Judgment Intelligence
Conviction Set Aside- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of Decision
- 17 November 2026
- Bench
- Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar
- Relevant Acts & Sections
- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Sections 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2), 20; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 313
Appeal allowed. The Special Judge's judgment of 28.08.2008 and the High Court's judgment of 19.12.2014 are set aside; the appellant is acquitted of the charges under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act, and his bail bonds are discharged (paras 49-50).
Source Supreme Court of India, www.sci.gov.in — judgment dated 17 November 2026 · Court's copy
Key holdings
- Demand and acceptance must be proved as facts before the Section 20 presumption can arise (paras 34, 48).
- Where the complainant and shadow witness have died, other evidence may prove the demand, but not the trap officer's hearsay (paras 33.4, 42).
- Recovery of treated notes and pink washes, without proof of demand, cannot sustain a conviction (paras 43-44).
- Official records showing the work done before the trap undermined the alleged motive (para 46).
- The accused rebuts the Section 20 presumption on a preponderance of probabilities; his version was plausible (para 47).
Judgment digest by NyayVidhan: a summary of the court's judgment, not its text. The judgment itself is the authoritative version.
Brief Facts
Questions before the Court (framed by NyayVidhan)
- With the complainant and the shadow witness dead, was the demand and acceptance of a bribe proved?
- Could the trap officer's account of what the shadow witness told him prove the demand?
- Did the recovery of the treated notes and the positive washes allow a presumption under Section 20?
Submissions
For the appellant. With the complainant and the shadow witness dead, there was no primary evidence of demand or acceptance, so Section 20 could not apply (paras 20, 20.1). The trap officer arrived after the transaction; his account was hearsay (para 20.2). Two clerks deposed that both cheques reached the Deputy Labour Commissioner's office on 01.01.2003, leaving no occasion for a demand on 06.01.2003 (para 20.3).
For the State. The written complaint detailed the demand; the recovery was undisputed, and the washes showed conscious handling of the money (para 21.1). Recovery raised the Section 20 presumption, which he failed to rebut (para 21.2).
Court's Findings
No direct evidence of demand
Under the Constitution Bench in Neeraj Dutta, proof of demand and acceptance is a sine qua non; if the complainant has died, they may be proved by other evidence, direct or circumstantial, and a presumption of fact arises only once the foundational facts are proved (para 33.4). Here neither the complainant nor the shadow witness entered the witness box, so there was no direct evidence of the alleged demands of 23.09.2002 and 07.12.2002, the telephone call, or the exchange at the spot (para 40).
The trap officer's account is hearsay
The trap case rested entirely on the trap officer, PW-10 (para 41). He had not himself seen or heard any demand or acceptance; he repeated what the shadow witness told him, and his versions differed on whether the money was taken in the right hand or the left (paras 41.2, 41.3, 42). Without the shadow witness, that hearsay was inadmissible and could not prove the demand (para 42).
Recovery alone, against the official record
What remained was the recovery and the pink washes, and mere recovery without proof of demand cannot sustain a conviction (paras 43-44). The prosecution therefore had to prove circumstances leading to an irresistible inference of guilt (para 45). But the order sheet and forwarding letter showed his office had dispatched both cheques on 28.12.2002; they reached the Labour Department on 01.01.2003, and the complainant collected them on 07.01.2003, so no work was pending with him on 06.01.2003 (para 46). His Section 313 explanation, that the complainant came to thank him and tried to thrust the notes into his pocket while shaking hands, was plausible on a preponderance of probabilities (para 47). With neither demand nor conscious acceptance proved, the Section 20 presumption could not be drawn (para 48).
Legal Principle
NyayVidhan's view · Practice note
Why It Matters
When the complainant or shadow witness cannot testify, the Constitution Bench in Neeraj Dutta lets the prosecution prove the demand through other witnesses or circumstances, but here the trap officer's account of what the shadow witness told him was inadmissible hearsay (paras 33.4, 42). Prosecutors should prove from the file that the official act was still pending on the day of the trap; the defence should check order sheets and dispatch records, which here defeated the alleged motive (para 46). On demand as the gravamen of the offence, see also P. Satyanarayana Murthy.
Editorial comment by the NyayVidhan Editorial Desk. It is not part of the Court's judgment and is not legal advice.
Precedents Relied Upon
- P. Satyanarayana Murthy Vs. State of A.P. (2015) 10 SCC 152
Proof of demand of illegal gratification is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the PC Act; mere acceptance or recovery of money without proof of demand is not sufficient, and failure to prove the demand is fatal (para 23 of that judgment, as extracted).
- Neeraj Dutta Vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) (2023) 4 SCC 731
Constitution Bench (Neeraj Dutta-1): where the complainant has died or is unavailable, demand and acceptance may be proved by other evidence, oral, documentary or circumstantial; but proof of demand and acceptance as facts in issue is a sine qua non, a presumption of fact may be drawn only when the foundational facts are proved, and Section 20 does not apply to Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii). Applied to hold that no admissible evidence proved either fact.
- Neeraj Dutta Vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) (2023) 18 SCC 251
Two-Judge Bench (Neeraj Dutta-2), after the Constitution Bench: the Section 20 presumption can be invoked only when the two basic facts, demand and acceptance of gratification, are proved beyond reasonable doubt; the demand must be for gratification other than legal remuneration, and the presumption is rebuttable on a preponderance of probability (para 16 of that judgment, as extracted).
View all precedents (12)
- Aman Bhatia Vs. State 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1013
Mere recovery of tainted money is insufficient; a conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) needs proof beyond reasonable doubt that the public servant voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe, and demand is the sine qua non of an offence under Section 7 (para 52 of that judgment, as extracted).
- State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. A.K. Gaba (2026) SCC Online SC 967
Proof of demand is the gravamen of the offence and without it the Section 20 presumption does not arise; where the prosecution evidence is inconsistent and material witnesses turn hostile, the benefit of doubt goes to the accused (para 16 of that judgment, as extracted).
- Jaswinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1952
Analysis of Section 7 of the PC Act as it then stood, and of its five Explanations, extracted for the ingredients of the offence.
- P. Sarangapani Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2024) 19 SCC 550
Relied on by the State. Following Neeraj Dutta-1, the death or non-availability of the complainant is not fatal, and the prosecution may prove the complaint and the facts in issue by other evidence; once acceptance is proved, the Section 20 presumption arises, rebuttably. There the pre-trap and post-trap proceedings and the conscious acceptance of the tainted currency were proved, and the conviction was confirmed.
- State of Karnataka Vs. Chandrasha (2024) SCC Online SC 3469
Relied on by the State. Three-Judge Bench: the Section 20 presumption can be drawn only after the demand for and acceptance of illegal gratification are proved, and does not apply to Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii); it is rebuttable on a preponderance of probability. There demand, acceptance and recovery were proved, so the presumption was rightly drawn.
- Hazari Lal Vs. State (Delhi Administration) (1980) 2 SCC 390
Relied on by the State. One of four decisions that the Court noted were rendered well before Neeraj Dutta-1; even in those cases, the Section 20(1) presumption depended on proof at the trial, not necessarily by direct evidence, that the accused had accepted or agreed to accept gratification.
- M. Narsinga Rao Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2001) 1 SCC 691
Relied on by the State. One of four decisions that the Court noted were rendered well before Neeraj Dutta-1; even in those cases, the Section 20(1) presumption depended on proof at the trial, not necessarily by direct evidence, that the accused had accepted or agreed to accept gratification.
- State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. C. Uma Maheshwari Rao (2004) 4 SCC 399
Relied on by the State. One of four decisions that the Court noted were rendered well before Neeraj Dutta-1; even in those cases, the Section 20(1) presumption depended on proof at the trial, not necessarily by direct evidence, that the accused had accepted or agreed to accept gratification.
- State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. R. Jeevaratnam (2004) 6 SCC 488
Relied on by the State. One of four decisions that the Court noted were rendered well before Neeraj Dutta-1; even in those cases, the Section 20(1) presumption depended on proof at the trial, not necessarily by direct evidence, that the accused had accepted or agreed to accept gratification.


