Judgment Intelligence
Petition Dismissed- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of Decision
- 31 July 1980
- Bench
- Justices R.S. Sarkaria and O. Chinnappa Reddy
- Relevant Acts & Sections
- Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966 — Sections 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 14; Railway Protection Force Act, 1957; Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 25; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 — Sections 162, 173, 190; Constitution of India — Article 20(3)
Criminal Appeals Nos. 208-209 of 1974 were dismissed and the case was sent back to the trial court; the Court recorded the State's undertaking to supply copies of the relied-on documents and statements, directed that inspection of other relevant material be allowed and asked for a day-to-day trial. The special leave petition, after leave, was disposed of by the same judgment (paras 74-75).
Key holdings
- The power to initiate prosecution by a charge-sheet under Section 173 of the Code is the clinching attribute of an investigating police officer (paras 55, 59).
- Confessional or incriminating statements recorded by a Railway Protection Force officer during an inquiry under Section 8(1) of the 1966 Act are not excluded by Section 25 of the Evidence Act (para 59).
- A person becomes "accused of any offence" under Article 20(3) only when a formal accusation is made against him by FIR, complaint or other formal document (paras 66, 70).
- Statements made to the Railway Protection Force before any formal accusation do not attract Article 20(3) (paras 68, 71).
Brief Facts
Court's Findings
Legal Principle
Precedents Relied Upon
Majority: a Customs officer is not a police officer under Section 25 of the Evidence Act although ‘police officer’ is read in a wide and popular sense; Subba Rao J. dissented. Followed as a matter of judicial discipline.
- Raja Ram Jaiswal v. State of Bihar
Relied on by the appellant: an excise officer empowered to investigate under the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915 is a police officer; distinguished because that Act expressly conferred the powers of an officer in charge of a police station.
- Badku Joti Savant v. State of Mysore
Constitution Bench test: an officer is a police officer under Section 25 only if invested with all the powers of an officer in charge of a police station under Chapter XIV, including the power to file a report under Section 173; applied to the Railway Protection Force.
View all precedents (18)
Constitution Bench (printed also as Ramesh Chandra v. State of West Bengal): a Customs officer who cannot submit a report under Section 173 is not a police officer under Section 25; on Article 20(3), the person must stand accused when the statement is made.
- Illias v. Collector of Customs
A Customs officer under the Customs Act, 1962, though given many powers similar to a police officer, cannot file a charge-sheet under Section 173 and is not a police officer under Section 25.
An officer of the Railway Protection Force inquiring under Section 8(1) of the 1966 Act cannot be equated with an officer in charge of a police station investigating under Chapter XIV; the right to file a police report is the hallmark of an investigation. Binding on the Bench.
- Ariel v. State
The policy of Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act is that confessions made to the police are presumed to be obtained under the circumstances in Section 24 and are inadmissible except as provided by Section 27.
- Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra
Forming the opinion in the report under Section 173 is the final step of an investigation, to be taken only by the officer in charge of the police station.
- M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra
Seven-Judge Bench: Article 20(3) applies only if a formal accusation of an offence had been made against the person when he made the self-incriminatory statement.
- Bhagwan Das v. Union of India
Reiterated the M.P. Sharma interpretation of ‘person accused of any offence’ in Article 20(3).
- Raja Narayanlal Bansilal v. Maneck Phiroz Mistry
Reaffirmed the M.P. Sharma interpretation of ‘person accused of any offence’ in Article 20(3).
To attract Article 20(3) the person must have stood in the character of an accused when he made the statement; becoming an accused later is not enough.
- K. Joseph Augusthi v. M.A. Narayanan
Reiterated that Article 20(3) requires the person to be an accused at the time of the statement; also cited by the appellant.
- Ramanlal Bhogilal Shah v. D.K. Guha
A person served with detailed grounds of arrest, and at any rate after an FIR, is a person accused of an offence, but Article 20(3) protects only against being compelled to incriminate himself.
- Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra
Cited by the appellant on Article 20(3).
- Mohamed Dastagir v. State of Madras
Cited by the appellant on Article 20(3).
Cited by the appellant on Article 20(3).
- In re The Special Courts Bill
Cited by the appellant on Article 20(3).
