Tuesday, 17 November 2026
Supreme Court of India
Corporate Law

Section 4 Limitation Act Cannot Stretch IBC's 15-Day Condonable Period: Supreme Court Holds NCLAT Appeals Time-Barred

Lulu International Shopping Malls Private Limited v. Gorinka Pratyusha and others Etc. 2026 INSC 1224 Decided 16 November 2026

Published: · NyayVidhan · 3 min read

In Lulu International Shopping Malls Private Limited v. Gorinka Pratyusha and others (2026 INSC 1224), the Supreme Court held that the NCLAT wrongly entertained appeals against a resolution plan filed on the 46th day by applying Section 4 of the Limitation Act because the 45th day was a holiday. Following Tata Steel, that benefit is confined to the prescribed 30-day period. The Court allowed the recall applications, set aside the condonation and directed the appeals to stand dismissed on limitation (paras 12, 14-15).

Section 4 Limitation Act Cannot Stretch IBC's 15-Day Condonable Period: Supreme Court Holds NCLAT Appeals Time-Barred

Judgment Intelligence

Petition Allowed
Lulu International Shopping Malls Private Limited v. Gorinka Pratyusha and others Etc.
2026 INSC 1224
Civil Appeal Nos. 3110-3111 of 2026
Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of Decision
16 November 2026
Bench
Justices Sanjay Kumar and Sanjeev Sachdeva
Relevant Acts & Sections
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Sections 61(2) and 62; Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 4; National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2016 — Rule 11
Final Outcome

Appeals allowed. The NCLAT Chennai's order of 10.02.2026 is set aside, the recall applications are allowed and the condonation order of 10.10.2025 is set aside; Company Appeal (AT)(CH)(Ins) Nos. 388 and 389 of 2025 stand dismissed on the ground of limitation; no costs (para 15).

Source Supreme Court of India, www.sci.gov.in — judgment dated 16 November 2026 · Court's copy

Key holdings

  1. Section 4 of the Limitation Act does not extend the 15-day condonable period under Section 61(2) of the IBC (paras 7, 12).
  2. A Supreme Court ruling clarifying a statute is the law of the land; earlier contrary orders survive only if final (para 9).
  3. The NCLAT has no review power under the IBC but can recall its orders in its inherent jurisdiction (para 10).
  4. A pending recall application keeps a condonation order from attaining finality (para 13).
  5. E-filing on the 46th day, itself a Sunday, showed no sufficient cause: it could have been done on the Saturday (para 12).

Judgment digest by NyayVidhan: a summary of the court's judgment, not its text. The judgment itself is the authoritative version.

Brief Facts

The appellant was the successful resolution applicant for the corporate debtor, Manjeera Retail Holdings, and the NCLT approved its plan on 26.03.2025 (para 3). The respondents, who claimed to have agreed to buy commercial units in a mall, appealed against the approval, complaining that their payments were recorded as advances from customers rather than as claims of financial creditors (para 4). Under Section 61(2) of the IBC the 30 days expired on 25.04.2025 and the further 15 days on 10.05.2025, a second Saturday; the appeals were filed on 11.05.2025 (para 5). On 10.10.2025 the NCLAT condoned the delay under Section 4 of the Limitation Act, and on 10.02.2026 it dismissed the appellant's recall applications (paras 5-6, 8).

Court's Findings

The NCLAT wrongly treated Tata Steel as later than its own order: Tata Steel was decided on 07.05.2025, before the condonation order of 10.10.2025, and a ruling clarifying a statutory provision is the law of the land, so an earlier contrary order is not saved unless it has attained finality (para 9). Though the NCLAT has no power of review under the IBC, it can recall its orders in its inherent jurisdiction under Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules, as its five-member Bench held in Dinkar T Venkatasubramanian, confirmed in Amtek Auto; Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority recognised the same incidental power (paras 10-11). The NCLAT was therefore not justified in refusing to recall (para 12). The respondents had not shown sufficient cause either: the appeals were e-filed on a Sunday, which could as well have been done on the Saturday (para 12). The condonation had not attained finality, because the recall applications kept the issue alive, and the Court could remedy it under Section 62 of the IBC (para 13). Entertaining the appeals was illegal (para 14).

Legal Principle

Under Section 61(2) of the IBC an appeal lies within 30 days, with at most 15 more on sufficient cause. Section 4 of the Limitation Act helps only when the 30-day prescribed period ends on a holiday, not the discretionary extension. The NCLAT may recall, under its inherent jurisdiction, an order contrary to the settled law (paras 5, 7, 10-12).

NyayVidhan's view · Practice note

Why It Matters

For anyone challenging a resolution plan, the outer limit under Section 61(2) of the IBC is 45 days, and a holiday on the 45th day does not carry it over: Section 4 of the Limitation Act helps only within the 30-day prescribed period (paras 5, 7, 12). The Supreme Court read Section 4 the same way for arbitral awards in My Preferred Transformation v. Faridabad Implements, and has held that time for a Section 62 IBC appeal runs from pronouncement (Sreenivasa Rao Ravinuthala). A party facing an NCLAT order contrary to settled law can seek its recall; a pending recall keeps the issue alive (paras 10, 13).

Editorial comment by the NyayVidhan Editorial Desk. It is not part of the Court's judgment and is not legal advice.

Precedents Relied Upon

  1. Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee and others (2025) 9 SCC 483
    Applied Discussed at ¶ 7, 9, 12, 14

    The 'prescribed period' in Section 4 of the Limitation Act means the period of limitation only, not a further period the Court or Tribunal may allow in its discretion; the benefit of a closed day is available only within the prescribed period. Applied to hold that Section 4 could not save IBC appeals filed on the 46th day; the NCLAT erred in not applying it.

  2. Union Bank of India (erstwhile Corporation Bank) v. Dinkar T Venkatasubramanian and others (2024) 248 Comp Cas 108 (NCLAT)
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 10

    Five-member Bench of the NCLAT: the NCLAT has no power to review a judgment but, in its inherent jurisdiction, can entertain an application to recall a judgment on sufficient grounds.

  3. Union Bank of India v. Financial Creditors of Amtek Auto Ltd. and others (2024) 248 Comp Cas 126 (SC)
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 10

    The Supreme Court agreed with the five-member NCLAT Bench in Dinkar T Venkatasubramanian and declined to interfere, confirming the NCLAT's inherent power to recall.

View all precedents (4)
  1. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority v. Prabhjit Singh Soni and another (2024) 243 Comp Cas 452 (SC)
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 11

    Three-judge Bench: a Tribunal or Court has the ancillary and incidental powers needed to do justice and, absent a statutory provision, can in an appropriate case recall its orders in exercise of those powers.

Join our WhatsApp Group
✕

Try: POCSO, IBC, Electoral Bond, Article 370, NDPS Act, Bail Conditions, SC Contempt