Judgment Intelligence
Referred to Larger Bench- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of Decision
- 4 November 2026
- Bench
- Justices Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Alok Aradhe
- Relevant Acts & Sections
- Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959 — Section 14(1)(j-1); Constitution of India — Articles 14, 21
Matter referred to a larger Bench for reconsideration of the ratio in Javed v. State of Haryana; the Registry is to place the judgment before the Chief Justice of India. The interim stay of the High Court's judgment continues until the civil appeal is finally decided (paras 66-67).
Source Supreme Court of India, www.sci.gov.in — judgment dated 4 November 2026 · Court's copy
Key holdings
- Javed v. State of Haryana, which upheld the two-child disqualification for panchayat office, has been referred to a larger Bench for reconsideration (para 66).
- India's TFR has fallen from 3.0 when Javed was decided to 1.9, below the replacement level of 2.1 (paras 20, 29).
- Under the doctrine of temporal reasonableness, a law valid when enacted may become arbitrary as its rationale ceases (paras 38-39).
- The Bench saw the norm as excluding citizens from political representation, weighing on women and burdening reproductive autonomy under Article 21 (paras 4, 60, 63-64).
- The Maharashtra provision's validity was not under challenge; the interim stay keeps the appellant in office until the appeal is decided (paras 31, 67).
Judgment digest by NyayVidhan: a summary of the court's judgment, not its text. The judgment itself is the authoritative version.
Brief Facts
Questions before the Court (framed by NyayVidhan)
- Do the assumptions on which Javed v. State of Haryana upheld the two-child disqualification still hold?
- Can a law, and a precedent upholding it, lose its justification because circumstances have changed?
- How does the disqualification bear on political representation, on women and on reproductive autonomy?
- Should Javed be reconsidered by a larger Bench, and what happens to the appellant meanwhile?
Submissions
For the appellant. The only argument the judgment records is that the third child was not conclusively proved, as the place of issue of the birth certificate was allegedly not valid; the Bench noted that she did in fact have a third child (para 5).
For the respondents. The judgment records no submissions for the Additional Commissioner or the other respondents. An amicus curiae assisted the Court, but the judgment does not set out the amicus's submissions (para 68).
Court's Findings
The foundation of Javed
Javed upheld the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 disqualification under the Article 14 twin test, relying on the then perception of a population boom and the National Population Policy, 2000, which aimed to bring the total fertility rate (TFR) to replacement level by 2010 (paras 8, 11, 29). That target has been surpassed; the TFR has fallen from 3.0 to 1.9 against a replacement level of 2.1, and the share of persons aged 60 and above rose from about 8.3% in 2014 to 9.7% in 2024 (paras 20-21, 29). The assumptions in Javed no longer hold much ground (para 9).
Changed circumstances
The Maharashtra provision was not challenged, so the Bench did not adjudicate directly on its validity, but it may observe that a law has lost its rationale (para 31). Drawing on Malpe Vishwanath Acharya, Satyawati Sharma and Super Max, it said a law rationally connected to its object when enacted may cease to bear that connection; the doctrine of temporal reasonableness holds ground (paras 38-39). With Raghubir Singh and the dissent in Devans Modern Breweries, it said the relevant case is a decision that was law when made but ceased to be so owing to altered circumstances (paras 43, 47-48).
Representation, women and reproductive autonomy
Rajbala relied on Javed, and Sukanya Shantha later questioned Rajbala (paras 50, 52). The norm treats elected office as an instrument of population policy (para 56), weighs disproportionately on women, who may be disqualified for reproductive decisions they do not control (paras 60-61), and forces a choice between reproductive autonomy under Article 21 and democratic participation (paras 63-64).
Reference and interim protection
As the validity of Javed, Rajbala and the provision was not under challenge, the Bench declared only that their underlying basis no longer holds ground (para 46), referred Javed to a larger Bench and continued its interim stay (paras 66-67).
Legal Principle
NyayVidhan's view · Practice note
Why It Matters
This reference leaves Section 14(1)(j-1) and similar provisions in force: the Bench recorded that the provision's validity was not before it, and Javed remains the governing precedent unless a larger Bench decides otherwise (paras 31, 46, 66). For a Sarpanch or candidate facing a two-child disqualification, the practical gain is a pending reference and the interim protection granted here (para 67). A fresh challenge should plead the changed fertility data and the doctrine of temporal reasonableness expressly (paras 29, 39). Compare K. Umadevi on the two-child norm and maternity benefit, and Sukanya Shantha on substantive equality and caste discrimination.
Editorial comment by the NyayVidhan Editorial Desk. It is not part of the Court's judgment and is not legal advice.
Precedents Relied Upon
- Javed v. State of Haryana (2003) 8 SCC 369
Upheld, under the Article 14 twin test and on the then perception of a population boom, the disqualification of persons with more than two living children from panchayat posts under the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. The Bench found that its foundation had changed and REFERRED the matter to a larger Bench for reconsideration of its ratio; it did not overrule it.
- Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39
Footnote citation: cited in a footnote, with the other decisions there, for the proposition that a law considered reasonable when enacted may lose its rationale with the passage of time and changed social circumstances, so that its continued operation may warrant reconsideration.
- John Vallamattom v. Union of India (2003) 6 SCC 611
Footnote citation: cited in a footnote, with the other decisions there, for the proposition that a law considered reasonable when enacted may lose its rationale with the passage of time and changed social circumstances, so that its continued operation may warrant reconsideration.
View all precedents (22)
- Motor General Traders v. State of A.P. (1984) 1 SCC 222
Footnote citation: cited in a footnote, with the other decisions there, for the proposition that a law considered reasonable when enacted may lose its rationale with the passage of time and changed social circumstances, so that its continued operation may warrant reconsideration.
- Rattan Arya v. State of T.N. (1986) 3 SCC 385
Footnote citation: cited in a footnote, with the other decisions there, for the proposition that a law considered reasonable when enacted may lose its rationale with the passage of time and changed social circumstances, so that its continued operation may warrant reconsideration.
- Yash Developers v. Harihar Krupa Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. 2024 INSC 559
Recognised the role of constitutional courts in auditing the working of statutes (paras 37-39 of that judgment quoted). The Bench said it faced a different situation, where the foundation of the legislation itself had crumbled.
Noted in a footnote as having followed Yash Developers on statutory performance audits.
- Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra (1998) 2 SCC 1
A statute justified when enacted may, with the passage of time, become arbitrary and unreasonable; relied on for the doctrine of temporal reasonableness.
- Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India (2008) 5 SCC 287
Legislation reasonable when enacted may with time or changed circumstances become arbitrary and violative of equality, and may be struck down in later litigation even if once upheld, where the rationale of classification has become non-existent; relied on for the doctrine of temporal reasonableness.
- State of Maharashtra v. Super Max International (P) Ltd. (2009) 9 SCC 772
Noted as the three-Judge Bench decision that reaffirmed the reasoning in Satyawati Sharma.
- Vinod Kumar v. Ashok Kumar Gandhi 2019 INSC 860
Noted in a footnote as holding that there was no good ground to refer Satyawati Sharma for reconsideration by a larger Bench.
- Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (1974) 2 SCC 402
The concurring opinion of Justice H.R. Khanna (para 22 quoted): law must adapt to new situations, and the Court cannot remain captive of a view later found patently erroneous or manifestly unreasonable; the Bench called it particularly prescient.
- Union of India v. Raghubir Singh (1989) 2 SCC 754
A Constitution Bench recognised that the doctrine of binding precedent is circumscribed by the need for re-adjustment of legal norms in a changing society (paras 10 and 12 quoted).
- State of Punjab v. Devans Modern Breweries Ltd. (2004) 11 SCC 26
The dissenting opinion of Justice S.B. Sinha: a decision neither reversed nor overruled may cease to be law owing to changed conditions (cessante ratione cessat ipsa lex); the Bench drew on it to say this is the situation relevant here.
- Rajbala v. State of Haryana (2016) 2 SCC 445
Expressly relied on Javed in upholding further qualifications and disqualifications for Panchayati Raj elections; the Bench noted that it acknowledged that the educational qualifications would render about 68% of Scheduled Caste women and 41% of Scheduled Caste men ineligible, and criticised its reasoning.
A three-Judge Bench questioned the reasoning in Rajbala, including its failure to consider the disproportionate exclusion of Scheduled Castes, and recognised concerns of indirect discrimination; relied on to show that the constitutional framework has moved beyond formal equality.
- People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India (2003) 4 SCC 399
Devotion to duty and concern for the welfare of the people are not the monopoly of well-educated persons; relied on against restrictions imposed only on leaders at the Panchayati Raj level.
- Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration (2009) 9 SCC 1
The choice to bear a child or to abstain from doing so falls within the ambit of Article 21.
- X v. Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Government of NCT of Delhi (2023) 9 SCC 433
The right of every woman to make reproductive choices without undue interference from the State is central to human dignity.
- K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1
Cited for the proposition that the liberty to bear a child and the choice of family life are intrinsic to individual dignity and privacy.
Cited in a footnote among the authorities that reproductive decisions are a facet of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21.
- X v. Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department 2022 SCC OnLine SC 905
Cited in a footnote among the authorities that reproductive decisions are a facet of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21.
