Legislative Privilege No Shield for Destroying Public Property: Supreme Court Refuses Withdrawal of Kerala Assembly Ruckus Case

On 13 March 2015, opposition MLAs disrupted the budget speech in the Kerala Legislative Assembly, climbed onto the Speaker's dais and damaged furniture and equipment worth Rs 2,20,093; a case was registered under the IPC and the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, and cognizance was taken (para 3). In 2018 the Public Prosecutor applied under Section 321 CrPC to withdraw the case, citing legislative privilege, the Speaker's sanction and public interest (para 4). The CJM refused consent, holding that immunity covers only speech and votes and that the loss fell on the public exchequer, and the High Court upheld the refusal (paras 5-7).

Under Section 321, the prosecutor decides on withdrawal but the court must consent, ensuring the power is not used improperly or to interfere with the course of justice; good faith alone is not decisive (paras 23, 58). Elected legislators are subject to criminal law like every citizen, and no privilege or immunity places them above it (para 52). Privileges bear a functional relationship to legislative duties and are not gateways to exemption from the general law (paras 55-56). Destroying public property cannot be equated with freedom of speech or legitimate protest in the House, and P.V. Narasimha Rao does not help the accused (paras 57, 59). Though the High Court cited the minority opinion in Sheonandan Paswan as the Court's view, its conclusion was tested against the majority view (para 46). No sanction of the Speaker was needed, and Section 197 CrPC does not apply because MLAs are not removable by the government (paras 62-64). The video recording was not a protected 'proceeding' under Article 194(2), and its admissibility is for the trial court (paras 82, 84).