Saturday, 21 November 2026
Supreme Court of India
Arbitration

Limitation Does Not Run During IBC Moratorium: Supreme Court Appoints Former CJI Sanjiv Khanna as Substituted Arbitrator

Punj Lloyd Limited v. Ramo Industries Pte. Ltd. Decided 16 November 2026

Published: · NyayVidhan · 3 min read

In Punj Lloyd Limited v. Ramo Industries Pte. Ltd., the Supreme Court held that an application for a substituted arbitrator, made after the former arbitrator recused on 21.12.2020, was within time, because limitation does not run during the IBC moratorium under Section 60(6) of the Code. It appointed Mr. Justice Sanjiv Khanna, former Chief Justice of India, to continue the proceedings from the stage already reached (paras 1, 5-7).

Limitation Does Not Run During IBC Moratorium: Supreme Court Appoints Former CJI Sanjiv Khanna as Substituted Arbitrator

Judgment Intelligence

Petition Allowed
Punj Lloyd Limited v. Ramo Industries Pte. Ltd.
Arbitration Petition No. 73 of 2026 with Arbitration Petition No. 74 of 2026
Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of Decision
16 November 2026
Bench
Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana
Relevant Acts & Sections
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Sections 14, 33(5) and 60(6); Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (appointment of a substituted arbitrator; no section printed in the order)
Final Outcome

Prayer for a substituted arbitrator allowed and both arbitration petitions disposed of: Mr. Justice Sanjiv Khanna, former Chief Justice of India, appointed to continue the proceedings from the stage reached; other issues left open; fees in consultation with the parties (paras 6-9).

Source Supreme Court of India, www.sci.gov.in — order dated 16 November 2026 · Court's copy

Key holdings

  1. The application for a substituted arbitrator was within time and the prayer was allowed (para 6).
  2. Limitation does not run during the moratorium under Section 60(6) of the IBC, though the liquidator could pursue recovery proceedings then (para 5).
  3. Mr. Justice Sanjiv Khanna, former Chief Justice of India, will continue the proceedings from the stage already reached (para 7).
  4. The respondent may raise all other issues before the arbitrator, whose fees are to be fixed in consultation with the parties (paras 6, 8).

Judgment digest by NyayVidhan: a summary of the court's judgment, not its text. The judgment itself is the authoritative version.

Brief Facts

Punj Lloyd Limited asked the Supreme Court to appoint a substituted arbitrator after the former arbitrator recused on 21.12.2020; a connected petition, Arbitration Petition No. 74 of 2026, was decided with it. The respondent argued that the arbitration had lapsed on the recusal, that the application was barred by limitation, and that the petitioner’s plea of being unaware of the recusal was not borne out by the records (para 1). The petitioner, which had been referred to the corporate insolvency resolution process, replied that limitation must be computed under Section 60(6) of the IBC, excluding the period of the moratorium, and relied on New Delhi Municipal Council v. Minosha India Limited (para 1).

Court's Findings

Considering the rival submissions in the light of New Delhi Municipal Council, the Court did not accept the respondent’s view that paragraph 3(h) of the liquidation order of 27.05.2022, which let the liquidator follow up pending applications and take steps to recover dues, stood in the way of deducting the moratorium period under Section 60(6) of the IBC (para 2). Paragraph 3(d) of the same order said that the moratorium under Section 14 would cease and a fresh moratorium under Section 33(5) would commence (para 3). Read together, the two clauses made it ‘amply clear’ that although the liquidator’s hands were not tied in following up pending proceedings or instituting new ones for recovery during the moratorium, the limitation for such proceedings ‘would not run during such moratorium period’ under Section 60(6) (para 5). The prayer for a substituted arbitrator was therefore within time and was allowed (para 6). The order gives no separate ruling on the lapse plea or on knowledge of the recusal, leaving the respondent free to raise all other issues before the arbitrator (paras 1, 6).

Legal Principle

Limitation for proceedings by a party under an IBC moratorium, here an application for a substituted arbitrator, does not run during the moratorium under Section 60(6) of the IBC, even where the liquidation order leaves the liquidator free to pursue pending and new recovery proceedings in that period (paras 5-6).

NyayVidhan's view · Practice note

Why It Matters

Where one side to an arbitration has been through insolvency, the moratorium dates matter when time is counted. Here the Court did not count the moratorium period under Section 60(6) of the IBC in deciding that a request for a substituted arbitrator, made after a recusal in December 2020, was in time (paras 1, 5-6). A clause in the liquidation order letting the liquidator pursue pending or new recovery proceedings did not change that (paras 2, 5). The order is brief: it does not set out filing dates or a day count, and other objections stay open before the new arbitrator, who picks up from the stage already reached (paras 6-7).

Editorial comment by the NyayVidhan Editorial Desk. It is not part of the Court's judgment and is not legal advice.

Precedents Relied Upon

  1. New Delhi Municipal Council v. Minosha India Limited (2022) 8 SCC 384
    Applied Discussed at ¶ 1, 2

    Relied on by the petitioner for computing the limitation for its application for a substituted arbitrator under Section 60(6) of the IBC by excluding the moratorium period; the Court considered the rival submissions in the light of the law laid down in it, rejected the respondent’s reading of the liquidation order and held the application within time.

Join our WhatsApp Group
✕

Try: POCSO, IBC, Electoral Bond, Article 370, NDPS Act, Bail Conditions, SC Contempt