Judgment Intelligence
Disposed Of- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of Decision
- 29 October 2026
- Bench
- Justices Sanjay Kumar and Sanjeev Sachdeva
- Relevant Acts & Sections
- Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 28(3), 34, 37; Constitution of India — Article 142
Appeals disposed of: no grounds to uphold the majority award; under Article 142 the respondents must refund the amounts paid with 9% simple interest a year from each payment until refund, and the appellant's court deposits are returned with any accrued interest; no costs (para 62).
Source Supreme Court of India, www.sci.gov.in — judgment dated 29.10.2026
Key holdings
- Paying 1% stamp duty as on a development agreement does not decide a document's nature; its terms do (para 14).
- Accepting late instalments without the contractual notice cures those delays but does not erase a time-of-essence clause (para 56).
- An award cannot adopt six times the agreed rate without any computation or reasons (para 59).
- Damages the agreement did not provide for were without foundation, and granting them in the alternative was opposed to public policy (para 60).
- Landowners who ended the deal but kept the money, contrary to Clause 54, must refund it with 9% simple interest (para 62).
Judgment digest by NyayVidhan: a summary of the court's judgment, not its text. The judgment itself is the authoritative version.
Brief Facts
Court's Findings
Legal Principle
NyayVidhan's view · Practice note
Why It Matters
For developers and landowners, the lesson lies in both the drafting and the conduct. A tribunal must follow the agreed order of payment, partition and conveyance, so a claimant that has not paid in full cannot obtain a conveyance through the award, still less at a price the tribunal sets itself (paras 52, 58-59). Owners who terminate must still return what the contract requires, or pay interest (para 62). Because Section 37 review is as wide as Section 34 (para 44; see Gayatri Balasamy), an award confirmed by the District Court remains open to challenge in appeal.
Editorial comment by the NyayVidhan Editorial Desk. It is not part of the Court's judgment and is not legal advice.
Precedents Relied Upon
- Sasan Power Limited v. North American Coal Corporation (India) Limited (2016) 10 SCC 813
The rights and obligations created by an agreement, not its name, determine its legal character; so the 1% stamp duty paid on the document as a development agreement did not settle its nature.
- Basant Singh v. Janki Singh AIR 1967 SC 341: 1966 SCC OnLine SC 234
Noted as having recognised that Ramabai Shriniwas Nadgir is no authority against considering admissions made in other suits on the same subject matter; the High Court's reliance on Ramabai was misplaced.
- Dattatraya Shripati Mohite v. Shankar Ishwara Mohite AIR 1960 Bom 153
Bombay High Court decision holding that Ramabai Shriniwas Nadgir is not an authority against considering a party's admissions in other suits on the same subject matter; cited to show that the High Court's reliance on Ramabai was misplaced.
View all precedents (13)
- Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited (2025) 7 SCC 1
Constitution Bench: appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 is coterminous with, and as broad as, the Section 34 jurisdiction, so the High Court could test the award afresh though the District Judge had confirmed it.
- Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Company Limited v. National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) (2019) 15 SCC 131
The 2015 amendment to Section 34 applies only to applications filed on or after 23.10.2015, so the unamended Section 34 governed; also cited for the rule that an award which unilaterally alters the contract and binds a party to a bargain it never made breaches fundamental principles of justice.
- Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Private Limited (2018) 6 SCC 287
The view, affirmed in Ssangyong, that the amended Section 34 applies only to applications filed on or after 23.10.2015; both Section 34 applications here were earlier, so the unamended provision applied.
- Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. (1994) Supp 1 SCC 644
Public policy under the unamended Section 34 covers awards contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law, the interest of India, or justice or morality.
- Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. (2003) 5 SCC 705
Public policy given a wider meaning: an award may also be set aside if patently illegal (the illegality going to the root of the matter) or so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the Court.
- Delhi Development Authority v. R.S. Sharma and Company, New Delhi (2008) 13 SCC 80
Its summary of the grounds of interference, including an award against the terms of the contract, quoted as part of the settled principles applied to the majority award.
- Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority (2015) 3 SCC 49
Under Section 28(3) the tribunal must decide by the contract's terms; a reasonable construction of the contract and a plausible view of facts must be accepted, unless no fair-minded or reasonable person could take that view.
- UHL Power Company Limited v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2022) 4 SCC 11
Three-Judge Bench: where a plausible interpretation of the contract is available, the arbitrator cannot be faulted for accepting it over another.
- OPG Power Generation Private Limited v. Enexio Power Cooling Solutions India Private Limited (2025) 2 SCC 417
Three-Judge Bench: an arbitral tribunal must decide in accordance with the terms of the contract, and an award against those terms is patently illegal.
- South East Asia Marine Engineering and Constructions Limited (SEAMEC LTD.) v. Oil India Limited (2020) 5 SCC 164
If, on a full reading of the contract, the tribunal's view of its terms is not a plausible one, the award is perverse and open to interference.
