Allowing the State's appeal against acquittal in the rape and death of a four-year-old girl, the Supreme Court held that "there is no requirement either under Section 27 of the Evidence Act or under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to obtain signature of independent witnesses on the record in which statement of an accused is written" (para 21). It restored the rape convictions with life imprisonment and convicted both men of culpable homicide not amounting to murder (para 26).
A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held Section 32A of the NDPS Act unconstitutional to the extent that it bars appellate courts from suspending sentences: a right of appeal without that power "would be unjust, unfair and violative of Article 21" (paras 17, 25). The bar on executive suspension, remission and commutation was upheld and severed (paras 15, 26). Suspension remains subject to Section 37's conditions, and Section 32A does not bar parole (paras 10, 27, 29).
The Supreme Court set aside a ten-year NDPS sentence for possession of about 9 grams of charas because the police refused the accused's request to be searched before a Magistrate (paras 2, 6). Rejecting the State's plea that Section 50 does not apply when a gazetted officer searches, it held that the suspect's right "cannot be taken away, merely because the officer going to search happens to be a gazetted officer" (para 4).
A three-judge Supreme Court bench held that poppy husk falls within poppy straw under Section 2(xviii) of the NDPS Act, so possessing it is an offence under Section 15. Poppy straw covers all parts of the opium poppy except the seeds, and for Section 15 it does not matter whether the husk contains more than 0.2 per cent morphine. The appeals were dismissed (paras 14-16).
The Supreme Court restored the acquittal of an auto-rickshaw driver found carrying charas worth Rs 5.29 lakh in gunny bags. The police inspector acted on a tip-off without writing it down or informing his superior, which was total non-compliance with Section 42 of the NDPS Act; such action becomes suspect and prejudices the accused. The driver also rebutted the Section 35 presumption of culpable mental state (paras 13, 17, 21-23).
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the man who shot Sant Longowal in 1985 under the TADA Act of 1985, which allowed only death for a terrorist act causing death, but commuted his death sentence to life imprisonment (paras 24, 37). Because Section 25 of TADA 1987 overrides inconsistent enactments, "the exclusivity of the extreme sentence contained in Section 3(2) of TADA 1985 must stand superseded by the corresponding benevolent provision in TADA 1987" (para 35).
A five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that an empowered officer about to search a person on prior information must inform him of his right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. Failure does not vitiate the trial, but renders the recovery suspect and vitiates a conviction resting only on contraband recovered from his person. Such contraband cannot by itself prove possession, and no Section 54 presumption can arise from an illegal search (paras 78, 93).
The Supreme Court upheld a heroin conviction, holding that the reliable oral evidence of the officer who conducted the search can establish compliance with Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act. T.P. Razak did not lay down a rule requiring independent or documentary support (paras 4-6). A confession recorded while the accused was in custody was not involuntary for that reason alone; his vague, belated retraction did not displace it, and a discrepancy in the sample's weight did not create a doubt (paras 7-8).
In a public interest case begun by a letter about deaths in police lock-ups, the Supreme Court held that torture in custody falls within the inhibition of Article 21 and laid down eleven requirements to be followed in all cases of arrest or detention (paras 23, 37). Non-compliance invites departmental action and contempt proceedings (para 38). Compensation in public law for such violations rests on strict liability, to which sovereign immunity is no defence (para 57).
Where TADA severely restricts bail, the trial must "proceed and conclude within a reasonable time", and release on bail "embedded in the right of a speedy trial" may be needed to meet Article 21, the Supreme Court held (para 6). Faced with 14,446 pending TADA cases and 248 Designated Courts, it sorted undertrials into four groups and directed bail, as a one-time measure, for those held five, three or two years according to their role (paras 2, 13-14, 16).
The Supreme Court held that Section 50 of the NDPS Act only requires the accused to be offered the option of being searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate; once he takes it, the searching officer, not the accused, chooses the nearest one conveniently available (para 2). Finding the construction plain, the Bench of Justices J.S. Verma and B.N. Kirpal declined to refer the question to a three-Judge Bench and dismissed the special leave petition (paras 3-4).
A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that courts cannot presume, as an official act regularly performed, that the searching officer told the accused of his right under Section 50 of the NDPS Act to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate (paras 9-10). Without evidence of that, possession is not established and the accused must be acquitted (para 10). The appellants' convictions for possessing charas were set aside (paras 13-15).