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Supreme Court of India
Constitutional Law

TADA Valid; Section 15 Police Confessions Upheld With Safeguards, Photo Identification Clause Struck Down: Supreme Court

Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab Decided 11 March 1994

Published: · NyayVidhan · 7 min read

In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569, the Supreme Court held that Parliament was competent to enact the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act, 1984 and the TADA Acts of 1985 and 1987, because the terrorism they address is more than a disturbance of public order (paras 68, 73, 78). By a majority it upheld section 15, which makes a confession to a Superintendent of Police admissible, subject to guidelines on voluntariness (paras 260, 263). It upheld the bail limits in sections 20(7) and 20(8), read knowledge into the definition of abet, and struck down section 22 (paras 134, 361, 368).

TADA Valid; Section 15 Police Confessions Upheld With Safeguards, Photo Identification Clause Struck Down: Supreme Court

Judgment Intelligence

Disposed Of
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab
Writ Petition No. 1833 of 1984 etc. (with criminal appeals and special leave petitions); reported as (1994) 3 SCC 569, JT 1994 (2) 423, 1994 SCALE 1 and [1994] 2 SCR 375
Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of Decision
11 March 1994
Bench
Justices S. Ratnavel Pandian, M.M. Punchhi, K. Ramaswamy, S.C. Agrawal and R.M. Sahai (Bench of five Judges)
Relevant Acts & Sections
Constitution of India — Articles 14, 20(3), 21, 50, 226, 246, 248, 254(2); Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 — Sections 2(1)(a), 3, 4, 8, 9(7), 11, 15, 16, 19, 20(3), 20(4), 20(7), 20(8), 22; Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act, 1984 — Section 3; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Sections 164, 167, 437, 438, 439; Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — Sections 24, 25, 26, 30
Final Outcome

Writ petitions, criminal appeals and special leave petitions disposed of without costs: the Acts upheld, section 22 struck down and the questions answered as summarised, the facts of each case left to the appropriate Bench (paras 368-370).

Source Supreme Court of India, judgment dated 11 March 1994 · Court's copy

Key holdings

  1. The 1984 Act and the TADA Acts are within Parliament's competence under Article 248 and Entry 97 of List I (para 73).
  2. Speedy trial is an essential part of Article 21, from arrest to revision (para 86).
  3. By a majority, section 15 police confessions were held valid under Articles 14 and 21 (para 260).
  4. Such confessions need a free atmosphere, prompt production before a Chief Judicial Magistrate and respect for silence (para 263).
  5. The section 20(8) bail conditions do not infringe Article 21 (paras 349, 368).
  6. High Courts may grant TADA bail under Article 226 only in rare cases (para 359).
  7. Abet requires knowledge or reason to believe; section 22 on photograph identification is struck down (paras 134, 361).

Case explainer by NyayVidhan: an account of this judgment and the law it laid down, not the court's text. The judgment itself is the authoritative version.

Brief Facts

The matters were a batch of writ petitions, criminal appeals and special leave petitions challenging the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act, 1984, the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985 and its successor of 1987, together with section 9 of the Uttar Pradesh amendment of 1976, which deleted section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on anticipatory bail, in that State (para 1). The 1984 Act set up special courts for speedy trial in areas declared terrorist affected (paras 4-5). The 1985 Act came into force on May 24, 1985 for two years, and the 1987 Act followed to continue and strengthen that law (paras 8, 11). The 1987 Act provided for Designated Courts, confessions recorded by senior police officers, limits on bail and an appeal straight to the Supreme Court (paras 83, 192, 335). Five Judges gave a common judgment on validity and left the merits of each case to be decided separately (para 2).

Questions before the Court (framed by NyayVidhan)

  1. Was Parliament competent to enact the 1984, 1985 and 1987 Acts, or did they fall under public order in the State List?
  2. Do the special procedures for speedy trial deny the fair procedure that Article 21 requires?
  3. Is section 15, admitting confessions recorded by a Superintendent of Police, valid under Articles 14 and 21?
  4. Are the bail limits in sections 20(7) and 20(8) constitutional?
  5. Can a High Court grant bail in TADA cases under Article 226?
  6. Are the definition of abet, the protection of witnesses and identification by photograph valid?

Submissions

For the petitioners. Parliament lacked competence because the Acts dealt with public order, a State subject (para 44). Under the guise of speedy trial the Acts denied the procedural safeguards that Article 21 requires (paras 80-81). Section 15 overrode sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act and sections 162 and 164 of the Code, and recordings on mechanical devices could be tampered with (para 193). The definition of abet was vague enough to catch innocent persons (para 99), and section 20(8) made bail impossible even for a person falsely charged (paras 339-340).

For the Union and the States. Terrorism encouraged from across the borders threatened the sovereignty of India, so the Acts related to the defence of India and not to public order (paras 54-55). Vesting the power to record confessions in a superior police officer was itself a safeguard, and the probative value of a confession was left to the court in each case (paras 198-199). The bail conditions were in line with section 437 of the Code (para 341).

Court's Findings

Parliament was competent

Terrorism under the Acts is not a mere disturbance of public order but a grave emergent situation that challenges the existence and sovereignty of the country (para 68). The Acts do not fall under Entry 1 of List II, and no other State entry was invoked, so they are within Parliament's competence under Article 248 read with Entry 97 of List I; they could also fall under Entry 1 of List I, Defence of India (para 73).

Speedy trial is part of Article 21

Speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an essential part of the right to life and liberty, running from arrest through investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision (para 86). Designated Courts were directed to avoid unreasonable delay, and Governments to fill vacancies and constitute more courts (para 369).

Section 15 survives, with guidelines

Treating terrorists and disruptionists as a separate class has a rational nexus with the object of the Acts; Anwar Ali Sarkar did not apply, because the Acts themselves classify the offenders and the offences (paras 243-244). Having regard to the competence of Parliament, the gravity of terrorism and the reluctance of witnesses to depose, the majority held section 15 valid under Articles 14 and 21 (paras 253, 260); recording by a Magistrate under section 164 remained available (paras 261-262). The Court laid down guidelines: a free atmosphere, prompt production before the Chief Metropolitan or Chief Judicial Magistrate, medical examination on any complaint of torture, investigation only by senior officers, and respect for the right to silence (para 263). The trial court must be satisfied that there was no trap and that all conditions were fulfilled (para 264).

Bail limits upheld

Excluding section 438 by section 20(7) does not deprive personal liberty under Article 21, and the Uttar Pradesh deletion of section 438 is valid (paras 330, 334). Section 20(8) bars bail unless the Public Prosecutor is heard and, if he opposes, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing the accused not guilty and not likely to offend on bail (para 342). These conditions mirror section 437 of the Code and are not unreasonable (para 349); the contrary view in Bimal Kaur was set aside (para 350). Courts must still guard liberty and resist the Act being invoked only to defeat bail (paras 351-352).

Article 226 only in rare cases

The High Courts retain jurisdiction, but the scheme of the Act, with appeals to the Supreme Court, requires that it be used most sparingly, only in rare and appropriate cases in extreme circumstances, and judicial discipline requires the High Courts to refrain (para 359).

Read in, qualified, struck down

Actual knowledge or reason to believe was read into clause (i) of the definition of abet (paras 133-134). Witnesses' identities should be disclosed before trial unless the court, for weighty reasons, protects witnesses whose lives may be in danger (para 290). Section 22 was struck down because treating identification from a photograph like a test identification parade could cause gross injustice (para 361).

Separate Opinions

Justice K. Ramaswamy agreed except on section 9(7), section 15 and, in part, Article 226 (Ramaswamy J., para 372). He found section 15(1) unfair and unjust, offending Articles 14 and 21, and section 9(7) subversive of judicial independence; he would have postponed that declaration for a year for Parliament to amend both provisions (Ramaswamy J., paras 406, 419, 423). He would have the High Courts decline Article 226 proceedings in all matters under the Act (Ramaswamy J., paras 435-436). Justice R.M. Sahai, in a concurring opinion, held section 15 violative of Articles 20(3) and 21 and liable to be struck down, and said retired persons should not preside over Designated Courts (Sahai J., paras 437, 456, 460). On section 15 the Court was thus divided three to two.

What Changes

A confession to a police officer was barred by sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act, and the Court rejected the analogy with officers under other special Acts, who are not police officers (paras 209, 214). It still sustained section 15 for terrorist offences, but attached its own guidelines on voluntariness, production before a Magistrate, medical examination and silence (paras 260, 263). It also confined Article 226 bail to rare cases and struck down section 22 (paras 359, 361).

Legal Principle

A special criminal law made under Parliament's residuary power may depart from the ordinary law of evidence and bail if its classification is rational and its procedure remains just, fair and reasonable under Article 21. A confession to a senior police officer may be admitted only with strict safeguards of voluntariness, and bail conditions requiring reasonable grounds to believe the accused not guilty are valid (paras 244, 253, 263, 349).

NyayVidhan's view · Practice note

Why It Matters

The ruling is still read for two lines of reasoning. On bail under a special statute, it held that a condition requiring reasonable grounds for believing the accused not guilty, and unlikely to offend on bail, is consistent with Article 21, while warning courts and prosecutors against invoking the Act merely to defeat bail (paras 342, 349, 352). On confessions, it upheld section 15 only as an exception for terrorist offences, hedged with guidelines on a free atmosphere, prompt production before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, medical examination on any complaint of torture and the right to silence, and two of the five Judges would have struck it down (paras 260, 263). It also read speedy trial into Article 21 from arrest to revision (para 86). For later rulings on statements to officers and on bail where trial is delayed, see Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu and V. Senthil Balaji v. Directorate of Enforcement.

Editorial comment by the NyayVidhan Editorial Desk. It is not part of the Court's judgment and is not legal advice.

Precedents Relied Upon

  1. Union of India v. H.S. Dhillon (1971) 2 SCC 779: (1972) 2 SCR 33
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 59, 61

    Where a law does not fall in the State List, Parliament has competence under the residuary power in Article 248 read with Entry 97 of the Union List. Relied on to uphold the Acts once Entry 1 of List II (public order) was excluded.

  2. Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Commerce Ltd., Khulna AIR 1947 PC 60: 74 IA 23: 51 CWN 599
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 61

    The pith and substance of a law decides the list to which it belongs, even if it incidentally touches a subject in another list. Applied to find the true character of the TADA Acts.

  3. Lakhi Narayan Das v. Province of Bihar AIR 1950 FC 59: 51 Cri LJ 921: 1949 FCR 693
    Referred To Discussed at ¶ 64

    Public order is a most comprehensive term and its maintenance within a province is primarily the concern of that province. Cited in fixing the scope of Entry 1 of List II.

View all precedents (24)
  1. Ram Manohar Lohia (Dr) v. State of Bihar (1966) 1 SCR 709: AIR 1966 SC 740: 1966 Cri LJ 608
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 65

    Hidayatullah J. distinguished law and order, public order and security of the State. Relied on to hold that terrorism under the Acts is more than a disturbance of public order.

  2. Arun Ghosh v. State of W.B. (1970) 1 SCC 98: 1970 SCC (Cri) 67: (1970) 3 SCR 288
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 68

    Public order concerns the even tempo of the life of the community of a locality. Relied on to hold that terrorism is a grave emergent situation challenging the sovereignty of the country, not a mere disturbance of public order.

  3. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248: (1978) 2 SCR 621
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 81, 88

    A law depriving a person of life or liberty must prescribe a procedure that is just, fair and reasonable. The test against which the procedures of the Acts were examined.

  4. Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23: (1979) 3 SCR 169(1)
    Followed Discussed at ¶ 87

    Speedy trial, meaning reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty in Article 21. Followed to read speedy trial into Article 21 for the special Acts.

  5. Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R. S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93
    Referred To Discussed at ¶ 87

    Listed among the decisions holding that speedy trial is a facet of the right to life and liberty under Article 21.

  6. Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon v. State of Gujarat (1988) 2 SCC 271 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 318
    Followed Discussed at ¶ 146, 147, 344, 347, 348, 355

    TADA is an extreme measure to be strictly construed; Sections 439 and 482 of the Code cannot be used to grant bail in TADA cases, and the Designated Courts must decide bail within the limits of Section 20(8). The Court agreed in full.

  7. Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya (1990) 4 SCC 76: 1991 SCC (Cri) 47
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 146, 147

    Penal statutes such as TADA must be strictly construed, and the prosecution must show from the record that the facts prima facie constitute an offence within the letter of the law.

  8. Special Courts Bill, 1978, In re (1979) 1 SCC 380: (1979) 2 SCR 476
    Distinguished Discussed at ¶ 165, 168

    Clause 7 of the Bill, allowing a retired High Court Judge to preside merely in consultation with the Chief Justice of India, violated Article 21. Distinguished: Section 9(7) continues a serving Judge, who does not retire.

  9. State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar 1952 SCR 284 : AIR 1952 SC 75 : 1952 Cri LJ 5 10
    Distinguished Discussed at ¶ 237

    A special courts law that left the choice of cases to the uncontrolled discretion of the State Government violated Article 14. Distinguished: the TADA Acts themselves classify the offenders and the offences.

  10. Gurbachan Singh v. State of Bombay 1952 SCR 737 : AIR 1952 SC 221 : 1952 Cri LJ 1147
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 198, 283

    An extraordinary law may depart from ordinary procedure, including by not disclosing witnesses who fear violence, if the classification is reasonable. Relied on to uphold Section 16(2) and (3); also cited on Section 15.

  11. State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (1962) 3 SCR 10: AIR 1961 SC 180: (1961) 2 Cri LJ 856
    Referred To Discussed at ¶ 207

    Cited among the decisions on the protection against self-incrimination in Article 20(3).

  12. Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani (1978) 2 SCC 424: 1978 SCC (Cri) 236
    Referred To Discussed at ¶ 207

    Cited among the decisions on the protection against self-incrimination in Article 20(3).

  13. Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan (1994) 3 SCC 440: JT (1994) 1 SC 290
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 114

    Courts may take a functional approach and look into the legislative intention to give effect to the purpose of an enactment. Relied on in construing the definition of abet.

  14. Bimal Kaur Khalsa v. Union of India AIR 1988 P&H 95 : (1988) 93 Punj LR 189 : 1988 Cri LJ 169
    Not Followed Discussed at ¶ 268, 290, 323, 350

    The Punjab and Haryana Full Bench struck down several TADA provisions. Its view that witnesses' identities be disclosed before trial was upheld with an exception, but its conclusions on Section 20(4)(a) and the last part of Section 20(8)(b) were set aside.

  15. Hira Nath Mishra v. Principal, Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi (1973) 1 SCC 805
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 284

    Rules of natural justice vary with conditions; evidence may be taken outside the presence of the person charged. Relied on to uphold the protection of witnesses' identity under Section 16.

  16. A.K. Roy v. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 271: 1982 SCC (Cri) 152: (1982) 2 SCR 272
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 285

    A detenu before the Advisory Board has no right to cross-examine where Parliament has not provided one. Recalled in upholding Section 16.

  17. Statesman (P) Ltd. v. H.R. Deb (1968) 3 SCR 614: AIR 1968 SC 1495
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 313

    A Magistrate exercising judicial functions holds a judicial office. Relied on to hold that Executive Magistrates recording confessions under Section 20(3) hold judicial office.

  18. Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State Of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565: 1980 SCC (Cri) 465: (1980) 3 SCR 383
    Referred To Discussed at ¶ 325

    Relied on by the petitioners for the argument that abolishing anticipatory bail deprives personal liberty; the challenge to Section 20(7) failed.

  19. Balchand Jain v. State of M.P. (1976) 4 SCC 572: 1976 SCC (Cri) 689: (1977) 2 SCR 52
    Distinguished Discussed at ¶ 346, 347

    Rule 184 of the Defence and Internal Security of India Rules, 1971 did not take away Section 438 of the Code. Distinguished because Section 20(7) of TADA expressly excludes Section 438.

  20. State of Maharashtra v. Anand Chintaman Dighe (1990) 1 SCC 397: 1990 SCC (Cri) 142
    Referred To Discussed at ¶ 353

    Referred to on the misuse of TADA by invoking it in cases whose facts do not warrant it.

  21. State of Maharashtra v. Abdul Hamid Haji Mohammed (1994) 2 SCC 664
    Followed Discussed at ¶ 357, 359

    The High Court may use Article 226 in a TADA case only in extreme and rare cases, such as where the accusation ex facie cannot constitute an offence under TADA. Followed in confining bail under Article 226 to rare cases.

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