Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

The Supreme Court acquitted a man sentenced to death for abducting and killing two boys, holding that his retracted judicial confession was uncorroborated and contradicted the medical evidence, so "it is not safe to convict the appellant solely on the basis of the alleged confession which has been retracted" (para 28). General corroboration of a retracted confession suffices (para 23).

The Supreme Court set aside a Madras High Court order quashing a corruption prosecution because the Inspector who registered the FIR had also investigated it. Nothing in the Code bars this; such an investigation can be assailed only for "bias or real likelihood of bias", which depends on the facts of each case (paras 3, 5). Bhagwan Singh and Megha Singh lay down no broad contrary rule (paras 7, 11).

The Supreme Court upheld the NDPS convictions of two men found with 200 grams of opium each, holding that Section 50 prescribes no particular form for telling a suspect of his right (paras 2, 7, 15). A notice asking whether they would give the officer the search or be searched by a gazetted officer or magistrate was enough, as in Joseph Fernandez (paras 9-10, 13). "No specific words are necessary to be used to convey existence of the right" (para 9).

The Supreme Court acquitted a man and his mother convicted of possessing charas and ganja because the seized drugs were never produced at trial, the panch witnesses turned hostile and the Investigating Officer was not examined (paras 5-6, 9). "The best evidence would have been the seized materials which ought to have been produced during the trial and marked as material objects" (para 6). A final report saying the laboratory report was awaited, filed after that report's date, added to the doubt (para 8).

The Supreme Court upheld the NDPS convictions of the occupants of a private car from which 820 grams of charas was recovered (paras 7, 30). Section 50 applies only to the personal search of a person, not to a vehicle, container, bag or premises (para 17). Once possession is established, the person claiming that it was not conscious must prove it, as Sections 35 and 54 recognise; the driver stood on no different footing (paras 27-29).

The Supreme Court upheld an opium conviction although the seizure memo and samples were prepared at the customs office, not at the spot. A seizure mahazar should normally be prepared on the spot, but a procedural illegality does not make the evidence inadmissible; the court asks whether serious prejudice was caused. The accused was present throughout and no tampering was alleged (paras 10, 16-17).

"To have speedy justice is a fundamental right which flows from Article 21 of the Constitution", the Supreme Court held, suspending the life sentence of an elderly woman whose 1997 appeal had not been listed in the Madhya Pradesh High Court (paras 1, 4, 5). It said convicts whose appeals are not decided within five years, for no fault of theirs, may be released on bail, and asked Chief Justices to set up regular benches (para 4).

Allowing the State's appeal against acquittal in the rape and death of a four-year-old girl, the Supreme Court held that "there is no requirement either under Section 27 of the Evidence Act or under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to obtain signature of independent witnesses on the record in which statement of an accused is written" (para 21). It restored the rape convictions with life imprisonment and convicted both men of culpable homicide not amounting to murder (para 26).

A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held Section 32A of the NDPS Act unconstitutional to the extent that it bars appellate courts from suspending sentences: a right of appeal without that power "would be unjust, unfair and violative of Article 21" (paras 17, 25). The bar on executive suspension, remission and commutation was upheld and severed (paras 15, 26). Suspension remains subject to Section 37's conditions, and Section 32A does not bar parole (paras 10, 27, 29).

The Supreme Court upheld a heroin conviction, holding that the reliable oral evidence of the officer who conducted the search can establish compliance with Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act. T.P. Razak did not lay down a rule requiring independent or documentary support (paras 4-6). A confession recorded while the accused was in custody was not involuntary for that reason alone; his vague, belated retraction did not displace it, and a discrepancy in the sample's weight did not create a doubt (paras 7-8).

In a public interest case begun by a letter about deaths in police lock-ups, the Supreme Court held that torture in custody falls within the inhibition of Article 21 and laid down eleven requirements to be followed in all cases of arrest or detention (paras 23, 37). Non-compliance invites departmental action and contempt proceedings (para 38). Compensation in public law for such violations rests on strict liability, to which sovereign immunity is no defence (para 57).

In this 1994 ruling the Supreme Court set out how the arrest and search safeguards of the NDPS Act work. An officer searching a person on prior information must tell him of his right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate, and Section 50 is mandatory (paras 17, 21, 26). An arrest or search under the Act by an officer who is not empowered is illegal, while lapses under Sections 52 and 57 are tested for prejudice (paras 14, 25-26).