Breach of Promise Is Not False Promise: Supreme Court's Test for Rape on Pretext of Marriage

On 10 May 1995 the 19-year-old prosecutrix left home to go with the appellant to Kurukshetra to marry; she said he had intercourse with her at Karna lake and then at his relatives' house in Kurukshetra, until he threw her out (paras 2, 5). After a stay at a university hostel she met him again and agreed to go to Ambala to marry in court, but her father and the police intercepted them at the Kurukshetra bus stand (paras 2, 4). The Karnal trial court convicted him under Sections 365 and 376 IPC with seven years' rigorous imprisonment for rape, and the Punjab and Haryana High Court affirmed (para 1).

The Court found material contradictions in the evidence and noted that the prosecutrix had never raised a grievance before anyone at any stage (paras 11, 13). On the undisputed facts she was 19, inclined towards the appellant, went with him willingly to marry, and the relationship developed with her consent (para 14). Section 114-A of the Evidence Act was not attracted; the only question was whether consent was obtained on a false promise of marriage, read with Section 90 IPC (para 15). Drawing on Uday, Deelip Singh, Yedla Srinivasa Rao and Pradeep Kumar Verma, it held that a court must distinguish a mere breach of promise from a false promise made at the outset only to satisfy lust (paras 16, 18). There must be adequate evidence that, at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention of marrying; failure to keep a promise about an uncertain future date does not always amount to misconception of fact (para 21). As in Uday, nothing showed such an intent: she was on her way to marry him at Ambala when they were caught, so the false-promise allegation could not stand (paras 22-24).