Judgment Intelligence
Partly Allowed- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of Decision
- 7 January 2022
- Bench
- Chief Justice N.V. Ramana, Justice A.S. Bopanna and Justice Hima Kohli
- Relevant Acts & Sections
- Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Sections 31(7), 34 and 37
UHL's appeal partly allowed to the extent of restoring the award's interest component, and the State's appeal dismissed; the parties to bear their own costs (paras 6, 23).
Key holdings
- S.L. Arora, the basis for denying compound interest, stood overruled by Hyder Consulting (paras 4-6).
- The award's interest component was restored in UHL's favour (para 6).
- The 1992 MoU merged into the 1997 Implementation Agreement, so its disputes were arbitrable (paras 10-11).
- The State terminated the agreement five months before the extendable period expired (para 22).
- Courts under Sections 34 and 37 must not replace a plausible arbitral interpretation (paras 14-21).
Case explainer by NyayVidhan: an account of this judgment and the law it laid down, not the court's text. The judgment itself is the authoritative version.
Brief Facts
Court's Findings
Legal Principle
Precedents Relied Upon
- Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. v. Governor, State of Orissa through Chief Engineer (2015) 2 SCC 189
A three-Judge Bench overruled S.L. Arora: post-award interest may be granted on a sum that includes interest, so arbitral tribunals are not barred from awarding interest on interest.
- State of Haryana v. S.L. Arora and Co. (2010) 3 SCC 690
Held that compound interest could be awarded only under a contract or statute; relied on by the High Court but overruled in Hyder Consulting, so the High Court's finding was set aside.
- MMTC Limited v. Vedanta Limited (2019) 4 SCC 163
Under Section 34 the court does not sit in appeal over an arbitral award and may interfere only on the limited grounds of public policy and patent illegality.
View all precedents (9)
- K. Sugumar v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (2020) 12 SCC 539
The power of the court under Section 34 to interfere with an arbitral award is highly constricted.
- Dyna Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd. (2019) 20 SCC 1
Arbitral awards should not be interfered with in a casual and cavalier manner, or merely because an alternative view on facts or interpretation of the contract exists.
- Parsa Kente Collieries Limited v. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited (2019) 7 SCC 236
Construction of the terms of a contract is primarily for the arbitrator; a reasonable construction does not justify setting the award aside.
- McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. and Others (2006) 11 SCC 181
Referred to in Parsa Kente: an arbitral tribunal must decide in accordance with the contract, but a reasonable construction of a term is no ground to set aside the award.
- Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. Dewan Chand Ram Saran (2012) 5 SCC 306
Referred to in Parsa Kente: an arbitral tribunal must decide in accordance with the contract, but a reasonable construction of a term is no ground to set aside the award.
- South East Asia Marine Engg. & Constructions Ltd. (SEAMAC Limited) v. Oil India Ltd. (2020) 5 SCC 164
Where two views are possible, the court cannot interfere with the plausible view taken by the arbitrator supported by reasoning.
