Introduction
A conviction is only half of a criminal case; the sentence decides what it means for the accused. Courts must choose between the statutory minimum and something more, between imprisonment and probation, between life imprisonment and death, and, while an appeal is pending, whether the sentence should be suspended. Each of these choices is governed by rules the Supreme Court and the High Courts have worked out case by case.
This guide explains those rules: the hearing on sentence, the death penalty, minimum sentences and the factors that justify more, fines and default imprisonment, probation, when appellate courts reduce a sentence, and suspension of sentence pending appeal. It draws on judgments published on NyayVidhan, each cited with the Court's own paragraph numbers.
The Hearing on Sentence
Sentence follows a separate hearing. An appellate court that reverses an acquittal and convicts for the first time must hear the accused on sentence before imposing it (Ramkrushna Prahllad Dongardive v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 INSC 1099, paras 21-22).
The Death Penalty
For murder, life imprisonment is the normal sentence. Where the witnesses on whose evidence a life hangs do not reveal the whole truth, the court must take every reasonable possibility into account before imposing death (Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 911, (1981) 2 SCC 166, paras 21-22). The Supreme Court has also withdrawn a blanket direction that trial courts call for mitigation reports in every case punishable with death, accepting that many such trials do not contemplate a death sentence and that trial courts may lack the resources (Aman Singh v. State of Bihar, Criminal Appeal Nos. 2351-2352 of 2026, paras 4-5).
Article 20(1) forbids only a heavier penalty than the law in force when the offence was committed. Where a later enactment covering the same offence softens the punishment, the court may apply the milder sentence to an accused still awaiting sentence (State v. Gian Singh, (1999) 9 SCC 312, paras 33, 35-36).
Minimum Sentences
Where a statute fixes a minimum sentence, courts must impose it even in harsh cases; any relief lies with the executive through commutation (Murlidhar Meghraj Loya v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1976 SC 1929, paras 8, 16). In an NDPS case involving a commercial quantity, the court cannot go below the statutory minimum whatever the mitigating circumstances, and remission is for the executive (Jothi @ Nagajothi v. State, 2025 INSC 1417, paras 32, 36). A first offender with no antecedents may receive the statutory minimum (Shahejadkhan Mahebubkhan Pathan v. State of Gujarat, 2012 INSC 453, paras 8-9).
The minimum is not the maximum. Under Section 32B of the NDPS Act, the listed factors are not exhaustive, and the court may also weigh other relevant factors, such as the quantity of drugs and the accused's antecedents, in imposing more than the minimum (Narayan Das v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 INSC 872, paras 14-15, 19; Rafiq Qureshi v. NCB, 2019 INSC 639, paras 15, 17). Poverty, being a carrier or being the sole breadwinner is not a mitigating circumstance in NDPS sentencing (Gurdev Singh v. State of Punjab, 2021 INSC 232, para 7), but a higher sentence resting on an irrelevant factor, with none of the listed factors present, can be corrected (Rafiq Qureshi, para 22).
Fines and Default Imprisonment
- A fine is a sentence, and an appellate court may suspend it under Section 389(1) CrPC, with or without conditions (CBI v. Ashok Sirpal, 2024 INSC 819, paras 5-6).
- Imprisonment in default of fine is not a sentence but a penalty for non-payment; before ordering it, the court must consider the offender's means and the nature of the offence, and an excessive fine should not accompany a substantial term except in exceptional cases (Shahejadkhan Mahebubkhan Pathan, para 12).
- Where sentences for offences arising from one transaction run concurrently, the fine, being part of the sentence, cannot be imposed or recovered twice (Hem Raj v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 INSC 332, paras 8-9).
Probation
Release on probation under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act turns on the nature of the offence and the character of the offender. A brutal attack causing grievous injuries, by accused who kept committing offences while on bail, does not merit release on good conduct, and the court must consider the Probation Officer's report and the material on antecedents (Umesh Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 INSC 1114, paras 13-14). In causing death by rash or negligent driving under Section 304A IPC, deterrence is a prime consideration and probation is not appropriate (B. Nagabhushanam v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 7 SCALE 716, para 12).
When Appellate Courts Reduce a Sentence
- Decades of delay. Where an appeal remained pending for 38 years while the convict was on bail, and he was aged and ill when it was finally dismissed, the Supreme Court cut the imprisonment and raised the fine without disturbing the conviction (Nazarul v. State of U.P., Criminal Appeal No. 4752 of 2026, paras 5-8).
- A lesser offence proved. Where robbery was not proved, the court convicted for the proved minor offence of grievous hurt under Section 222 CrPC and restricted the sentence to the period already undergone (Appa v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 INSC 1091, paras 9-10, 13-14).
- Economic offences. Social and economic offences stand on a graver footing, and confiscation, loss of business or delay did not justify reducing a sentence for professional smuggling (Balkrishna Chhaganlal Soni v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 120, (1974) 3 SCC 567, paras 18-21).
Suspension of Sentence Pending Appeal
Where a criminal appeal is not decided within five years for no fault of the convict, the convict may be released on bail pending appeal, unless special circumstances justify refusal (Akhtari Bi v. State of M.P., (2001) 4 SCC 355, para 4). There is no rule that a convict must serve half the sentence before bail pending appeal, and where much of a fixed-term sentence is served and the appeal will not be heard before it ends, refusing bail only under Section 37 of the NDPS Act violates Article 21 (NCB v. Lakhwinder Singh, 2025 INSC 190, paras 5-7).
- Special statutes still apply. When an NDPS sentence is suspended, the court must record satisfaction on both Section 37 conditions; length of custody and appeal delay alone do not suffice (Union of India v. Rattan Mallik, (2009) 2 SCC 624, paras 11, 13-15). Section 32A of the NDPS Act is unconstitutional to the extent that it takes away an appellate court's power to suspend a sentence (Dadu @ Tulsidas v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 437, paras 25-26).
- Parity. Where co-accused, including the one found in possession, are on bail and the prosecution has not sought cancellation, the appellant is entitled to parity in seeking suspension (Vikash Kumar v. Union of India, Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 13985 of 2026, para 5).
- No view on the merits. A court deciding suspension should not make observations on the merits of the pending appeal (State of Punjab v. Rakesh Kumar, 2018 INSC 1131, para 16).
- Deposit conditions. A deposit condition must not be so onerous that it defeats the right of appeal (Ashok Sirpal, para 8). In cheque-bounce appeals, a deposit under Section 148 of the NI Act is a separate power that should follow the complainant's application, a hearing and recorded reasons, not a routine condition of suspension (Kunaram v. State of Rajasthan, 2026:RJ-JD:20187, paras 7-9).
Key Points
- An appellate court convicting for the first time must hear the accused on sentence (Ramkrushna Prahllad Dongardive, paras 21-22).
- Life imprisonment is the normal sentence for murder; a milder later law may benefit an accused still awaiting sentence (Dudh Nath Pandey, paras 21-22; Gian Singh, paras 33, 35).
- Statutory minimums bind the courts, but the minimum is not the maximum, and NDPS sentencing may weigh quantity and antecedents (Murlidhar Meghraj Loya, para 16; Narayan Das, paras 14-19).
- Default imprisonment is a penalty for non-payment, and fines are not doubled for concurrent sentences (Shahejadkhan Mahebubkhan Pathan, para 12; Hem Raj, para 9).
- Suspension of sentence pending appeal weighs delay, time served, parity and any special statute, without deciding the merits (Akhtari Bi, para 4; Lakhwinder Singh, paras 5-7; Rattan Mallik, para 13).
More rulings are collected on the Sentencing and Suspension of Sentence pages. See also our guides to bail for long custody and Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
