In this 2013 ruling the Supreme Court set aside a rape conviction founded on an alleged false promise of marriage. It held that consent is vitiated only if the accused never intended to marry from the very beginning, and that a mere breach of promise differs from a false promise (paras 18, 21). The 19-year-old prosecutrix had gone with the appellant willingly to marry him, and they were caught on their way to marry at Ambala, so the false-promise allegation could not stand (paras 23-24).
The Supreme Court refused bail to men caught transporting 449 cartons of Phensedyl and Recodex cough syrup, concealed with household goods and carried without documents. The exemption for codeine preparations measured per dose applies only to therapeutic use; with nothing to show where the bulk consignment was going, the whole codeine content of each bottle counted, attracting the NDPS Act (paras 10-13).
The Supreme Court reduced the 15-year sentences of two first offenders convicted of carrying 500 g of brown sugar to the 10-year statutory minimum, and cut the imprisonment in default of the Rs 1.5 lakh fine from three years to six months. Default imprisonment is a penalty, not a sentence, and courts must weigh the offender's means before ordering it; having served nearly 12 years, the appellants were to be released (paras 9, 12, 14-15).
The Supreme Court acquitted a man convicted of carrying two kilograms of heroin because a consent memo that only asked him to choose between a Gazetted Officer and a Magistrate did not inform him of his right under Section 50 of the NDPS Act (paras 9-10, 12). On confessions to Customs officers, the Bench chose to follow Noor Aga rather than Kanhaiyalal (para 11).
The Supreme Court upheld the acquittal of a man found with 16 grams of smack in 1998, because the written Section 50 notice only told him that a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate ‘could be arranged’, not that he had a right to be searched before one (paras 20-22). It rejected the State's argument that a recovery made in breach of Section 50 can still be proved through police or independent witnesses (paras 23-25, 28).
The Supreme Court acquitted a hotel servant convicted of possessing 2.1 kg of opium found in a room next to the hotel kitchen, holding that possession under Section 18 of the NDPS Act "has to be conscious" and that a servant does not possess his master's contraband unless it was left in his custody under his absolute control (paras 2, 15-16). His confessions to Central Bureau of Narcotics officers were held admissible and voluntary, but showed only that he was the owners' servant (paras 10, 13, 15).
The Supreme Court acquitted a cinema-hall owner convicted of possessing 175 grams of smack, because the seized powder was never produced at trial and nobody explained where the samples and the bulk were kept before they reached the laboratory and the Malkhana (paras 10-12, 15). Following Jitendra, it held there was "no evidence to connect the forensic report with the substance that was seized" (para 12), and extended the acquittal to two co-accused who had not appealed (para 16).
In a State appeal against acquittal in an 8 kg opium case, the Supreme Court held that Section 50 of the NDPS Act did not apply because the opium was carried in a bag on the head (State of H.P. v. Pawan Kumar). It nonetheless upheld the acquittal: the prosecution could not show where the samples were between their removal from the Malkhana on 26 February and their receipt at the laboratory on 9 March, so their sanctity was compromised (para 2).
The Supreme Court upheld a ten-year NDPS sentence for 1 kg 750 grams of opium recovered from a bag the appellant was carrying (paras 1, 12, 15). Section 50 applies only where the drug is recovered in a body search, not from a container carried by the accused (para 12). The absence of independent witnesses did not by itself show false implication, and a twelve-day delay in sending the sample was not fatal given the link evidence (paras 9-10, 14).
The Supreme Court acquitted the co-owner of a truck caught carrying poppy husk, holding that Section 25 of the NDPS Act needs evidence that the owner knowingly permitted the vehicle's misuse, and that the presumption of a culpable mental state under Section 35 arises only after the prosecution proves that knowledge (paras 9-10). His giving a wrong address when registering the truck could not fasten him with knowledge of its misuse (para 10).
A five-Judge Constitution Bench held that Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act obliges the empowered officer to inform a suspect of his right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate, and that this obligation is mandatory and requires strict compliance. Merely asking whether the suspect wishes to be so searched is not enough, and the "substantial compliance" view in Joseph Fernandez and Prabha Shankar Dubey was rejected (paras 18, 21-22).
A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that no individual "should be forcibly subjected to any of the techniques in question", narcoanalysis, polygraph examination and the BEAP test, whether in criminal investigation or otherwise (para 223). Compulsory tests violate the right against self-incrimination and personal liberty (paras 221-222). Voluntary tests are allowed with safeguards, but their results are not evidence; facts discovered through them may be proved under Section 27 of the Evidence Act (para 223).