ICC at the Aggrieved Woman's Workplace Can Inquire Into Complaint Against Officer of Another Department: Supreme Court

The appellant, a 2010-batch Indian Revenue Service officer posted with the Central Board of Direct Taxes, was accused by an IAS officer posted in another Central Government department of sexually harassing her at her workplace in 2023 (paras 2-3, 7). An FIR followed, and she complained to the ICC of her department (paras 4-5). He challenged the ICC's notice of 13.06.2023 before the CAT, saying that only the ICC of his own department could inquire (paras 7-8, 25). The CAT and the Delhi High Court rejected the challenge, and this Court let the inquiry continue with its outcome kept in a sealed cover (paras 8-9, 26-27).

In Section 11(1), 'where' is used in the sense of a situation, not a place, as S.G. Glass Works explained (paras 40-41). The phrase 'where the respondent is an employee' is a procedural trigger directing the ICC to apply his service rules, not a jurisdictional limit, and the section must be read as a whole (paras 44-46). The definitions of 'respondent', 'employee' and 'workplace' do not require both persons to work at the same workplace (paras 47-49). Section 19(h), on facilitating criminal action, does not exclude proceedings under the Act (para 50). As a social welfare law built on Vishaka, the Act cannot force a woman to pursue her remedy before a committee at an alien workplace, which would defeat the wide meaning of 'workplace' in Section 2(o)(v) (paras 53-57). The power to inquire differs from the power to punish: under Section 13 the ICC's report goes to the respondent's employer, which must act on it (para 59). Under the memorandum of 16.07.2015, the ICC first conducts a fact-finding inquiry, and the ICC of the respondent's department may act as inquiring authority in any disciplinary proceedings (paras 62, 65-68). No prejudice to the appellant was shown (para 70).