Judgment Intelligence
Petition Dismissed
Karamjit Singh v. State (Delhi Administration)
Criminal Appeal No. 11 of 2000; cited as (2003) 5 SCC 291
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of Decision
- 26 March 2003
- Bench
- Justices S. Rajendra Babu and G.P. Mathur
- Relevant Acts & Sections
- Explosive Substances Act, 1908 — Sections 3, 4, 5; Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 — Sections 3, 5
Final Outcome
The appeal was dismissed; the Designated Court's judgment convicting and sentencing the appellant was upheld (para 11).
Brief Facts
On secret information that the appellant, a driver in the Delhi Police, was sheltering terrorists and keeping explosives, a police raiding party watched his locked quarter on 8 November 1990 (para 2). When he arrived he tried to run, was overpowered, and opened the door and a locked steel box in the bedroom, which held explosives, detonators fitted with wires, timers, splinters and tools (para 2). The Designated Court convicted him under Sections 3 and 4 of the Explosive Substances Act and Sections 3 and 5 of TADA and imposed concurrent sentences of up to five years and six months (para 1). The recovery witnesses were all police officers (para 8).
Court's Findings
The quarter allotted to the appellant's father-in-law was proved to have been given to the appellant, who lived there with his wife, and three raiding officers deposed that he opened both locks; this "conclusively establishes the charge" (para 7). The objection that all recovery witnesses were police personnel was "too broadly stated": their testimony "should be treated in the same manner as testimony of any other witness", and no rule of law requires independent corroboration (para 8). It is "not a proper judicial approach to distrust and suspect them without good grounds", and everything depends on the facts of each case (para 8). In November 1990, with terrorism at its peak, public reluctance to join the raid was natural; the defence suggested no motive for false implication of a fellow officer (para 8). A stray answer on timing in one witness's cross-examination, given nearly four years later, did not discredit the others (para 9). As the appellant held the quarter and the key to the box, the articles were in his possession (para 10).
Legal Principle
Evidence of police witnesses is assessed like that of any other witness. There is no rule of law that it must be corroborated by independent witnesses, and the presumption of honesty applies to police officers too; reliability depends on the facts of each case (para 8).