Wednesday, 18 November 2026
Supreme Court of India
Service Law

Action Contrary to Court Order Is a Nullity: Supreme Court Awards Terminated School Clerks Rs. 10 Lakh Each

Prithviraj S. Singh (Deceased) through LRs. etc. v. The Secretary, School Education Department, State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2026 INSC 1241 Decided 18 November 2026

Published: · NyayVidhan · 3 min read

In Prithviraj S. Singh (Deceased) through LRs. v. Secretary, School Education Department, State of Maharashtra (2026 INSC 1241), the Supreme Court found that two terminated school clerks had argued points beyond their writ pleadings, but still granted relief under Article 142. The school never acted on a High Court consent order letting it lead evidence, so nothing before the School Tribunal established the charges. The Court directed the school to pay each appellant Rs. 10 lakh as compensation (paras 9-12).

Action Contrary to Court Order Is a Nullity: Supreme Court Awards Terminated School Clerks Rs. 10 Lakh Each

Judgment Intelligence

Disposed Of
Prithviraj S. Singh (Deceased) through LRs. etc. v. The Secretary, School Education Department, State of Maharashtra & Ors.
2026 INSC 1241
Civil Appeal Nos. 10193-10194 of 2016
Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of Decision
18 November 2026
Bench
Justices Dipankar Datta and Sheel Nagu
Relevant Acts & Sections
Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 — Section 9; Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981 — Rule 37(2)(a)(iii); Constitution of India — Articles 142, 226
Final Outcome

Appeals disposed of. Under Article 142, the school must pay each appellant (the late Prithviraj S. Singh through his heirs) Rs. 10,00,000 as lump sum compensation for wrongful termination within three months, in full and final settlement, with interest at 12% per annum on default (paras 12-13).

Source Supreme Court of India, www.sci.gov.in — judgment dated 18 November 2026 · Court's copy

Key holdings

  1. Arguments beyond the writ pleadings need not be entertained; a party must plead its case (para 9).
  2. With no evidence led under the consent order, nothing before the Tribunal established the charges (paras 5, 11).
  3. Not furnishing the final inquiry reports before termination was a serious flaw (para 11).
  4. An action wholly contrary to an express judicial order is a nullity and cannot be accepted (para 11).
  5. Article 142 compensation replaced the larger relief that properly drafted petitions could have won (para 12).

Judgment digest by NyayVidhan: a summary of the court's judgment, not its text. The judgment itself is the authoritative version.

Brief Facts

Prithviraj S. Singh, a senior clerk, and Shivadatta R. Singh, a head clerk, were proceeded against departmentally at a school for misappropriation of public money and allied charges. They abstained from the inquiry in protest and it went ex parte; the inquiry reports were never furnished to them, and they were removed from service (para 2). On the school's writ petitions, the Bombay High Court passed a consent order on 17.03.2005 allowing the school to apply to the School Tribunal to lead evidence (para 4). It did not; the Tribunal dismissed their appeals on 19.07.2006 (para 5). Their writ petitions, pleading only parity with the in-charge headmaster, were dismissed on 17.06.2016 (paras 7-8).

Court's Findings

The writ petitions neither alleged breach of the consent order nor challenged the Tribunal's omission; they rested on parity with the in-charge headmaster (para 7). Arguments on the merits of the Tribunal's orders were therefore beyond the pleadings. A party must plead the averments supporting the relief it claims, and a court need not entertain a plea without them, so the appeals could have been dismissed by a short order (para 9). What concerned the Court was the consent order of 17.03.2005: the school offered no justification for not adhering to it (para 10). There was thus no evidence worth the name before the Tribunal to establish the charges. The Tribunal also found no infirmity although the final inquiry reports were not furnished before termination, a serious flaw in the disciplinary process (para 11). A High Court cannot grant relief under Article 226 without an appropriately pleaded case, but the appellants deserved some relief because an action or order wholly contrary to an express judicial order is a nullity, as in Ram Saran Varshney (para 11). Properly drafted petitions would have earned larger relief (para 12).

Legal Principle

A court need not entertain a plea unsupported by the necessary averments, and a High Court cannot grant Article 226 relief without an appropriately pleaded case. But an action or order wholly contrary to an express judicial order passed in exercise of competent jurisdiction is a nullity, which can ground relief under Article 142 (paras 9, 11-12).

NyayVidhan's view · Practice note

Why It Matters

The judgment opens with its lesson: a meritorious cause failed through inept drafting of a writ petition (para 1). The appellants' strongest points, that the school never acted on the consent order to lead evidence and that the Tribunal decided without that evidence, were not pleaded, so the Court held the arguments on them beyond the pleadings (paras 7, 9). A writ petition against a tribunal's order should plead every ground relied on, including any breach of an earlier court order. Employers should note that the Court still granted relief on the principle that an action wholly contrary to an express judicial order is a nullity (paras 11-12).

Editorial comment by the NyayVidhan Editorial Desk. It is not part of the Court's judgment and is not legal advice.

Precedents Relied Upon

  1. Ranjan Kumar Mitra v. Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. & Ors. (1997) 10 SCC 386
    Referred To Discussed at ¶ 5

    Recorded as the decision on which the School Tribunal held that employees who deliberately avoided the inquiry proceedings could not assail their termination on merits. The Supreme Court only noted the Tribunal's reliance and did not apply it.

  2. Ram Saran Varshney v. State of U.P. (2016) 3 SCC 724
    Relied Upon Discussed at ¶ 11

    Cited ('See:') for the principle that an action or order wholly contrary to an express judicial order passed in exercise of competent jurisdiction is a nullity and cannot be accepted; the principle on which the Court granted the appellants relief despite their deficient pleadings.

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