Judgment Intelligence
Disposed Of- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of Decision
- 30 August 1978
- Bench
- Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud and Justices V.R. Krishna Iyer, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, P.N. Shinghal and D.A. Desai (five Judges)
- Relevant Acts & Sections
- Constitution of India — Articles 14, 19, 20(2), 21, 32; Prisons Act, 1894 — Sections 30(2), 46, 56; Indian Penal Code — Sections 73, 74; Code of Criminal Procedure — Section 366(2)
Both writ petitions disposed of in the light of the observations made in the judgment; section 30(2), as read down, and section 56, as interpreted, did not violate the Constitution (paras 251-252, 265-266).
Source Supreme Court of India, judgment dated 30 August 1978 · Court's copy
Key holdings
- Prisoners are entitled to all constitutional rights unless their liberty has been constitutionally curtailed (para 235).
- Solitary confinement is a punishment only a court can impose; section 30(2) does not let jail authorities impose it (paras 241-242).
- A prisoner is under sentence of death only when the sentence is final, conclusive and indefeasible (para 245).
- Even then, unless special circumstances exist, he stays within sight and sound of other prisoners (para 246).
- Bar fetters need reasons germane to safe custody, judged on the prisoner's own character, not on the sentence alone (paras 259, 262).
- Reasons for fetters must be recorded, with revision to the Inspector General and regular review (para 261).
- Degrading treatment is arbitrary under Article 14; bar fetters may not be kept on for an unusually long period (para 264).
Case explainer by NyayVidhan: an account of this judgment and the law it laid down, not the court's text. The judgment itself is the authoritative version.
Brief Facts
Questions before the Court (framed by NyayVidhan)
- Do prisoners keep their fundamental rights inside jail, and may the Court intervene?
- Does section 30(2) of the Prisons Act authorise solitary confinement of a prisoner under sentence of death?
- When is a prisoner under sentence of death for section 30(2)?
- So read, does section 30(2) violate Articles 14, 19, 20 or 21?
- Does section 56 give the Superintendent unguided power to put a prisoner in bar fetters, contrary to Articles 14 and 21?
Submissions
For the petitioners. The amicus curiae for Batra urged that section 30 did not empower the jail to impose solitary confinement: separate and cellular confinement under section 46 punish jail offences, and solitary confinement could be awarded only by a court under sections 73 and 74 of the Penal Code; read otherwise, section 30(2) violated Articles 14, 19, 20 and 21 (para 238). Sobhraj argued that section 56 gave the Superintendent unguided, uncanalised and arbitrary power to confine a prisoner in irons, ultra vires Articles 14 and 21 (para 254), and that fetters kept on day and night reduced a prisoner from a human being to an animal (para 264).
For the respondents. The Additional Solicitor General did not claim that section 30(2) allowed solitary confinement: it permitted statutory segregation for the prisoner's own safety, and should be read down rather than struck down (para 240). It was said that prisoners have no fundamental freedom to escape from lawful custody (para 256).
Court's Findings
Prisoners keep their fundamental rights
Convicts are not wholly denuded of their fundamental rights: no iron curtain can be drawn between the prisoner and the Constitution, and prisoners are entitled to all constitutional rights unless their liberty has been constitutionally curtailed; lawful incarceration limits some rights, but even a convict keeps the protection of Article 21 (para 235). Since a convict is in prison under its order, the Court need not take a hands-off attitude; it must balance the dehumanising prison atmosphere against order, security against escape and rehabilitation (para 236).
No solitary confinement under section 30(2)
Solitary confinement is a substantive punishment that only a court can impose, within the strict limits of sections 73 and 74 of the Penal Code (para 241). Section 30(2) does not provide a punishment for breach of jail discipline, and even the separate and cellular confinement of section 46 do not remove a prisoner from the sight of others (paras 241-242). The jail authorities have no power to add to the punishment the court imposed, so section 30(2) does not empower them to impose solitary confinement (para 242).
Under sentence of death means a final sentence
A Sessions Judge's death sentence cannot be executed until the High Court confirms it, and appeals and mercy petitions may follow, yet prison authorities applied section 30(2) from that sentence (para 244). The expression can only mean a prisoner whose death sentence has become final, conclusive and indefeasible, beyond judicial scrutiny (para 245). Until then he is in jail custody under section 366(2) of the Code only to be available for execution. Even afterwards he may be kept in a cell apart with a day and night watch, but unless special circumstances exist he must be within the sight and sound of other prisoners and able to take food in their company (para 246).
Read down, section 30(2) is valid
Solitary confinement on top of jail custody would punish twice, against Article 20(2), but section 30(2) as read excludes it (para 247). Substantially curtailing the liberty to move, mix, mingle and talk with co-prisoners without the backing of law violates Article 21; that law must be right, just and fair, and an arbitrary law violates Article 14; read down, the section loses its obnoxious element (para 251). Classification by sentence for security is valid, and the restriction does not violate Article 19 (para 252).
Bar fetters under section 56
Bar fetters make a serious inroad on a prisoner's limited liberty and need the authority of law (para 257). The power under section 56 may be used only for reasons germane to safe custody, such as the prisoner's character and propensities, judged for each prisoner; necessity is opposed to mere expediency, and the length of sentence or the gravity of the crime is not by itself relevant (paras 259, 262). Reasons must be recorded in the journal and the history ticket, as far as possible in a language the prisoner understands, with revision to the Inspector General and regular review; so guided, the power is not arbitrary (paras 261, 263). But treatment that offends human dignity and reduces a man to the level of a beast is arbitrary under Article 14, and section 56 does not permit bar fetters for an unusually long period, day and night (para 264).
Separate Opinions
What Changes
Legal Principle
NyayVidhan's view · Practice note
Why It Matters
On NyayVidhan, the judgments that cite this case rely on its starting point: prisoners are entitled to all constitutional rights unless their liberty has been constitutionally curtailed, and lawful incarceration limits only some of them (para 235). The Supreme Court in Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India relied on it for the view that limits on inmates that are cruel or irrelevant to rehabilitation are unreasonable and arbitrary (concurring, para 54). Shayara Bano v. Union of India cited it as a Constitution Bench ruling that read down section 30(2) and treated arbitrariness as a ground for striking down a law (para 251). For jail administrations the working test is the one set for section 56: irons only where the prisoner's own character makes them necessary for safe custody, with reasons recorded in a language he understands, a revision to the Inspector General and frequent review (paras 259, 261).
Editorial comment by the NyayVidhan Editorial Desk. It is not part of the Court's judgment and is not legal advice.
Precedents Relied Upon
- Procunier v. Martinex 40 L. Ed. 2d. 224
Prisoners are entitled to all constitutional rights unless their liberty has been constitutionally curtailed. Its account of the State's interests in prisons (internal order and discipline, security against escape, rehabilitation) was relied on to find guidelines for the power under section 56.
- Wolff v. McDonnell 41 L. Ed. 2d. 935
Conviction does not reduce a person to a nonperson; the imposition of any major punishment within the prison system is conditional upon procedural safeguards.
- D. Bhuvan Mohan Patnaik & ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & ors [1975] 2 SCR 24
Convicts are not, by mere reason of the conviction, denuded of all their fundamental rights, and even a convict keeps the right under Article 21. Followed, with its approval of Field J.'s account of life and liberty.
View all precedents (12)
- Poll v. Procunier 41 L. Ed. 2d. 495
Lawful incarceration brings about a necessary withdrawal or limitation of some fundamental rights, justified by the considerations underlying the penal system.
- State of Maharashtra v. Sindhi @ Raman [1975] 3 SCR 574
The trial of an accused under sentence of death does not end in the Court of Sessions, since the sentence is subject to confirmation by the High Court. Relied on to hold that a prisoner is under sentence of death only when the sentence is final.
- Shaik Abdul Azeez v. State of Karnataka [1977] 3 SCR 393
Under section 303 of the Penal Code an accused is under sentence of imprisonment for life only if a judicially final sentence is legally extant. Relied on for the meaning of under sentence of death in section 30(2).
- Munn v. Illinois [1877] 94 US 113
Field J. explained that life means something more than mere animal existence and liberty something more than freedom from physical restraint. Relied on for the content of life and personal liberty in Article 21.
- Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. [1964] I SCR 332
A Constitution Bench approved Field J.'s statement; personal liberty is a compendious term for the rights that make up personal liberty other than those in Article 19(1)(d), and the burden to justify its curtailment rests on the State.
- A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras [1950] SCR 88
Its view that each article of the Constitution deals exclusively with its own subject was noted as no longer the law, the doctrine of exclusivity having been overruled in R. C. Cooper.
- R. C. Cooper v. Union of India [1971] 1 SCR 512
A majority overruled the doctrine of exclusivity of fundamental rights. Relied on to test section 30(2) against Articles 14, 19 and 21 together.
- Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [1978] I SCC 248
The law in procedure established by law must be right, just and fair, not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive, and a law under Article 21 must also meet Articles 19 and 14. Followed to read section 30(2) down.
- Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P. [1973] 2 SCR 541
A Constitution Bench had pointed out that the Constitution has no provision like the Eighth Amendment against cruel and unusual punishment; the Court held degrading treatment arbitrary under Article 14 instead.
