Finding that only 16% of drugs seized between 2002 and 2012 had been disposed of, the Supreme Court issued nationwide directions on the sampling, storage and disposal of seized narcotics. Under Section 52A of the NDPS Act, samples must be drawn in the presence and under the supervision of a Magistrate, who certifies them. Governments were directed to set up secure storage within six months, and stocks in concluded cases were ordered destroyed (paras 13, 15, 19-20).
The Supreme Court upheld an NDPS conviction for possessing 1 kg of opium, rejecting the plea that the trial was vitiated because the complainant officer also investigated (paras 2, 9, 12). Distinguishing Megha Singh and Rajangam, it noted that the search was conducted in the presence of and under the instructions of a DSP, that the complainant was not alone in the investigation, and that the point had never been raised earlier (para 11).
The Supreme Court upheld a poppy husk conviction resting on one police witness, holding that where the non-examination of independent witnesses is satisfactorily explained, official witnesses whose evidence inspires confidence can found a conviction (paras 8, 10). Once physical possession was proved, Section 35 of the NDPS Act shifted to the driver the burden of proving he was not in conscious possession (para 12). The investigating officer's non-examination caused no prejudice; the sentence was cut from twelve to ten years (paras 16, 19-20).
A three-Judge Bench set aside a Prevention of Corruption Act conviction where the complainant had died before trial and the shadow witness did not reproduce any demand. Proof of demand is the gravamen of offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii), and mere acceptance or recovery of money without it cannot sustain a conviction (paras 21-22). Holding the appellant guilty on this evidence would be an inferential deduction impermissible in law (para 24).
The Supreme Court set aside an NDPS conviction because the officer who raided the accused's house on secret information never recorded that information or reported it to his superior under Section 42. The State argued that the FIR, sent to the Superintendent of Police the same day, was enough. The Court held that the Section 42 procedure is separate from the Code of Criminal Procedure, and compliance with one does not show compliance with the other (paras 11, 13).
The Supreme Court held that Section 304B IPC must receive a fair, pragmatic and common-sense interpretation, declared that Appasaheb and Vipin Jaiswal do not state the law correctly, and ruled that money demanded at any time that is reasonably connected to a married woman's death is in connection with the marriage (para 20). ‘Soon before’ her death is a relative expression and not ‘immediately before’ (paras 23, 25). The husband's conviction was upheld (para 26).
The Supreme Court set aside an Allahabad High Court order granting bail on parity to a murder accused who was a history-sheeter, holding that "it was not a case of parity" and the order "clearly exposes the non-application of mind" (para 17). It explained that setting aside an unjustified grant of bail is different from cancelling bail for supervening circumstances (para 13).
In the Akshardham temple attack case, the Supreme Court acquitted all six accused, three of whom had been sentenced to death. The sanction under Section 50 of POTA was void for non-application of mind, the confessions were recorded without the Section 32 safeguards, accomplice statements came a year late, and Urdu letters said to be found on the attackers' bloodied bodies were spotless (paras 77, 90, 97, 102-103). No independent evidence remained (paras 121, 135).
The Supreme Court acquitted four in-laws convicted of burning a woman to death on her dying declaration. Two proved through employer, tenant and scooter-dealer witnesses that they were far away, and the courts below had wrongly picked holes in that defence evidence (paras 25-37). As the declaration blamed every in-law alike for every act, it could not be split, and an unchallenged neighbour's account of a door bolted from inside raised the possibility of suicide (paras 40-43).
The Supreme Court upheld the acquittal of two men from whom 9.6 kg of opium was recovered, holding that Section 50 of the NDPS Act was breached. A joint written notice, signed by one accused for both, is not a valid communication of the right; each person must be told individually. Offering a third option of search before a superintendent of the raiding party was also improper. Because both the bag and the persons were searched, Section 50 applied (paras 12, 14-15).
A Constitution Bench held that registration of an FIR under Section 154 CrPC is mandatory when the information discloses a cognizable offence, and no preliminary inquiry is then permissible (para 111). A limited preliminary inquiry, completed within seven days, may be held only to ascertain whether a cognizable offence is disclosed, in categories such as matrimonial, commercial, medical negligence and corruption cases or after abnormal delay (para 111). Registration of an FIR and arrest are "two entirely different concepts" (para 98).
Doubting Kanhaiyalal and Raj Kumar Karwal, a two-judge Bench referred to a larger Bench whether an NDPS investigating officer is a police officer and whether a Section 67 statement can be treated as a confession (paras 28-29, 38-40). The NDPS Act "is purely penal in nature" (para 32). The appellant's further sentence was suspended and bail granted pending the reference (para 43).