhampton New Water Works Co. v. Hawkesford, a right created by a statute that gives a special remedy must be enforced by that remedy only; the Act provides one, an election petition presented after the election is over (paras 16-17). That the Act was made subject to the Constitution did not help the appellant: the opening words of Article 329(b), notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, are apt to exclude the High Court's jurisdiction over any matter arising while the elections are in progress (para 18). Similar English words have never been held to permit certiorari or mandamus against a rejection (paras 19-20). Elections should keep to their time schedule, and irregularities that would vitiate one go to a special tribunal by election petition, not to a court mid-way (para 22). Drawing on Theberge v. Laudry, the right to vote or stand is a creature of statute (paras 23-25).
Article 71(1) and section 36
The contrast with Article 71(1) lost much of its force once it was accepted that one idea can be expressed in different ways. Article 329(b) follows the wording of the election rules made under the Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935; its negative form suits a provision meant to oust the jurisdiction of all courts in electoral matters and lay down the only mode of challenge, while Article 71(1) is affirmative because it confers a special jurisdiction on the Supreme Court (paras 29-35). The section 36 argument had no bearing on the result: scrutiny is only a stage in the election process, and a Returning Officer who performs that duty does not call any election in question (para 37).
What Changes
Legal Principle
NyayVidhan's view · Practice note
Why It Matters
For a candidate whose nomination was rejected, the ruling's lesson is that the poll cannot be stopped by a writ petition. The rejection is a ground for an election petition after the result, and Article 329(b) closes every other route while the election is in progress (paras 13, 18, 38). Hardship to the candidate does not change that; the Court treated it as a secondary question and stressed that elections should keep to their time schedule (paras 6, 22). Two limits frame it. It construed Article 329(b), which covers elections to Parliament and the State Legislatures, with the Representation of the People Act, 1951 as it then stood; and it left the powers of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227, and of the Supreme Court under Article 136, to be decided on a proper occasion (paras 7, 26). For recent Rajasthan High Court rulings on rejected nominations in panchayat elections, see Anil v. State of Rajasthan and Jetu Devi v. State of Rajasthan.
Editorial comment by the NyayVidhan Editorial Desk. It is not part of the Court's judgment and is not legal advice.
Precedents Relied Upon
- Sarvothama Rao v. Chairman, Municipal Council, Saidapet (1924) I.L.R. 47 mad. 585 at 600
Wallace J.'s observations that a post-election remedy is wholly inadequate for a candidate whose nomination was rejected were set out as the hardship the appellant relied on; the Court said they represent only one side of the picture and that hardship is a secondary question once the construction of Article 329(b) is settled.
- Desi Chettiar v. Chinnasami Chettiar (1928) A. I.R. Mad. 1271 at 1272
The same Judge's later passage: the candidate's remedy is an election petition, and the inconvenience of holding up elections while individuals pursue their own grievances must be weighed; the Court held that this applies with greater force to elections to legislatures.
- Srinivasalu v. Kuppuswami (1928) A.I.R. Mad. 253 at 255
The Madras High Court's view that election may be taken to embrace the whole procedure whereby an elected member is returned, whether or not a poll is needed; Fazl Ali J. agreed with it and read election in Part XV in that wide sense.
View all precedents (10)
- Sat Narain v. Hanuman Prasad (1945) A.I.R. Lah. 85
Cited as the case in which a member of the Bench (printed 'Maimjan J.') had agreed with the Srinivasalu view of election as the whole procedure.
- Wolverhampton New Water Works Co. v. Hawkesford 6 C.B. (N.S.) 336, 356
Willes J.'s rule that where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which gives a special and particular remedy, that remedy must be followed; applied to hold that the Representation of the People Act, 1951 provides only one remedy, an election petition after the election is over.
- Neville v. London Express Newspaper Limited [1919] A.C. 368
The House of Lords approved the Wolverhampton rule on special statutory remedies.
- Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant & Co. [1935] A.C. 532
The Privy Council reaffirmed the Wolverhampton rule on special statutory remedies.
- Secretary of State v. Mask & Co. (1940) 44 C.W.N. 709
The Privy Council reaffirmed the Wolverhampton rule on special statutory remedies.
- Hurdutrai v. Official Assignee of Calcutta (1948) 52 C.W.N. 343, 349
Cited for the rule being equally applicable to the enforcement of rights.
- Theberge v. Laudry (1876) 2 App. Cas. 102
The Privy Council refused special leave against a Quebec court's judgment on an election petition: the election statutes created a special jurisdiction meant to become conclusive as soon as possible. The Court drew from it that the right to vote or stand as a candidate is a creature of statute, and that a special election tribunal's jurisdiction is exercised under the law that creates it.

