Virat Kumar v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (with Rekha Rani Vyas v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.)

2026:RJ-JP:40680

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR

S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 19016/2026
CNR: RJHC020871422026 | URN: CW / 39549U / 2026

Virat Kumar ----Petitioner
Versus
(1) State of Rajasthan, through its Secretary and Commissioner, Panchayati Raj Department, Government Secretariat, Jaipur; (2) Deputy Secretary and Deputy Commissioner, Panchayati Raj Department, Government Secretariat, Jaipur; (3) The District Collector, Alwar; (4) The Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Alwar; (5) The Sub Division Officer, Alwar, District Alwar; (6) Mrs. Artika Shukla, The Present District Collector Alwar (The Then Chief Executive Officer), Alwar ----Respondents

Connected With

S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3370/2026
CNR: RJHC020139362026 | URN: CW / 7449U / 2026

Rekha Rani Vyas ----Petitioner
Versus
(1) State of Rajasthan, through the Secretary and Commissioner, Panchayati Raj Department, Government Secretariat, Jaipur; (2) The District Collector, Alwar; (3) Smt. Artika Shukla, The present District Collector Alwar (The Then Chief Executive Officer, Alwar); (4) The Additional District Collector, Alwar; (5) The Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad Alwar; (6) The Sub Division Officer, Alwar District Alwar (Raj.) ----Respondents

For Petitioner(s): Mr. Punit Singhvi with Ms. Shraddha Mehta and Mr. Ishan Verma; Mr. Tanveer Ahamad
For Respondent(s): Mr. Kapil Prakash Mathur-AAG with Mr. Ashutosh Udahawat, Mr. Sourabh Sharma, Mr. Tanmay Sharma

JUSTICE ANOOP KUMAR DHAND

[NyayVidhan note: stored from the official Rajasthan High Court PDF (hcraj file 205200190162026_3.pdf), a common order in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 19016/2026 and the connected S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3370/2026. The cause titles are abridged: the petitioners' parentage, ages, addresses and a spouse's name are omitted. The Supreme Court passages quoted in paras 12 and 13 are kept inline with their own paragraph numbers. The Court's text is otherwise as printed, including 'Panchayti' (para 8), 'Praishad' and 'enquiy' (para 9), 'no one cannot be a judge' (para 10) and 'real livelihood of bias' and 'Board of15 Works' in the quoted passages. No 'Reportable' mark is printed. Page furniture (running heads, page numbers, upload/download stamps, staff initials, TCPDF line) is removed. The PDF is authoritative.]

[Source: Rajasthan High Court, hcraj.nic.in — order dated 05.10.2026.]

Order

05/10/2026

1. Since common questions of law and facts and involved in both the writ petitions, hence, with the consent of counsel for the parties, their arguments were heard together and they are being decided by this common order.

2. For the sake of convenience, the facts pleaded in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 19016/2026 are taken into consideration.

3. The instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner with the following prayer:- “i. By an appropriate writ, order or direction, the impugned letter dated 31.07.2026, preliminary inquiry report dated 21.02.2025 and 17.06.2025, and letter dated 30.01.2025, may be declared arbitrary and illegal. ii. by an appropriate writ, order or direction , the impugned letter dated 31.07.2026 may kindly be quashed and set aside, in the interest of justice. iii. By an appropriate writ, order or direction, the impugned preliminary inquiry report dated 21.02.2025 and 17.06.2025, may kindly be quashed and set aside, in the interest of justice. iv. By an appropriate writ, order or direction, the impugned letter dated 30.01.2025 may kindly be quashed and set aside, in the interest of justice. v. By an appropriate writ, order or direction, for taking action against the private respondent for not following the basic principles of natural justice.”

4. By way of filing these writ petitions, a challenge has been led to the impugned letter dated 31.07.2026 issued by the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Alwar and the Preliminary Enquiry conducted in furtherance of the aforesaid letter, on the basis of which charge-sheet has been proposed against the petitioners.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the recruitment to the post of Junior Assistant for the year 2013 was initiated by the Zila Parishad, Alwar and the entire recruitment process was conducted under the directions of the then Chief Executive Officer, i.e. respondent No. 6- Smt. Artika Shukla. Counsel submits that later on, the said Chief Executive Officer Smt. Artika Shukla became the District Collector, Alwar and upon her instructions, a Preliminary Enquiry was conducted by the Committee for the alleged irregularities committed in the aforesaid recruitment process. Counsel submits that the Committee submitted its report to the said District Collector, Alwar and found a prima case with regard to the irregularities being committed in the selection process of Junior Assistant for the year 2013. Counsel submits that now the respondents are bent upon to serve a charge-sheet upon the petitioners. Counsel submits that such exercise at the behest of the respondent No. 6 is nothing but a gross violation of the principles of natural justice. The principles of natural justice provide that no one can be a Judge in his/her own cause and in the instant case, once the entire recruitment process has been conducted under the instructions of the respondent No. 6, herself then the respondent No. 6 cannot issue directions for conducting any enquiry with regard to the aforesaid recruitment process. Hence, the order of conducting Preliminary Enquiry and the subsequent orders arising out of the same, suffer from irregularity and are not sustainable in the eyes of law and the same are liable to be quashed and set aside.

6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents-State opposed the prayer and submitted that the respondents have taken a decision to debar the respondent No. 6 from the aforesaid process of enquiry and now, the enquiry would be conducted at the State Level by certain other persons. Hence, under these circumstances, no cause of action survives with the petitioners to continue with both the writ petitions and the same are liable to be rejected.

7. Heard and considered the submissions made at Bar and perused the material available on record.

8. Perusal of the record indicates that selection process with regard to direct recruitment to the post of Junior Assistant for the year 2013 was conducted by the District Establishment Committee (Selection Committee) under Section 90 of the Rajasthan Panchayti Raj Act, 1994 and thereafter, the entire selection process was carried out under the supervision of the then Chief Executive Officer of the Zila Parishad i.e. respondent No.6. It appears that at a later point of time, certain irregularities were found in the aforesaid recruitment process, hence, the District Collector, Alwar passed an order for conducting enquiry with regard to the aforesaid recruitment process.

9. It is worthy to note here that when the selection process was conducted, the respondent No. 6 was posted as Chief Executive Officer in Zila Praishad, Alwar and when the order for conducting enquiry was passed, she was posted as District Collector, Alwar and thereafter, the enquiy was conducted by the Committee comprising of three members and certain irregularities were found in the aforesaid selection process. It appears that on the basis of the enquiry, so conducted by the aforesaid committee, now the respondents have proposed to serve charge-sheet upon the petitioners.

10. It is settled proposition of law that no one cannot be a judge in his/her own cause, as per the mandates of the principles of natural justice. In the instant case, the respondent No. 6 was not only involved in the recruitment process but she also become the Judge for passing the order for conducting Preliminary Enquiry in regard to the aforesaid recruitment process, therefore, the possibility of her bias cannot be ruled out. The principle of law captured in the legal maxim nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa would certainly apply in the present case because one of the fundamental principles of jurisprudence is that no one ought to be a Judge in his/her own cause.

11. The question is not that whether the authority was actually biased or arrived at a decision based on any partiality, but when the circumstances are such as to create a reasonable apprehension in the mind of others that there is likelihood of bias affecting the decision, then the proceedings cannot be upheld.

12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Yadav and Others v. State of Haryana and Others reported in (1985) 4 SCC 417 has held as under: “16. We agree with the petitioners that it is one of the fundamental principles of our jurisprudence that no man can be a judge in his own cause and that if there is a reasonable likelihood of bias it is “in accordance with natural justice and common sense that the justice likely to be so biased should be incapacitated from sitting”. The question is not whether the judge is actually biased or in fact decides partially, but whether there is a real livelihood of bias. What is objectionable in such a case is not that the decision is actually tainted with bias but that the circumstances are such as to create a reasonable apprehension in the mind of others that there is a likelihood of bias affecting the decision. The basic principle underlying this rule is that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done and this rule has received wide recognition in several decisions of this Court. It is also important to note that this rule is not confined to cases where judicial power stricto sensu is exercised. It is appropriately extended to all cases where an independent mind has to be applied to arrive at a fair and just decision between the rival claims of parties. Justice is not the function of the courts alone; it is also the duty of all those who are expected to decide fairly between contending parties. The strict standards applied to authorities exercising judicial power are being increasingly applied to administrative bodies, for it is vital to the maintenance of the rule of law in a Welfare State where the jurisdiction of administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid pace that the instrumentalities of the State should discharge their functions in a fair and just manner. This was the basis on which the applicability of this rule was extended to the decision-making process of a selection committee constituted for selecting officers to the Indian Forest Service in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262 : AIR 1970 SC 150 : (1970) 1 SCR 457] . What happened in this case was that one Naqishbund, the acting Chief Conservator of Forests, Jammu and Kashmir was a member of the Selection Board which had been set up to select officers to the Indian Forest Service from those serving in the Forest Department of Jammu and Kashmir. Naqishbund who was a member of the Selection Board was also one of the candidates for selection to the Indian Forest Service. He did not sit on the Selection Board at the time when his name was considered for selection but he did sit on the Selection Board and participated in the deliberations when the names of his rival officers were considered for selection and took part in the deliberations of the Selection Board while preparing the list of the selected candidates in order of preference. This Court held that the presence of Naqishbund vitiated the selection on the ground that there was reasonable likelihood of bias affecting the process of selection. Hegde, J. speaking on behalf of the Court countered the argument that Naqishbund did not take part in the deliberations of the Selection Board when his name was considered, by saying: “But then the very fact that he was a member of the Selection Board must have had its own impact on the decision of the Selection Board. Further admittedly he participated in the deliberations of the Selection Board when the claims of his rivals ... was considered. He was also party to the preparation of the list of selected candidates in order of preference. At every stage of his participation in the deliberations of the Selection Board there was a conflict between his interest and duty.... The real question is not whether he was biased. It is difficult to prove the state of mind of a person. Therefore what we have to see is whether there is reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been biased.... There must be a reasonable likelihood of bias. In deciding the question of bias we have to take into consideration human probabilities and ordinary course of human conduct.” This Court emphasised that it was not necessary to establish bias but it was sufficient to invalidate the selection process if it could be shown that there was reasonable likelihood of bias. The likelihood of bias may arise on account of proprietary interest or on account of personal reasons, such as, hostility to one party or personal friendship or family relationship with the other. Where reasonable likelihood of bias is alleged on the ground of relationship, the question would always be as to how close is the degree of relationship or in other words, is the nearness of relationship so great as to give rise to reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the authority making the selection.”

13. Procedural fairness is a mandatory ingredient in the administration of justice in order to protect an arbitrary action. Rule of natural justice is not a codified canon. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Canara Bank and Others v. Debasis Das and Others reported in (2003) 4 SCC 557 has held as under: “13. Natural justice is another name for commonsense justice. Rules of natural justice are not codified canons. But they are principles ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration of justice in a common-sense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form. 14. The expressions “natural justice” and “legal justice” do not present a watertight classification. It is the substance of justice which is to be secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated law. As Lord Buckmaster said, no form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigant's defence. 15. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognized by all civilized States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences is in issue. These principles are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alteram partem rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should apprise the party determinatively of the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. It is after all an approved rule of fair play. The concept has gained significance and shades with time. When the historic document was made at Runnymede in 1215, the first statutory recognition of this principle found its way into the “Magna Carta”. The classic exposition of Sir Edward Coke of natural justice requires to “vocate, interrogate and adjudicate”. In the celebrated case of Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of15 Works [(1863) 143 ER 414 : 14 CBNS 180 : (1861-73) All ER Rep Ext 1554] the principle was thus stated: “Even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defence. ‘Adam’ (says God), ‘where art thou? Hast thou not eaten of the tree whereof, I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat?” Since then the principle has been chiselled, honed and refined, enriching its content. Judicial treatment has added light and luminosity to the concept, like polishing of a diamond. 16. Principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing injustice. 17. What is meant by the term “principles of natural justice” is not easy to determine. Lord Summer (then Hamilton, L.J.) in R. v. Local Govt. Board [(1914) 1 KB 160 : 83 LJKB 86] (KB at p. 199) described the phrase as sadly lacking in precision. In General Council of Medical Education & Registration of U.K. v. Spackman [1943 AC 627 : (1943) 2 All ER 337 : 112 LJKB 529 (HL)] Lord Wright observed that it was not desirable to attempt “to force it into any Procrustean bed” and mentioned that one essential requirement was that the Tribunal should be impartial and have no personal interest in the controversy, and further that it should give “a full and fair opportunity” to every party of being heard. 18. Lord Wright referred to the leading cases on the subject. The most important of them is Board of Education v. Rice [1911 AC 179 : 80 LJKB 796 : (191113) All ER Rep 36 (HL)] where Lord Loreburn, L.C. observed as follows: (All ER p. 38 C-F) “Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they have not originated, the practice of imposing upon departments or officers of State the duty of deciding or determining questions of various kinds. It will, I suppose, usually be of an administrative kind; but sometimes it will involve matter of law as well as matter of fact, or even depend upon matter of law alone. In such cases, the Board of Education will have to ascertain the law and also to ascertain the facts. I need not add that in doing either they must act in good faith and listen fairly to both sides, for that is a duty lying upon everyone who decides anything. But I do not think they are bound to treat such a question as though it were a trial. … The Board is in the nature of the arbitral tribunal, and a court of law has no jurisdiction to hear appeals from their determination, either upon law or upon fact. But if the court is satisfied either that the Board have not acted judicially in the way which I have described, or have not determined the question which they are required by the Act to determine, then there is a remedy by mandamus and certiorari.” Lord Wright also emphasized from the same decision the observation of the Lord Chancellor that “the Board can obtain information in any way they think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties to the controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view”. To the same effect are the observations of Earl of Selbourne, L.O. in Spackman v. Plumstead District Board of Works [(1885) 10 AC 229 : 54 LJMC 81 : 53 LT 151] where the learned and noble Lord Chancellor observed as follows: “No doubt, in the absence of special provisions as to how the person who is to decide is to proceed, law will imply no more than that the substantial requirements of justice shall not be violated. He is not a judge in the proper sense of the word; but he must give the parties an opportunity of being heard before him and stating their case and their view. He must give notice when he will proceed with the matter and he must act honestly and impartially and not under the dictation of some other person or persons to whom the authority is not given by law. There must be no malversation of any kind. There would be no decision within the meaning of the statute if there were anything of that sort done contrary to the essence of justice.” Lord Selbourne also added that the essence of justice consisted in requiring that all parties should have an opportunity of submitting to the person by whose decision they are to be bound, such considerations as in their judgment ought to be brought before him. All these cases lay down the very important rule of natural justice contained in the oft quoted phrase “justice should not only be done, but should be seen to be done”. 19. Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. The expression “civil consequences” encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life. 20. Natural justice has been variously defined by different Judges. A few instances will suffice. In Drew v. Drew and Lebura [(1855) 2 Macq 1 : 25 LTOS 282 (HL)] (Macq at p. 8), Lord Cranworth defined it as “universal justice”. In James Dunber Smith v. Her Majesty the Queen [(1877-78) 3 AC 614 (PC)] (AC at p. 623) Sir Robort P. Collier, speaking for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, used the phrase “the requirements of substantial justice”, while in Arthur John Spackman v. Plumstead District Board of Works [(1885) 10 AC 229 : 54 LJMC 81 : 53 LT 151] (AC at p. 240), the Earl of Selbourne, S.C. preferred the phrase “the substantial requirement of justice”. In Vionet v. Barrett [(1885) 55 LJRD 39] (LJRD at p. 41), Lord Esher, M.R. defined natural justice as “the natural sense of what is right and wrong”. While, however, deciding Hookings v. Smethwick Local Board of Health [(1890) 24 QBD 712] Lord Esher, M.R. instead of using the definition given earlier by him in Vionet case [(1885) 55 LJRD 39] chose to define natural justice as “fundamental justice”. In Ridge v. Baldwin [(1963) 1 QB 539 : (1962) 1 All ER 834 : (1962) 2 WLR 716 (CA)] (QB at p. 578), Harman, L.J., in the Court of Appeal countered natural justice with “fair play in action”, a phrase favoured by Bhagwati, J. in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [(1978) 1 SCC 248 : (1978) 2 SCR 621] . In H.K. (An Infant), Re [(1967) 2 QB 617 : (1967) 1 All ER 226 : (1967) 2 WLR 962] (QB at p. 630), Lord Parker, C.J. preferred to describe natural justice as “a duty to act fairly”. In Fairmount Investments Ltd. v. Secy. of State for Environment [(1976) 1 WLR 1255 : (1976) 2 All ER 865 (HL)] Lord Russell of Killowen somewhat picturesquely described natural justice as “a fair crack of the whip” while Geoffrey Lane, L.J. in R. v. Secy. of State for Home Affairs, ex p Hosenball [(1977) 1 WLR 766 : (1977) 3 All ER 452 (CA)] preferred the homely phrase “common fairness”. 21. How then have the principles of natural justice been interpreted in the courts and within what limits are they to be confined? Over the years by a process of judicial interpretation two rules have been evolved as representing the principles of natural justice in judicial process, including therein quasi-judicial and administrative process. They constitute the basic elements of a fair hearing, having their roots in the innate sense of man for fair play and justice which is not the preserve of any particular race or country but is shared in common by all men. The first rule is “nemo judex in causa sua” or “nemo debet esse judex in propria causa sua” as stated in Earl of Derby's case [(1605) 12 Co Rep 114 : 77 ER 1390] that is, “no man shall be a judge in his own cause”. Coke used the form “aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa, quia non potest esse judex et pars” (Co. Litt. 1418), that is, “no man ought to be a judge in his own case, because he cannot act as judge and at the same time be a party”. The form “nemo potest esse simul actor et judex”, that is, “no one can be at once suitor and judge” is also at times used. The second rule is “audi alteram partem”, that is, “hear the other side”. At times and particularly in continental countries, the form “audietur et altera pars” is used, meaning very much the same thing. A corollary has been deduced from the above two rules and particularly the audi alteram partem rule, namely “qui aliquid statuerit, parte inaudita altera acquum licet dixerit, haud acquum fecerit” that is, “he who shall decide anything without the other side having been heard, although he may have said what is right, will not have been what is right” [see Boswel's case [(1605) 6 Co Rep 48b : 77 ER 326] (Co Rep at p. 52-a)] or in other words, as it is now expressed, “justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done”. Whenever an order is struck down as invalid being in violation of principles of natural justice, there is no final decision of the case and fresh proceedings are left upon (sic open). All that is done is to vacate the order assailed by virtue of its inherent defect, but the proceedings are not terminated. 22. What is known as “useless formality theory” has received consideration of this Court in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India [(1999) 6 SCC 237] . It was observed as under: (SCC pp. 245-47, paras 22-23) “22. Before we go into the final aspects of this contention, we would like to state that cases relating to breach of natural justice do also occur where all facts are not admitted or are not all beyond dispute. In the context of those cases there is a considerable case-law and literature as to whether relief can be refused even if the court thinks that the case of the applicant is not one of ‘real substance’ or that there is no substantial possibility of his success or that the result will not be different, even if natural justice is followed see Malloch v. Aberdeen Corpn. [(1971) 2 All ER 1278 : (1971) 1 WLR 1578 (HL)] (per Lord Reid and Lord Wilberforce), Glynn v. Keele University [(1971) 2 All ER 89 : (1971) 1 WLR 487] , Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority [(1980) 2 All ER 368 : (1980) 1 WLR 582 (CA)] and other cases where such a view has been held. The latest addition to this view is R. v. Ealing Magistrates' Court, ex p Fannaran [(1996) 8 Admn LR 351] (Admn LR at p. 358) [see de Smith, Suppl. p. 89 (1998)] where Straughton, L.J. held that there must be ‘demonstrable beyond doubt’ that the result would have been different. Lord Woolf in Lloyd v. McMahon [(1987) 1 All ER 1118 : 1987 AC 625 : (1987) 2 WLR 821 (CA)] has also not disfavoured refusal of discretion in certain cases of breach of natural justice. The New Zealand Court in McCarthy v. Grant [1959 NZLR 1014] however goes halfway when it says that (as in the case of bias), it is sufficient for the applicant to show that there is ‘real likelihood — not certainty — of prejudice’. On the other hand, Garner's Administrative Law (8th Edn., 1996, pp. 271-72) says that slight proof that the result would have been different is sufficient. On the other side of the argument, we have apart from Ridge v. Baldwin [1964 AC 40 : (1963) 2 All ER 66 : (1963) 2 WLR 935 (HL)] , Megarry, J. in John v. Rees [(1969) 2 All ER 274 : 1970 Ch 345 : (1969) 2 WLR 1294] stating that there are always ‘open and shut cases’ and no absolute rule of proof of prejudice can be laid down. Merits are not for the court but for the authority to consider. Ackner, J. has said that the ‘useless formality theory’ is a dangerous one and, however inconvenient, natural justice must be followed. His Lordship observed that ‘convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms’. More recently, Lord Bingham has deprecated the ‘useless formality theory’ in R. v. Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police Forces, ex p Cotton [1990 IRLR 344] by giving six reasons. (See also his article ‘Should Public Law Remedies be Discretionary?’ 1991 PL, p. 64.) A detailed and emphatic criticism of the ‘useless formality theory’ has been made much earlier in ‘Natural Justice, Substance or Shadow’ by Prof. D.H. Clark of Canada (see 1975 PL, pp. 2763) contending that Malloch [(1971) 2 All ER 1278 : (1971) 1 WLR 1578 (HL)] and Glynn [(1971) 2 All ER 89 : (1971) 1 WLR 487] were wrongly decided. Foulkes (Administrative Law, 8th Edn., 1996, p. 323), Craig (Administrative Law, 3rd Edn., p. 596) and others say that the court cannot prejudge what is to be decided by the decision-making authority. de Smith (5th Edn., 1994, paras 10.031 to 10.036) says courts have not yet committed themselves to any one view though discretion is always with the court. Wade (Administrative Law, 5th Edn., 1994, pp. 526-30) says that while futile writs may not be issued, a distinction has to be made according to the nature of the decision. Thus, in relation to cases other than those relating to admitted or indisputable facts, there is a considerable divergence of opinion whether the applicant can be compelled to prove that the outcome will be in his favour or he has to prove a case of substance or if he can prove a ‘real likelihood’ of success or if he is entitled to relief even if there is some remote chance of success. We may, however, point out that even in cases where the facts are not all admitted or beyond dispute, there is a considerable unanimity that the courts can, in exercise of their ‘discretion’, refuse certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or injunction even though natural justice is not followed. We may also state that there is yet another line of cases as in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [(1996) 3 SCC 364 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 717] , Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. [(1996) 5 SCC 460] that even in relation to statutory provisions requiring notice, a distinction is to be made between cases where the provision is intended for individual benefit and where a provision is intended to protect public interest. In the former case, it can be waived while in the case of the latter, it cannot be waived. 23. We do not propose to express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the ‘useless formality’ theory and leave the matter for decision in an appropriate case, inasmuch as in the case before us, ‘admitted and indisputable’ facts show that grant of a writ will be in vain as pointed out by Chinnappa Reddy, J.”

14. Since the respondent No. 6 herself was the Chief Executive Officer of Zila Parishad, Alwar at the time of conducting the recruitment process in the year 2013 and she herself, on becoming the District Collector, Alwar has passed the order for conducting a Preliminary Enquiry and at her instance, the enquiry has been conducted by the three members of the Committee. Such act at the instance of the respondent No. 6 has created apprehension in the mind of the petitioners that the District Collector, Alwar, the respondent No. 6, has acted with bias.

15. It is well established principle, both in Indian Legal Jurisprudence and across the World, that the principles of natural justice must be followed before passing any adverse order against the affected party. The first rule is “nemo judex in causa sua” which means that, no one should be a judge in his own cause. Under these circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the entire Preliminary Enquiry conducted by the Enquiry Officers at the instance of respondent No. 6 is vitiated as the same is struck by the principles of natural justice i.e. nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa.

16. On this count alone, the Preliminary Enquiry and the subsequent proceedings arising out of the same are not sustainable in the eyes of the law and the same are liable to be and are hereby quashed and set aside.

17. The matter is remitted to the State for passing orders for conducting a fresh enquiry by the concerned Officers without including the respondent No. 6 in the entire proceedings.

18. Needless to observe that the entire fresh exercise would be conducted by the State expeditiously within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order.

19. With the aforesaid observations, both writ petitions stand disposed of. Stay applications and all pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.

(ANOOP KUMAR DHAND),J