Dr. Mahipal Singh Sihag v. State Public Information Officer-cum-Commissioner & Anr.

[2026:RJ-JP:16358]

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR

S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5616/2022

Dr. Mahipal Singh Sihag S/o Shri Ramjas Sihag ----Petitioner
Versus
(1) State Public Information Officer-cum-Commissioner, Commissionerate of College Education, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur
(2) Chief Information Commissioner, Rajasthan Information Commission, Jaipur ----Respondents

For Petitioner(s): Dr. Savita Sihag
For Respondent(s): Mr. Chinmay Saxena with Ms. Ritika Naruka for Mr. S.S. Naruka, AAG

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SAMEER JAIN

Judgment

Arguments concluded on: 08/04/2026 | Judgment reserved on: 08/04/2026 | Full judgment pronounced on: 21/04/2026

REPORTABLE

1. The present writ petition has been filed invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court as enshrined under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the legality and validity of the impugned order dated 18.12.2021 passed by the Rajasthan State Information Commission, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as ‘learned Second Appellate Authority’) under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (for short, ‘RTI Act’). By way of the said impugned order, the learned Second Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioner and denied the disclosure of the requested information.

FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE LIS AT HAND

2. Before adverting to the rival submissions and entering upon the realm of arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respective parties, it is considered apposite to delineate the factual background and the circumstances, in a nutshell, which have culminated in the present adjudication. 2.1 The petitioner, vide an RTI application dated 25.02.2020 (Annexure-1) filed under Section 6 of the RTI Act, sought specific details/information pertaining to a third-party individual, namely Dr. Ram Narayan Sharma, who was deputed at the post of Associate Professor, Department of Geography, Rajasthan University situated at Jaipur, Rajasthan and was discharging his duties as Lecturer, Geography in the Department of College Education, Jaipur, Rajasthan. 2.2 The information sought comprised the dates of the lecturer’s joining, which allegedly occurred in the year 1998, and the dates of superannuation/retirement, alongside all corresponding office orders and internal note-sheets containing deliberations regarding these events. 2.3 The Joint Director (HRD), Department of College Education, Rajasthan, Jaipur, vide its reply dated 26.05.2020 (Annexure-2), declined/rejected the said application citing twofold reasons that the required information pertains to an event that occurred more than twenty years prior to the date of application and that the said information pertains to a third-party individual, and therefore, the same cannot be provided as per Section 11 read with Section 8(3) of the RTI Act. 2.4 Against the said rejection order, the petitioner preferred an appeal (Annexure-3) before the learned First Appellate Authority and the same was dismissed vide order dated 24.06.2020 (Annexure-4) on the ground that the required information pertains to a third-party individual, and therefore, the same cannot be provided as per the provisions enshrined under Section 11 of the RTI Act. 2.5 Against the said dismissal order, the petitioner preferred an appeal dated 10.08.2020 (Annexure-5) before the learned Second Appellate Authority and the said appeal also came to be dismissed vide order dated 18.12.2021 (Annexure-6) on the aforementioned grounds as enshrined under Section 11 of the RTI Act. 2.6 Being aggrieved by the said order dated 18.12.2021 passed by the learned Second Appellate Authority, the present petition has been filed.

SUBMISSIONS PUT FORTH ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES

3. At the outset, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the impugned order is ex facie illegal, arbitrary, and the same suffers from patent perversity. It was argued that the learned Second Appellate Authority has misinterpreted the provisions enshrined under Section 8(3) and Section 11 of the RTI Act. It was further submitted that the required information vis-a-vis the dates of joining and retirement of a public servant do not fall under the ambit of “personal information” as they are intrinsically linked to the public activity and public interest and the same should outweigh any possible harm and injury to the interest of the third party. In support of the aforesaid contentions, reliance has been placed upon the dictum enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. Central Information Commissioner & Others, (2013) 1 SCC 212, and in light of above, it was prayed that the present petition should be allowed and the impugned order dated 18.12.2021 should be quashed and set aside.

4. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents vehemently opposed the present petition and it was submitted that the required information could not be provided due to the fact that the same pertains to an event that occurred more than twenty years prior to the date of application, and therefore, the said information cannot be provided as per the provisions enshrined under Section 8(3) of the RTI Act; that the same pertains to a third-party individual; that the petitioner miserably failed to establish any larger public interest before the learned Second Appellate Authority, and therefore, the information sought could not be provided as per the provisions enshrined under Section 11 of the RTI Act. Lastly, it was submitted that the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Girish Ramchandra Deshpande (supra), upon which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, has been misinterpreted, and in fact, the legal position emerging therefrom is supportive of the case of the respondents more than the case of the petitioner. Making the above submissions, it was prayed by learned counsel to dismiss the present writ petition with an exemplary cost.

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

5. Having heard the rival arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties at length and upon assiduous perusal of the material available on record, including but not limited to the impugned order dated 18.12.2021 passed by the learned Second Appellate Authority and considering the judgment cited at the Bar, this Court has formulated the following views:

6. Upon careful examination of the impugned order, it is observed by this Court that the required information sought by the petitioner was denied on multifaceted grounds, one of them being that the information sought pertains to a third-party individual and as the petitioner miserably failed to establish any larger public interest involved, the same could not be provided as per the provisions enshrined under Section 11 of the RTI Act. Moreover, relying upon the reasoning adopted by the learned First Appellate Authority vide order dated 24.06.2020, it was held that as the information sought pertains to an event that occurred more than twenty years prior to the date of application, therefore the same cannot be provided as per the provisions enshrined under Section 8(3) of the RTI Act.

7. Adverting to the exhaustive legal submissions advanced and put forth before this Court, the nitty-gritty of the instant dispute revolves around the interpretation of the learned Second Appellate Authority vis-a-vis Section 11 and Section 8(3) of the RTI Act, and therefore, as a threshold matter, it is pertinent to have a bird’s eye view of the said provisions for the proper and appropriate adjudication of the lis at hand. The relevant extracts of the aforesaid provisions have been reproduced as under: “8. Exemption from disclosure of information.— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, there shall be no obligation to give any citizen,— (a) information, disclosure of which would prejudicially affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security, strategic, scientific or economic interests of the State, relation with foreign State or lead to incitement of an offence; (b) information which has been expressly forbidden to be published by any court of law or tribunal or the disclosure of which may constitute contempt of court; (c) information, the disclosure of which would cause a breach of privilege of Parliament or the State Legislature; (d) information including commercial confidence, trade secrets or intellectual property, the disclosure of which would harm the competitive position of a third party, unless the competent authority is satisfied that larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information; (e) information available to a person in his fiduciary relationship, unless the competent authority is satisfied that the larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information; (f) information received in confidence from foreign Government; (g) information, the disclosure of which would endanger the life or physical safety of any person or identify the source of information or assistance given in confidence for law enforcement or security purposes; (h) information which would impede the process of investigation or apprehension or prosecution of offenders; (i) cabinet papers including records of deliberations of the Council of Ministers, Secretaries and other officers: Provided that the decisions of Council of Ministers, the reasons thereof, and the material on the basis of which the decisions were taken shall be made public after the decision has been taken, and the matter is complete, or over: Provided further that those matters which come under the exemptions specified in this section shall not be disclosed; (j) information which relates to personal information the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual unless the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or the appellate authority, as the case may be, is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information: Provided that the information which cannot be denied to the Parliament or a State Legislature shall not be denied to any person. (2) Notwithstanding anything in the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (19 of 1923) nor any of the exemptions permissible in accordance with sub-section (1), a public authority may allow access to information, if public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm to the protected interests. (3) Subject to the provisions of clauses (a), (c) and (i) of sub-section (1), any information relating to any occurrence, event or matter which has taken place, occurred or happened twenty years before the date on which any request is made under section 6 shall be provided to any person making a request under that section: Provided that where any question arises as to the date from which the said period of twenty years has to be computed, the decision of the Central Government shall be final, subject to the usual appeals provided for in this Act.” (emphasis supplied) “11. Third party information.— (1) Where a Central Public Information Officer or a State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, intends to disclose any information or record, or part thereof on a request made under this Act, which relates to or has been supplied by a third party and has been treated as confidential by that third party, the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, shall, within five days from the receipt of the request, give a written notice to such third party of the request and of the fact that the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, intends to disclose the information or record, or part thereof, and invite the third party to make a submission in writing or orally, regarding whether the information should be disclosed, and such submission of the third party shall be kept in view while taking a decision about disclosure of information: Provided that except in the case of trade or commercial secrets protected by law, disclosure may be allowed if the public interest in disclosure outweighs in importance any possible harm or injury to the interests of such third party. (2) Where a notice is served by the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, under sub-section (1) to a third party in respect of any information or record or part thereof, the third party shall, within ten days from the date of receipt of such notice, be given the opportunity to make representation against the proposed disclosure. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 7, the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, shall, within forty days after receipt of the request under section 6, if the third party has been given an opportunity to make representation under sub-section (2), make a decision as to whether or not to disclose the information or record or part thereof and give in writing the notice of his decision to the third party. (4) A notice given under sub-section (3) shall include a statement that the third party to whom the notice is given is entitled to prefer an appeal under section 19 against the decision.” (emphasis supplied)

8. Upon careful examination of the impugned order dated 18.12.2021 passed by the learned Second Appellate Authority, it has been observed that the dismissal of the petitioner’s appeal therein rests on two foundational pillars, both of which exhibit varying degrees of legal infirmity when subjected to rigorous judicial scrutiny of the provisions enshrined under the relevant statute, i.e., the RTI Act.

9. The first pillar invokes the privacy exemption, claiming that the third-party employment details are inherently shielded from disclosure to prevent an unwarranted invasion of privacy. This brings into sharp focus Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, which exempts personal information that has no relation to any public activity or public interest, or which would cause an unwarranted invasion of privacy, unless the Central Public Information Officer (for short, ‘CPIO’) or the learned Appellate Authority is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies such disclosure. The validity of denial of the information/rejection of the appeal in the instant matter hinges upon whether dates of joining and retirement of one Dr. Ram Narayan Sharma, along with ancillary and incidental note-sheets, meet the threshold of “personal information”.

10. The second pillar of the impugned order asserts that the information sought by the petitioner cannot be provided because it pertains to an event that occurred over twenty years prior to the date of filing of the application. This specific reasoning highlights a profound misinterpretation of the provision enshrined under Section 8(3) of the RTI Act. Upon an assiduous perusal of the said provision, as reproduced above, this Court is of the view that it is a sunset clause intended to lift exemptions and not a statutory bar to impose them. The learned Authorities i.e., the First Appellate Authority and the Second Appellate Authority, have weaponized a provision meant to guarantee disclosure after a temporal lapse, contorting it into a ground of blanket denial and the same amounts to the blatant disregard and misapplication of the statutory provisions. The said finding passed by the learned Second Appellate Authority is ill-reasoned and legally absurd. Section 8(3) of the RTI Act explicitly mandates that any information relating to any occurrence or event that happened twenty years before the date of the request shall be provided, operating as a mandatory sunset clause for the majority of the exemptions enshrined under Section 8(1) of the RTI Act. Such a blatant statutory misapplication demonstrates a profound non-application of mind and an absolute failure to appreciate the legal provisions enshrined under the RTI Act.

11. The legislative intent behind Section 8(3) is unambiguous: the passage of twenty years acts as a mandatory sunset clause for the majority of the exemptions listed under Section 8(1). Information that might have been fiercely protected from public view under the guise privileged and confidential information must be thrust into the public domain once a period of two decades have elapsed. The only enduring exemptions that survive the twenty-year period, as per the literal text of the statute, are those pertaining to national security and sovereignty [Section 8(1)(a)], parliamentary privilege [Section 8(1)(c)], and cabinet papers [Section 8(1)(i)]. Therefore, the finding given by the learned Second Appellate Authority’s that the passage of twenty years serves as a justification for denying the information demonstrates a fundamental ignorance of the law as Section 8(3) categorically operates to facilitate disclosure, removing conditional exemptions after the specified time has elapsed.

12. In this regard, it is pertinent to refer to the landmark dictum encapsulated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Central Board of Secondary Education & Anr. v. Aditya Bandopadhyaya & Ors., (2011) 8 SCC 497, wherein dealing with the legal contours and the twenty-year rule as enshrined under Section 8(3) of the RTI Act, it has categorically been held as under: “57. Section 8(3) provides that information relating to any occurrence, event or matters which has taken place and occurred or happened twenty years before the date on which any request is made under section 6, shall be provided to any person making a request. This means that where any information required to be maintained and preserved for a period beyond twenty years under the rules of the public authority, is exempted from disclosure under any of the provisions of section 8(1) of RTI Act, then, notwithstanding such exemption, access to such information shall have to be provided by disclosure thereof, after a period of twenty years except where they relate to information falling under clauses (a), (c) and (i) of section 8(1). 58. In other words, section 8(3) provides that any protection against disclosure that may be available, under clauses (b), (d) to (h) and (j) of section 8(1) will cease to be available after twenty years in regard to records which are required to be preserved for more than twenty years. Where any record or information is required to be destroyed under the rules and regulations of a public authority prior to twenty years, section 8(3) will not prevent destruction in accordance with the Rules...” (emphasis supplied

13. Inasmuch as the legal position is no longer res integra, it is unequivocally established that Section 8(3) of the RTI Act is a sunset clause which operates fundamentally as an avenue qua the disclosure of existing records that have survived the test of time, rather than a blanket statutory bar or standalone ground for denial of the information. It is not the case of the respondents that they are not in the possession of the information sought by the petitioner as it pertains to twenty years prior to the date of application, therefore, blanket denial under Section 8(3) of the RTI Act is unwarranted.

14. Moreover, the learned Second Appellate Authority committed a grave error in bypassing the mandatory procedural safeguards as enshrined under Section 11 of the RTI Act, failing to issue notice and afford the third party an opportunity of hearing. If the public authority determines, upon reviewing the un-severed documents, that certain segments of the information sought contain confidential third-party information and that the third-party individual, lecturer in the instant case, may object to disclosing such information, the learned authority has adhered to the procedure outlined in Section 11 of the RTI Act. The learned Second Appellate Authority cannot act as a proxy defender of privacy without consulting the affected third-party. The third-party must be issued a formal notice and afforded an opportunity to present privacy defenses. The learned Second Appellate Authority must then objectively balance these defenses against the larger public interest, producing a reasoned and speaking order that reflects the harmonization inter se them.

15. Trite it is to say, the mandatory procedural safeguards as prescribed under Section 11 of the RTI Act has comprehensively been dealt with by the Hon’ble Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal, (2020) 5 SCC 481, wherein it was categorically held that the procedure enshrined under Section 11 is not just a mere formality but a mandatory statutory safeguard necessary to balance the transparency with the right to privacy. The relevant extracts from the said dictum collectively elucidate the rigorous procedural mandate, and read as under: “68. In R.K. Jain v. Union of India, the applicant had sought inspection of documents relating to Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) of a Member of Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) and follow-up action taken by the authorities based on the ACRs. The information sought was treated as personal information, which, except in cases involving overriding public interest, could not be disclosed. It was observed that the procedure under Section 11 of the RTI Act in such cases has to be followed. The matter was remitted to examine the aspect of larger public interest and to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 11 of the RTI Act which, it was held, was mandatory. 71. In Arvind Kejriwal v. Central Public Information Officer, the Delhi High Court had examined and interpreted Section 11 of the RTI Act in the following manner: “12. Sections 11(1), (2), (3) and (4) are the procedural provisions which have to be complied with by the PIO/appellant authority, when they are required to apply the said test and give a finding whether information should be disclosed or not disclosed. If the said aspect is kept in mind, we feel there would be no difficulty in interpreting Section 11(1) and the so called difficulties or impartibility as pointed out by the appellant will evaporate and lose significance. This will be also in consonance with the primary rule of interpretation that the legislative intent is to be gathered from language employed in a statute which is normally the determining factor. The presumption is that the legislature has stated what it intended to state and has made no mistake. (See Prakash Nath Khanna vs. CIT, (2004) 9 SCC 686; and several judgments of Supreme Court cited in B. Premanand and Ors. vs. Mohan Koikal and Ors.) 13. Read in this manner, what is stipulated by Section 11(1) is that when an information seeker files an application which relates to or has been supplied by third party, the PIO has to examine whether the said information is treated as confidential or can be treated as confidential by the third party. If the answer is in the possible sphere of affirmative or “maybe yes”, then the procedure prescribed in Section 11 has to be followed for determining whether the larger public interest requires such disclosure. When information per se or ex facie cannot be regarded as confidential, then the procedure under section 11 is not to be followed. All information relating to or furnished by a third party need not be confidential for various reasons including the factum that it is already in public domain or in circulation, right of third party is not affected or by law is required to be disclosed etc. The aforesaid interpretation takes care of the difficulties visualised by the appellant like marks obtained in an examination, list of BPL families, etc. In such cases, normally plea of privacy or confidentiality does not arise as the said list has either been made public, available in the public domain or has been already circulated to various third parties. On the other hand, in case the word “or” is read as “and”, it may lead to difficulties and problems, including invasion of right of privacy/confidentiality of a third party. For example, a public authority may have in its records, medical reports or prescriptions relating to third person but which have not been supplied by the third person. If the interpretation given by the appellant is accepted then such information can be disclosed to the information seeker without following the procedure prescribed in Section 11(1) as the information was not furnished or supplied by the third person. Such examples can be multiplied. Furthermore, the difficulties and anomalies pointed out can even arise when the word “or” is read as “and” in cases where the information is furnished by the third party. For example, for being enrolled as a BPL family, information may have been furnished by the third party who is in the list of BPL families. Therefore, the reasonable and proper manner of interpreting Section 11(1) is to keep in mind the test stipulated by the proviso. It has to be examined whether information can be treated and regarded as being of confidential nature, if it relates to a third party or has been furnished by a third party. Read in this manner, when information relates to a third party and can be prima facie regarded and treated as confidential, the procedure under Section 11(1) must be followed. Similarly, in case information has been provided by the third party and has been prima facie treated by the said third party as confidential, again the procedure prescribed under Section 11(1) has to be followed. xx xx xx 16. Thus, Section 11(1) postulates two circumstances when the procedure has to be followed. Firstly when the information relates to a third party and can be prima facie regarded as confidential as it affects the right of privacy of the third party. The second situation is when information is provided and given by a third party to a public authority and prima facie the third party who has provided information has treated and regarded the said information as confidential. The procedure given in Section 11(1) applies to both cases.” 83. The aforesaid passages highlight the relevance of confidentiality in the government and its functioning. However, this is not to state that plea of confidentiality is an absolute bar, for in terms of proviso to Section 11(1) of the RTI Act, the PIO has to undertake the balancing exercise and weigh the advantages and benefits of disclosing the information with the possible harm or injury to the third party on the information being disclosed. We have already referred to the general approach on the right of access to government records under the heading “Section 8(1)(j) and Section 11 of the RTI Act” with reference to the decisions of the High Court of Australia in John Fairfax and Sons Ltd. (supra). 96. In the RTI Act, in the absence of any positive indication as to the considerations which the PIO has to bear in mind while making a decision, the legislature had intended to vest a general discretion in the PIO to weigh the competing interests, which is to be limited only by the object, scope and purpose of the protection and the right to access information and in Section 11(1), the ‘possible’ harm and injury to the third party. It imports a discretionary value judgment on the part of the PIO and the appellate forums as it mandates that any conclusion arrived at must be fair and just by protecting each right which is required to be upheld in public interest. There is no requirement to take a fortiori view that one trumps the other.” (emphasis supplied)

16. In view of the overarching facts and the aforementioned dictum passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the learned Second Appellate Authority has to follow the mandatory statutory procedure prescribed under Section 11 of the RTI Act, and has to subsequently pass a reasoned and speaking order balancing the horizons of right to privacy and larger public interest.

17. Adverting to the dictum passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Girish Ramchandra Deshpande (supra), upon which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, this Court finds itself in consonance with the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent that the said reliance is misplaced and the aforesaid dictum is supportive of the case of the respondent more than the case of the petitioner. However, the said dictum vide its paragraphs 13 and 14, categorically held that although the onus to establish that the information sought is in the larger public interest lies upon the applicant, but if the learned Appellate Authority deems fit that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of the information sought, appropriate orders could be passed in light of the same. Hence, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also recognized that the learned Appellate Authority, after considering the facts and circumstances of the case, has to pass an appropriate, well-reasoned, and speaking order while rejecting or allowing the appeal preferred by the petitioner. The relevant extracts of the aforesaid dictum are reproduced as under: “13. We are in agreement with the CIC and the courts below that the details called for by the petitioner i.e. copies of all memos issued to the third respondent, show cause notices and orders of censure/punishment etc. are qualified to be personal information as defined in clause (j) of Section 8(1) of the RTI Act. The performance of an employee/officer in an organization is primarily a matter between the employee and the employer and normally those aspects are governed by the service rules which fall under the expression “personal information”, the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or public interest. On the other hand, the disclosure of which would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of that individual. Of course, in a given case, if the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer of the Appellate Authority is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information, appropriate orders could be passed but the petitioner cannot claim those details as a matter of right. 14. The details disclosed by a person in his income tax returns are “personal information” which stand exempted from disclosure under clause (j) of Section 8(1) of the RTI Act, unless involves a larger public interest and the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or the Appellate Authority is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information.” (emphasis supplied)

PARTING NOTE AND CONCLUSION

18. Before parting, this Court deems it apposite to express its strong deprecation of the manner in which the learned Second Appellate Authority has adjudicated the statutory appeal in the instant matter. By absurdly weaponizing the twenty-year mandate as enshrined under Section 8(3) of the RTI Act, a clause which is meant for the disclosure, the learned Second Appellate Authority has acted contrary to the very spirit of the legislation and wrongly upheld the order passed by the learned First Appellate Authority qua non-disclosure of the information sought by the petitioner without any cogent and justifiable reasoning. It is sorry state of affairs that such cavalier and ill-founded interpretations of the statutory provisions by the learned Appellate Authorities place an unnecessary and vexatious burden upon the citizens and they are compelled to approach the Constitutional Courts.

19. In view of the foregoing discussion and findings, this Court is of the view that the said impugned order suffers from patent illegality and jurisdictional overreach.

20. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 18.12.2021 passed by the learned Second Appellate Authority is hereby quashed and set aside.

21. As the information sought pertains to more than twenty years prior to the date of application, and considering that a period of approximately six years has already been passed from the date of application filed under Section 6 of the RTI Act, the learned Second Appellate Authority or the Competent Authority of the respondents is/are directed to supply a copy of the information sought to the petitioner as per the provisions enshrined under Section 8 of the RTI Act within an upper limit of sixty (60) days from the date of passing of this order.

22. In light of the foregoing facts and circumstances, the present writ petition stands allowed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed.

23. Registrar (Judicial) is directed to send a copy of the present order to the learned Second Appellate Authority i.e., Rajasthan State Information Commission, Jaipur, for necessary compliance.

(SAMEER JAIN),J