Tuesday, 17 November 2026
Supreme Court of India
Constitutional Law

Shayara Bano: Triple Talaq Set Aside 3:2; Manifestly Arbitrary Laws Can Be Struck Down

Published: · NyayVidhan · 7 min read

In Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017 INSC 785), the Supreme Court held by a 3:2 majority of a five-Judge Constitution Bench that the practice of talaq-e-biddat, instant triple talaq, is set aside (Order of the Court). Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman, for himself and Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, held that Section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 recognises and enforces triple talaq, which is manifestly arbitrary and violates Article 14, so the Act is void to that extent (paras 18, 57). Justice Kurian Joseph concurred: triple talaq is against the Quran and lacks legal sanctity (concurring, paras 10, 26). Chief Justice Khehar and Justice Nazeer dissented.

Shayara Bano: Triple Talaq Set Aside 3:2; Manifestly Arbitrary Laws Can Be Struck Down

Judgment Intelligence

Petition Allowed
Shayara Bano v. Union of India and others
2017 INSC 785
Writ Petition (C) No. 118 of 2016 with Suo Motu Writ (C) No. 2 of 2015 and Writ Petitions (C) Nos. 288, 327 and 665 of 2016 and 43 of 2017
Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of Decision
22 August 2017
Bench
Chief Justice Jagdish Singh Khehar and Justices Kurian Joseph, Rohinton Fali Nariman, Uday Umesh Lalit and S. Abdul Nazeer (3:2; Chief Justice Khehar and Justice Nazeer dissenting)
Relevant Acts & Sections
Constitution of India — Articles 13, 14, 25, 32, 141, 142; Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 — Section 2
Final Outcome

Practice of talaq-e-biddat (triple talaq) set aside by a majority of 3:2 (Order of the Court). Justice Nariman, for himself and Justice Lalit, declared Section 2 of the 1937 Act void to that extent (para 57); the minority would have disposed of the petitions with directions (dissent, para 201).

Source Supreme Court of India, judgment dated 22 August 2017

Key holdings

  1. By a majority of 3:2, the practice of talaq-e-biddat, instant triple talaq, was set aside (Order of the Court).
  2. Section 2 of the 1937 Act recognises and enforces triple talaq and is a law in force under Article 13 (paras 18-19).
  3. Triple talaq is not an essential religious practice and has no protection under Article 25 (para 25).
  4. Legislation, plenary or subordinate, can be struck down under Article 14 as manifestly arbitrary (para 55; concurring, para 5).
  5. McDowell is per incuriam, and judgments reading it as an absolute bar are no longer good law (para 53).
  6. Instant, irrevocable triple talaq shuts out reconciliation and is manifestly arbitrary (para 57).
  7. Justice Kurian Joseph held that triple talaq, being against the Quran, lacks legal sanctity (concurring, paras 10, 26).

Case explainer by NyayVidhan: an account of this judgment and the law it laid down, not the court's text. The judgment itself is the authoritative version.

Brief Facts

Shayara Bano, the lead petitioner, was married in 2001. In October 2015, after she had gone to her parental home, her husband divorced her by a deed of divorce pronouncing talaq three times (dissent, paras 1-3, 7). Under Article 32 she sought a declaration that talaq-e-biddat is void and that Section 2 of the 1937 Act is unconstitutional so far as it supports it, relying on Articles 14, 15 and 21 (dissent, para 1). The matter reached a Constitution Bench after a Division Bench, in Prakash v. Phulavati, noted press reports on discrimination against Muslim women and directed that a public interest petition be registered; similar petitions by Aafreen Rehman, Gulshan Parveen, Ishrat Jahan and Atiya Sabri followed (para 1). The Union of India supported the petitioners, while the All India Muslim Personal Law Board and others opposed them (para 2). The hearing was confined to talaq-e-biddat; polygamy and halala were left for separate consideration (dissent, para 10).

Questions before the Court (framed by NyayVidhan)

  1. Does Section 2 of the 1937 Act recognise and enforce triple talaq, so that it is a law in force open to challenge under Part III?
  2. Is triple talaq an essential religious practice protected by Article 25?
  3. Must the Court leave the question to the legislature?
  4. Can legislation be struck down under Article 14 for being manifestly arbitrary?
  5. Is triple talaq manifestly arbitrary, and what follows for the 1937 Act?

Submissions

For the petitioners and the Union of India. Triple talaq is an anachronism that violates Muslim women’s rights under Articles 14, 15(1) and 21, and Section 2 of the 1937 Act, which makes it a rule of decision, is invalid to that extent (para 2). The Attorney General argued that religion cannot deny Muslim women equal status and dignity, that freedom of religion is subject to the other fundamental rights, and that talaq-e-ahsan and talaq-e-hasan were equally arbitrary (dissent, paras 62, 67, 77).

For the Muslim Personal Law Board and the other respondents. Relying on Narasu Appa Mali, they argued that personal law is beyond Part III; that Section 2 only displaces contrary custom, so Muslim personal law operates of its own force; that triple talaq is protected by Article 25 and fundamental rights bind only State action; and that reform is for the legislature under Article 25(2)(b), citing Ahmedabad Women Action Group (paras 2, 15, 23, 29; dissent, paras 81, 98, 109).

Court's Findings

Section 2 of the 1937 Act enforces triple talaq

In the leading majority opinion, Justice Nariman, for himself and Justice Lalit, held that the non obstante clause in Section 2 cannot govern its enacting part; reading the Act as aimed only at contrary custom would be the tail wagging the dog (paras 16-17). All forms of talaq recognised by Muslim personal law, triple talaq among Sunnis included, are recognised and enforced by the Act, which makes them the rule of decision (para 18). As a pre-Constitution law, the Act is a law in force under Article 13(3)(b), void under Article 13(1) to the extent it is inconsistent with Part III (para 19). Whether Narasu Appa Mali is good law was left open (para 22).

No protection under Article 25

Article 25 protects only essential religious practices (para 24). Triple talaq is permissible in law but called sinful by the very Hanafi school that tolerates it, and Islam would not change in its fundamental nature without it; it is therefore no essential practice and forms no part of Article 25(1), so the plea to leave it to the legislature under Article 25(2)(b) does not arise (para 25).

The Court must decide

The right to move the Court under Article 32 is itself a fundamental right, and the Court cannot decline to decide an alleged breach and send the matter to the legislature (paras 26-27). Ahmedabad Women Action Group, which declined such petitions, contradicts itself and, to the extent it is contrary to at least two Constitution Bench decisions, cannot be said to be good law (paras 29-30).

Manifest arbitrariness reaches legislation

Tracing Article 14 through Royappa, Maneka Gandhi and Ajay Hasia, the opinion held that arbitrariness strikes at legislation as well as executive action (paras 38-41). McDowell, which held that no enactment can be struck down merely as arbitrary, failed to notice Ajay Hasia, K.R. Lakshmanan and the Constitution Bench rulings in Mithu and Sunil Batra; it is per incuriam, and the judgments reading it as an absolute bar are no longer good law (paras 44, 53). Since subordinate legislation can be challenged on any ground available against plenary legislation, one test applies to both: a law is manifestly arbitrary if made capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle, or if it is excessive and disproportionate (para 55). Justice Kurian Joseph agreed on this question of law (concurring, para 5).

Triple talaq is manifestly arbitrary

Triple talaq is an innovative form outside the Sunna, lawful but sinful in Hanafi law (para 56). Shamim Ara held that talaq must be for a reasonable cause and be preceded by attempts at reconciliation by two arbiters from the families (para 56). Because triple talaq is instant and irrevocable, that reconciliation can never take place, and the marital tie can be broken capriciously and whimsically by a Muslim man. It therefore violates Article 14, and the 1937 Act is void to the extent it recognises and enforces it; the discrimination ground was not reached (para 57).

Separate Opinions

Justice Kurian Joseph concurred in setting triple talaq aside by another route. Agreeing with the Chief Justice that the 1937 Act does not regulate talaq, he did not accept that it can be tested under Article 14, though he agreed that legislation can be struck down for arbitrariness (concurring, paras 4-5). Triple talaq closes the door to the reconciliation the Quran requires and so violates Shariat; Shamim Ara had already denied it legal sanctity (concurring, paras 1, 10, 26). Chief Justice Khehar, for himself and Justice Nazeer, dissented: talaq-e-biddat is part of the personal law of Hanafi Sunnis, protected by Article 25, and Articles 14, 15 and 21 reach only State action (dissent, paras 190, 192). Under Article 142 they directed the Union to consider legislation and injuncted Muslim husbands from pronouncing it for six months (dissent, paras 199-200).

What Changes

Triple talaq had been recognised as a legal form of divorce for Sunni Muslims since Sarabai (1906) and the Privy Council’s Rashid Ahmad (1932) (para 20). The practice is now set aside (Order of the Court), and Rashid Ahmad’s view that it is valid without a reasonable cause no longer holds good (para 57). On Article 14, the judgments that read McDowell as barring any challenge to legislation for arbitrariness, Bihar Distillery, Rakesh Kohli, Rajbala and Binoy Viswam, are no longer good law (para 53); plenary and subordinate legislation can be struck down as manifestly arbitrary (para 55).

Legal Principle

Legislation, plenary or subordinate, can be struck down under Article 14 if it is manifestly arbitrary: made capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle, or excessive and disproportionate. Instant triple talaq, which lets a husband break the marriage capriciously with no chance of reconciliation, is manifestly arbitrary; the leading opinion held Section 2 of the 1937 Act void to that extent (paras 55, 57; concurring, para 5).

NyayVidhan's view · Practice note

Why It Matters

Shayara Bano is cited on NyayVidhan less for triple talaq than for its reading of Article 14. Three of the five Judges accepted that legislation, plenary or subordinate, can be struck down for arbitrariness (para 55; concurring, para 5), and Justice Nariman’s opinion supplies the test: a law made capriciously, irrationally or without adequate determining principle, or one that is excessive and disproportionate, is manifestly arbitrary (para 55). Later Supreme Court rulings on this site, including Joseph Shine v. Union of India and Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India (Electoral Bonds), cite it for that proposition. Read it with care: the 3:2 result rests on two routes, because Justice Kurian Joseph did not accept that the 1937 Act enforces triple talaq (concurring, para 5); the leading opinion left the discrimination ground undecided (para 57); and the judgments that read McDowell as an absolute bar were declared no longer good law (para 53).

Editorial comment by the NyayVidhan Editorial Desk. It is not part of the Court's judgment and is not legal advice.

Precedents Relied Upon

  1. Aswini Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda Bose 1953 SCR 1
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 16, 17

    The enacting part of a section is construed first on its natural meaning, and a non obstante clause does not cut it down to the disability it removes. Followed to reject the reading that Section 2 of the 1937 Act only displaces contrary custom, and to hold that it recognises and enforces every form of talaq, triple talaq included.

  2. Rashid Ahmad v. Anisa Khatun (1931-32) 59 IA 21: AIR 1932 PC 25
    Not Followed Discussed at ¶ 20, 21, 57

    The Privy Council held a triple talaq immediately effective. The 1937 Act recognises and enforces this view of the law, but its premise that triple talaq is valid even without a reasonable cause no longer holds good after Shamim Ara.

  3. State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali AIR 1952 Bom 84
    Referred To Discussed at ¶ 2, 3, 22

    Relied on by the Muslim Personal Law Board for the view that personal laws are outside Article 13. As the challenge was to a statute, the Bench found it unnecessary to decide whether it is good law, but said it may need a re-look in a suitable case.

View all precedents (25)
  1. Javed v. State of Haryana 2003 (8) SCC 369
    Applied Discussed at ¶ 24, 25

    What a religion merely permits or does not prohibit is not a religious practice or a positive tenet. Applied to hold that triple talaq, lawful but sinful in the Hanafi school, is not an essential religious practice.

  2. Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagdishwarananda Avadhuta 2004 (12) SCC 770
    Applied Discussed at ¶ 24, 25

    A practice is essential only if the religion would fundamentally change without it. Applied to hold that Islam, as seen through an Indian Sunni Muslim’s eyes, would not change without triple talaq.

  3. Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, U.P. 1963 (Supp.) 1 SCR 885
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 26, 27, 30

    The right to move the Supreme Court under Article 32 is itself a fundamental right, and the Court cannot refuse to entertain petitions complaining of breaches of fundamental rights. Relied on to hold that the Court could not send the matter back to the legislature.

  4. Ahmedabad Women Action Group v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 573
    Not Followed Discussed at ¶ 29, 30

    Relied on by the Muslim Personal Law Board; it declined to decide challenges to personal law as matters of State policy. The Bench found no discernible ratio in it and held that, to the extent it is contrary to at least two Constitution Bench decisions, it cannot be said to be good law.

  5. E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N. (1974) 4 SCC 3
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 38

    Equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies, and an arbitrary act is unequal and violates Article 14. Relied on as the source of the arbitrariness doctrine.

  6. Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 39

    Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action, and reasonableness pervades it. Relied on in tracing the arbitrariness doctrine.

  7. Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi (1981) 1 SCC 722
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 41, 44

    Arbitrariness in State action, whether of the legislature or of the executive, attracts Article 14. Relied on to hold that the doctrine reaches legislation; McDowell failed to notice this Constitution Bench ruling.

  8. K.R. Lakshmanan (Dr.) v. State of T.N. (1996) 2 SCC 226
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 42, 44

    A three-Judge Bench struck down a 1986 Tamil Nadu Act as arbitrary and violative of Article 14, separately from discrimination. Relied on as a coordinate Bench ruling that McDowell failed to notice.

  9. State of A.P. v. McDowell & Co. (1996) 3 SCC 709
    Not Followed Discussed at ¶ 43, 44, 45, 53

    Held that no enactment can be struck down merely as arbitrary or unreasonable. Held per incuriam, having failed to notice Ajay Hasia, K.R. Lakshmanan and the Constitution Bench rulings in Mithu and Sunil Batra, with its reasoning otherwise flawed.

  10. Mithu v. State of Punjab (1983) 2 SCC 277
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 44

    A Constitution Bench struck down Section 303 IPC (mandatory death sentence for life convicts who commit murder) under Articles 14 and 21. Relied on to show that statutory law is struck down if arbitrary.

  11. Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration & Ors. (1978) 4 SCC 494
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 44

    A Constitution Bench read down Section 30(2) of the Prisons Act, holding arbitrariness a ground for striking down a legislative provision. McDowell did not refer to it.

  12. Om Kumar v. Union of India (2001) 2 SCC 386
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 44

    Proportionality has been applied to legislative action in India since 1950. Relied on to reject McDowell’s doubt about applying proportionality to this facet of Article 14.

  13. Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra (1998) 2 SCC 1
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 46

    A law can become arbitrary with the passage of time: freezing rents at 1940 values under the Bombay Rent Act was held arbitrary. Cited to show statutes struck down as arbitrary even after McDowell.

  14. Mardia Chemicals Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. etc. etc. (2004) 4 SCC 311
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 47

    Section 17(2) of the Securitisation Act, 2002 (pre-deposit) was struck down as unreasonable, arbitrary and violative of Article 14. Cited likewise.

  15. Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No.1 of 2012 (2012) 10 SCC 1
    Explained Discussed at ¶ 51

    Read as not treating McDowell as authority that legislation can never be struck down as arbitrary: a constitutional infirmity must be found, and Article 14 itself supplies one when legislation is manifestly arbitrary.

  16. Cellular Operators Association of India v. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (2016) 7 SCC 703
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 54

    Subordinate legislation can be struck down if manifestly arbitrary, meaning done capriciously or without adequate determining principle (quoting Khoday Distilleries and Sharma Transport).

  17. Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India (1985) 1 SCC 641
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 55

    Subordinate legislation can be challenged on any ground available against plenary legislation. Relied on to hold that the test of manifest arbitrariness applies to legislation as well.

  18. Shamim Ara v. State of U.P. (2002) 7 SCC 518
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 56, 57

    Talaq must be for a reasonable cause and be preceded by attempts at reconciliation by two arbiters from the two families. Relied on to hold that instant, irrevocable triple talaq, which shuts out reconciliation, is manifestly arbitrary. Kurian Joseph J. also treated it as the law under Article 141 (concurring opinion).

  19. State of Bihar v. Bihar Distillery Ltd. (1997) 2 SCC 453
    Not Followed Discussed at ¶ 53

    Among the judgments that read McDowell as an absolute bar to striking down legislation as arbitrary under Article 14; held no longer good law, McDowell itself being per incuriam.

  20. State of M.P. v. Rakesh Kohli (2012) 6 SCC 312
    Not Followed Discussed at ¶ 53

    Among the judgments that read McDowell as an absolute bar to striking down legislation as arbitrary under Article 14; held no longer good law, McDowell itself being per incuriam.

  21. Rajbala v. State of Haryana & Ors. (2016) 2 SCC 445
    Not Followed Discussed at ¶ 53

    Among the judgments that read McDowell as an absolute bar to striking down legislation as arbitrary under Article 14; held no longer good law, McDowell itself being per incuriam.

  22. Binoy Viswam v. Union of India (2017) 7 SCC 59
    Not Followed Discussed at ¶ 53

    Among the judgments that read McDowell as an absolute bar to striking down legislation as arbitrary under Article 14; held no longer good law, McDowell itself being per incuriam.

Cited on NyayVidhan

Judgments reported on NyayVidhan that cite this decision, from verified citation links.

  1. Rajasthan High Court 29 October 2026 Relied Upon
  2. Supreme Court of India 2 April 2026 Referred To
  3. Rajasthan High Court 20 March 2025 Followed
  4. Rajasthan High Court 19 December 2024 Referred To
  5. Supreme Court of India 17 October 2024 Applied
View all citing judgments (7)
  1. Supreme Court of India 15 February 2024 Applied
  2. Supreme Court of India 27 September 2018 Applied
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