Delay Alone Cannot Defeat Substantive Right: Supreme Court Allows Condonation in Second Appeal Against Ex Parte Reversal

Published: 28 October 2026 · NyayVidhan

The Supreme Court set aside a Himachal Pradesh High Court order of 10.04.2025 that refused to condone the delay in a plaintiff's second appeal, after finding that the first appellate court had reversed the plaintiff's partial decree ex parte. The length of the delay alone cannot defeat a substantive right, especially where a Trial Court decision is reversed, and courts should not be pedantic under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, it held (paras 2, 8-10).

Delay Alone Cannot Defeat Substantive Right: Supreme Court Allows Condonation in Second Appeal Against Ex Parte Reversal

Judgment Intelligence

Petition Allowed

Janardhan Dass v. Kirnesh Jung

Civil Appeal No. 13931 of 2026 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 23859 of 2025)

Court: Supreme Court of India
Date of Decision: 29 September 2026
Bench: Justices M.M. Sundresh and Prasanna B. Varale
Relevant Acts & Sections: Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5

Final Outcome

Appeal allowed. The High Court's order of 10.04.2025 rejecting the application to condone the delay in filing the second appeal is set aside, with no view on the merits; the appellant has liberty to apply to implead the proposed party; pending applications disposed of (paras 10-13).

Source Supreme Court of India, www.sci.gov.in — order dated 29.09.2026

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Key holdings

The duration of delay per se is not a ground to reject the appellant's substantive right (para 9).
The ex parte reversal of a Trial Court decree, without hearing the appellant, weighed in favour of condonation (paras 8-9).
Courts should not adopt a pedantic approach to applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (para 9).
Nothing was said on the merits; the appellant may apply to implead the party to whom the property was stated to be alienated (paras 10-11).

Judgment digest by NyayVidhan: a summary of the court's judgment, not its text. The judgment itself is the authoritative version.

Brief Facts

Janardhan Dass, the plaintiff, sued Kirnesh Jung to cancel a sale deed of 26.05.2010 between them for the suit properties and the later mutation entries, and for an injunction restraining the defendant from entering the properties (para 3). The Trial Court partly decreed the suit, cancelling the sale deed subject to the appellant repaying Rs. 6,40,000 of the Rs. 16,50,000 consideration, and granted the injunction (para 4). The First Appellate Court allowed the defendant's appeal and dismissed the suit (para 4). The High Court, in C.M.P.(M) No. 312/2023, dismissed the appellant's application to condone the delay in filing a second appeal on 10.04.2025 (paras 2, 4). The order does not state how long the delay was.

Court's Findings

The Court noted that the Trial Court had partly decreed the suit in the appellant's favour, that the Appellate Court set the decree aside without hearing the appellant, and that the High Court then dismissed the second appeal by refusing to condone the delay (para 8). On perusing the first appellate judgment, it found that the decree had been set aside ex parte (para 9). On those facts the appellant was certainly entitled to condonation of delay, because the duration of delay per se cannot be a ground to reject the appellant's substantive right, especially when the case involves reversing the Trial Court's decision (para 9). Courts are not expected to adopt a pedantic approach while deciding an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (para 9). The Court therefore set aside the order rejecting the condonation application, making clear that it expressed nothing on the merits (para 10). As the respondent is stated to have alienated the property to a proposed party while the proceedings were pending, the appellant was given liberty to apply to implead that party (para 11). The order does not rule on the COVID-19 period and cites no decision.

Legal Principle

On an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the length of the delay by itself cannot defeat a litigant's substantive right, particularly where a Trial Court decree in that litigant's favour was reversed in appeal ex parte; courts should not take a pedantic approach to condonation (paras 8-9).

NyayVidhan's view · Practice note

Why It Matters

For a party who loses a Trial Court decree in a first appeal decided without hearing them, this order is useful support when seeking condonation of delay: the Court treated the ex parte reversal as a key fact and said the length of the delay alone cannot defeat a substantive right (paras 8-9). It is a short order with no cited authority, so it should not be read as excusing an unexplained delay, and it does not address the COVID-19 period raised before it (paras 6-7). Where the property has changed hands during the case, an impleadment application should follow (para 11). Compare UP Co-operative Federation on condonation of delay in appeals.

Editorial comment by the NyayVidhan Editorial Desk. It is not part of the Court's judgment and is not legal advice.

Statutory Provisions: Limitation Act